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Abstract
Smartphones are commonly used within business environments nowadays. They provide sophis-
ticated communicational means which go far beyond simple telephone capabilities. Email access
and particular apps on the device are examples of their versatile abilities. While these features
allow them to be used in a very flexible way, e.g. in di↵erent infrastructures, they impose new
threats to their surrounding infrastructure. For example, if used in an environment which allows
the installation of custom apps, malicious software may be placed on the device. In order to
mitigate these threats, a detailed awareness combined with the possibility to enforce certain
constraints on such devices need to be established. In detail, it is necessary to include such de-
vices into a decision making process which decides about the policy compliance of such devices.
The policy used in this process defines the rules which apply to the particular infrastructure,
e.g. if custom apps are allowed or if a specific software version may not be allowed. However,
even when relying on this process, there is one limitation as it does not include a trust-based
evaluation. This leads to the problem that a malicious smartphone might compromise the infor-
mation used for the decision making process which should determine the policy compliance of
this device. This renders the overall approach ine↵ective as the decision wether a device is policy
compliant or not may be false. Given that, the thesis presented here provides means to evaluate
the trustworthiness of such information to allow a trustworthy decision making about the policy
compliance. It therefore introduces two things: (1) a generic trust model for such environments
and (2) a domain-specific extension called Trustworthy Context-related Signature and Anomaly
Detection system for Smartphones (TCADS). The trust model (1) allows to specify, to calculate
and to evaluate trust for the information used by the decision making process. More in detail,
the trust founding process of (1) is done by introducing so-called security properties which allow
to rate the trustworthiness of certain aspects. The trust model does not limit these aspects
to a particular type. That is, device-specific aspects like the number of installed apps or the
current version of the operating system may be used as well as device independent aspects like
communicational parameters. The security properties defined in (1) are then used to calculate
an overall trust level, which provides an evaluable representation of trust for the information
used by the decision making process. The domain-specific extension (2) uses the trust model
and provides a deployable trust-aware decision making solution for smartphone environments.
The resulting system, TCADS, allows not only to consider trust within the decisions about the
policy compliance but also enables to base the decisions solely on the trust itself. Besides the
theoretical specification of the trust model (1) and the domain-specific extension (2), a proof of
concept implementation is given. This implementation leverages both, the abilities of the generic
trust model (1) as well as the abilities of the TCADS system (2), thus providing a deployable
set of programs. Using this proof of concept implementation, an assessment shows the benefits
of the proposed concept and its practical relevance. A conclusion and an outlook to future work




Smartphones sind in heutigen Unternehmensnetzen mittlerweile nicht mehr wegzudenken. Über
einfache Telefonie-basierte Fähigkeiten hinaus bieten sie Eigenschaften wie zum Beispiel Email-
Zugri↵ oder hohe Anpassbarkeit auf Basis von Apps. Obwohl diese Funktionalitäten eine viel-
seitige Nutzung solcher Smartphones erlauben, stellen sie gleichzeitig eine neuartige Bedro-
hung für die umgebende Infrastruktur dar. Erlaubt eine spezifische Umgebung beispielsweise
die Installation von eigenen Apps auf dem Smartphone, so ist es über diesen Weg möglich,
Schadprogramme auf dem Gerät zu platzieren. Um diesen Bedrohungen entgegenzuwirken, ist
es zum einen nötig Smartphones in der jeweiligen Umgebung zu erkennen und zum anderen,
Richtlinien auf den jeweiligen Geräten durchsetzen zu können. Die durchzusetzenden Richtlin-
ien legen fest, welche Einschränkungen für die jeweilige Umgebung gelten, z.B. die Erlaubnis
zur Installation von eigenen Apps oder die Benutzung einer bestimmten Softwareversion. Aber
auch wenn eine entsprechende Lösung zur Einbeziehung von Smartphones in die Infrastruk-
tur verwendet wird, bleibt ein Problem ungelöst: die Betrachtung der Vertrauenswürdigkeit
von durch das Smartphone bereitgestellten Informationen. Diese Einschränkung führt zu dem
Problem, dass ein entsprechend kompromittiertes Smartphone die Informationen, welche zur
Entscheidungsfindung über die Richtlinienkonformität des Gerätes verwendet werden, in einer
Art undWeise ändert, welche den gesamten Entscheidungsprozess ine zient und somit wirkungs-
los macht. Die hier vorliegende Arbeit stellt daher einen neuen Ansatz vor um einen ver-
trauenswürdigen Entscheidungsprozess zur Regelkonformität des Gerätes zu ermöglichen. Im
Detail werden dazu zwei Ansätze vorgestellt: (1) Ein generisches Modell für Vertrauensürdigkeit
sowie eine (2) domänenspezifische Abbildung dieses Modells, welches als Trustworthy Context-
related Signature and Anomaly Detection system for Smartphones (TCADS) bezeichnet wird.
Das Modell für Vertrauenswürdigkeit (1) erlaubt die Definition, Berechnung und Auswertung von
Vetrauenswürdigkeit für Informationen welche im Entscheidungsprozess verwendet werden.Im
Detail basiert die Vertrauenswürdigkeitsbestimmung auf Grundfaktoren für Vertrauen, den so-
genannten Sicherheitseigenschaften. Diese Eigenschaften bewerten die Vertrauenswürdigkeit an-
hand von bestimmten Aspekten die entweder Gerätespezifisch und Geräteunabhängig sein können.
Basierend auf dieser Bewertung wird dann eine Gesamtvertrauenswürdigkeit, der sogenannte
Trust Level berechnet. Dieser Trust Level erlaubt die Berücksichtigung der Vertrauenswürdigkeit
bei der Entscheidungsfindung. Teil (2) der Lösung stellt, basierend auf dem Modell der Ver-
trauenswürdigkeit, ein System zur vertrauensbasierten Entscheidungsfindung in Smartphone
Umgebungen bereit. Mit diesem System, TCADS, ist es nicht nur möglich, Entscheidungen auf
ihre Korrektheit bezüglich der Vertrauenswürdigkeit zu prüfen, sondern auch Entscheidungen
komplett auf Basis der Vertrauenswürdigkeit zu fällen. Neben dem allgemeingültigen Modell
(1) und dem daraus resultierenden domänenspezifischen System (2), stellt die Arbeit außerdem
einen Tragfähigkeitsnachweis in Form einer Referenzimplementierung bereit. Diese Implemen-
tierung nutzt sowohl Fähigkeiten des Modells der Vertrauenswürdigkeit (1) als auch des TCADS
Systems (2) und stellt ein nutzbares Set von Programmen bereit. Eine Evaluierung basierend
auf diesem Tragfähigkeitsnachweis zeigt die Vorteile und die Praktikabilität der vorgestellten
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This chapter gives an introduction to the thesis. First, the motivation is explained
outlining the problems which arise when integrating smartphones into a business infras-
tructure. Based on these findings, the second part presents the research questions which
are addressed within this thesis. Finally, the outline of the thesis including a short overview
of each chapter is given.
1.1 Motivation
Smartphones are commonly used nowadays, not only within the private sector but also
in business infrastructures (cf. [1]). Due to this and the special properties of such phones,
like the app-centric architecture and their versatile usage profile, providers of such infras-
tructures need to pay attention to them. In particular, the threats which are imposed by
such devices are di↵erent to other threats in such infrastructures [2]. Taken the current
situation concerning smartphones, there is a huge amount of di↵erent types of threats for
such devices [3]. It starts with the operating system of the device itself, like the Android
operating system [4], that has become the most popular mobile OS with a current market
share of about 68 percent [5, 6], being itself vulnerable to certain attacks. For example,
particular Android OS versions have been vulnerable to an attack which could be trig-
gered by special data sent to Android’s volume manager allowing to gain root access [7].
This provides a way to perform a privilege escalation attack (cf. [8]). Another example,
which came up during the time of writing this thesis is an insu ciently protected memory
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access on some of Samsung’s Android-based phones. It allows an attacker to gain root
access out of an app by accessing the memory [9]. A detailed analysis about the prob-
lems with Android’s OS can be found in [10, 11]. In addition, even higher level parts of
the OS might provide a possibility for attackers to compromise the device and use it for
their purposes. Android uses so-called permissions to limit the rights that a program (i.e.
an app) has on the system. A flaw of this system presented in [12] can be used to gain
additional rights with a consequence that a program may behave in an unexpected way.
Even if mitigating the threats which are caused by the operating system itself, there are
additional problems which need to be taken into account when dealing with smartphones.
Their specialised architecture, which condenses most functionality in apps, introduces an-
other group of threats: the so-called malapps. Malapps allow an attacker to use the smart-
phone for their purposes without the legitimate user of the smartphone having knowledge
about this. For example, Schlegel et al. [13] present a malapp called soundcomber. This
malapp acts unnoticed on the phone and allows to record the sound from the phone’s
microphone. While this may be not critical at first view, it can be used to mount so-called
sensor sni ng attacks (cf. [14]). If carried out in the appropriate environment, e.g. during
a business meeting where a company’s internal planning is discussed, this could have a
rather critical impact. The presented types of attacks are not only common to Android-
based devices but can also be found for other device types. Given the iOS operating
system used on Apple’s devices like the iPhone or the iPad, the iSAM approach explained
in [15] provides a combined attack by first jailbreaking (i.e. removing the manufacturers
restrictions, cf. [16]) the device and afterwards by installing a malapp. More examples
for malware, not only for Android and iOS but also for Symbian-based devices are given
in [17]. These examples show two things: (1) the compromise of smartphone devices is
not limited to a particular type (i.e. OS or manufacturer) and (2) with the smartphone’s
platforms developing further, the threats develop as well. Moreover, when integrating such
devices into network-based infrastructures, these devices have to be managed as well. In
particular, smartphones render a special class of devices and must be treated in a proper
way if including them into a network-based environment. Current approaches provide a
way of performing a network-based management along with an intrusion detection for
this class of devices. That is, a decision making about the smartphone’s compliance with
the network’s policy is performed. This is done by collecting certain kind of informa-
tion (i.e. properties, cf. [2]) from such devices, like the installed apps or their operating
2
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system. In addition, information provided by the other components within the network
is also used. Examples for these kind of information sources may be the intrusion de-
tection systems or components like the DHCP server or the DNS server. By using the
combination of the smartphone and network-based information, an overall view of the
network is provided. This view does include the smartphones as well as the other network
components. Approaches like the CADS system [2, 18, 19] provide this view. Besides the
network-based view, complex policies can usually be defined. These policies are used for
handling smartphone devices within the infrastructure. Handling refers to a range of ac-
tions which can be taken after making a decision about the device’s compliance to such
policies. These actions range from a simple monitoring of a smartphone to a complex
enforcement including a whole set of components. Furthermore, approaches are based on
collecting information from a set of components, not only from the smartphones but also
from components within the infrastructure. For example, if a phone uses a certain service
of the network, these services provide information about the usage. The service usage may
be monitored, and if the usage exceeds certain limits or other constraints, like the physical
access location of the smartphone, an action is triggered. Although this provides a holis-
tic, policy-based decision making process, another problem is identified. The information
collected from the particular sources is not distinguished in terms of trustworthiness. The
assumption of the system is, that every collected information is true and trustworthy.
This may be appropriate for certain scenarios. However, it is a limited view when con-
sidering the problems above, as the information is provided by di↵erent sources like the
smartphones itself or the infrastructure. If one of these sources is compromised, it may
provide false information. This false information would afterwards being used within a
decision making process. The compromise of such a source may be either intentionally or
unintentionally. An attack which was successfully carried out is only one example for an
intended compromise. An unintentional compromise could be due to a misconfiguration
of the system. Given the smartphones itself, they are commonly more threatened than
the infrastructure-based components which are statically residing at one place and do not
o↵er the same versatility as the smartphones. For example, the malapps which have been
mentioned above, may be enhanced to compromise the information collection process on
the smartphone. This becomes even more critical, when considering approaches like bring
your own device (BYOD, cf. [20]), which allows employees to use their own equipment, in
particular their own smartphone, within the company’s infrastructure. Due to the fact,
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that this employee uses that device for multiple tasks, including personal ones where se-
curity considerations are not enforced (i.e, security considerations may play a minor role)
there is a rather high chance of the device becoming compromised. Furthermore, devices
used by employees which are provided by the company get usually administered by the
company’s IT support. This is not the case when allowing a BYOD strategy. Given all
that, it is necessary to di↵erentiate between the trustworthiness of the data independently
from where this data was collected. In case of BYOD, it needs to be distinguished between
data collected at devices which are administered by the company and employee-owned de-
vices. This would improve the decision making process that is based on these information
essentially. At first, it would be more reliable against attacks which aim on providing false
information leading to a false decision, thus addressing issues like false positive and false
negative rates. Furthermore, the measured trust itself can be interpreted as data which
influences the decision making process for a more versatile system.
1.2 Research Questions
There are three research questions which are addressed in this thesis:
1. Which data and characteristics can be used to derive trust?
2. How can trust be defined and calculated?
3. How is it possible to use trust in the decision making process?
The first question deals with the problems of analysing the basis (e.g. data, characteristics
of smartphones, environment) for the calculation of trust. More precisely, if a device
is compromised, certain characteristics of this device indicate this. For example, if a
smartphone is compromised by a malapp, the running processes would indicate this. In
this case, the processes represent a characteristic of the device. Such characteristics can be
used as factors, influencing the device’s trustworthiness. By providing several of these fine
grained low level trust factors which do not only address the component (i.e. the device)
but also the communication channel of this device, an adequate basis is given. This is
done in detail in section 4.2.2. Due to the fact, that there are several trust deriving factors
provided and not only one, answering this part leads to the second research question.
4
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This second question deals with the problem of the trust definition and calculation. The
basic definition of trust is given in section 4.2.1. A more refined version of this definition,
which includes the findings for answering the first research question is given in 4.2.3. If
trust can be derived, which is done by answering the first question, there must be a way
to calculate trust. This is necessary to combine the single characteristics addressed in the
first question into a usable trust value. Section 4.2.3 explains the process that is used
to answer this question. As a result, a trust level describing the trustworthiness of data
is provided. Furthermore, as it is likely that trust is not based on only one single factor
(i.e. characteristics of the device) but on a varying set of factors, answering this question
provides a way of combining these factors into an evaluable trust measurement.
Although addressing the first two questions allows to derive and calculate trust, there
is no method of actually using this trust evaluation within a decision making process.
Answering the third question provides this method of using trust in the decision mak-
ing process. In detail, a way is given to express a domain-specific trust measurement
which can be included into the scenario’s decision making process. Sections 4.3 and 4.4
answer this question by giving a generic data representation of the trust model and a
domain-specific extension. The domain-specific extension combines all previous results
into an actually usable system, which allows a trust-aware decision making. Furthermore,
necessary components are introduced and explained within these sections.
By answering all three questions, it is possible to collect data and evaluate this data in
terms of their trustworthiness, particularly in relevant scenarios.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is organised as shown in figure 1.1. Chapter 1 emphasises the general situa-
tion when using and managing smartphones in business environments. Chapter 2 deals
with the particular use cases: First of all, the reference infrastructure, which defines the
basic environment, is introduced. Based on this reference infrastructure, four particular
scenarios are analysed: the first deals with general trustworthiness of collected informa-
tion, the second deals with expressing policy-based decisions, the third shows a way to
provide tailored services and finally, the fourth shows a forensic-based approach. Sum-
marising this, the chapter is finished with the identification of the overall requirements
that need to be fulfilled in order to solve the problems described. The current state of
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Figure 1.1: Outline of the thesis. Chapters are shown dashed with the appropriate sections
(rectangles) inside them. Arrows depict the common thread and the usage of
particular results from previous chapters and sections.
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the art in research and technology is analysed in chapter 3. The relevant related work
is categorised and analysed in terms of the fulfilment of the requirements stated in the
previous chapter. The chapter is finished with a conclusion of the requirements and their
fulfilment by the related work as well as the technological-based approaches. Based on
these findings, a generic trust model and a domain-specific extension of this model is
developed in chapter 4. The trust model introduces a trust evaluation system. In detail,
it combines basic (i.e. low level) trust factors to high level trust values which allow to
evaluate data in terms of their trustworthiness. The low level trust factors, so-called secu-
rity properties, are assigned to each relevant component within the network environment.
In addition, not only to the component itself but also to the communication channels
between the components. If a component provides data for the decision making process,
the security properties are combined into a single trust level for the collected data. This
trust level can be evaluated (i.e., concrete values can be assigned to it). The evaluation is
used within the domain-specific extension which provides a trust-aware decision making
system. Chapter 5 describes an implementation of the domain-specific extension by the
use of IF-MAP and provides a proof of concept by this. Furthermore, an evaluation of the
proof of concept implementation is given in this chapter. It is based on a particular inves-
tigation of performance e↵ects and on the results of tests with a defined set of test cases
summarising the scenarios, thus also showing the practical usage of the overall approach
(i.e., of the generic trust model as the domain-specific extension leverages this model).
Finally, chapter 6 summarises all parts including a final assessment of the approach and
gives an outlook to future work.
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This chapter introduces the reference infrastructure and the relevant scenarios upon
this infrastructure. All scenarios are based on the ESUKOM [21] research project which
deals with smartphone security in business infrastructures. Due to this, these scenarios
represent real world use cases and point out current problems in this research field. By
analysing these scenarios relevant requirements are identified.
2.1 Reference Infrastructure
The following section describes the infrastructure that is common to all scenarios. The
components which are used to form the basic environment are widely adopted. They are
therefore commonly found within company (i.e. business) networks. Figure 2.1 depicts the
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overall layout and the components that are part of the infrastructure. More details are


















Figure 2.1: Reference Infrastructure (cf. [2]).
2.1.1 Zone Topology
The topology of the network is divided into two separated zones, the public and the in-
ternal zone. The public zone describes the logical area, which is located outside of the
company’s network and therefore also outside of the company’s administrative influence.
There may be arbitrary devices in this section which can be connected to the network
by two di↵erent means. The first connection possibility is the direct connection using a
wireless technology, for example by leveraging the 802.11 [22] standard. The term direct
connection refers to a direct, logical network connection without any intermediary com-
ponents in between. The second option which may also be used for connection purposes is
the indirect connection. This is the case if the device connects to another network which
is connected to the Internet and tunnels trough both networks. For example, this is the
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case, if a Virtual Private Network (VPN) is used. The infrastructure distinguishes between
these two types of connection means: local access is used if a direct connection is meant
and remote access if using an Internet-based connection.
In detail, a more fine grained version of the topology is actually used. It is formed by
placing another zone in between the public and the internal zone. This zone, commonly
referred to as demilitarised zone (DMZ), consists primarily of components which are
used to separate the internal and the public zone from each other, e.g. firewall systems.
Furthermore, this zone provides the possibility to place components which should be
accessible from outside the network without the need to allow a direct connection to the
internal zone. A VPN gateway or a proxy server are examples for such kind of components.
For simplicity issues, this kind of zone is interpreted as part of the internal zone within
this thesis.
There are two types of components which can be found within the zones: infrastructure-
based components and endpoints. Infrastructure-based components are required in order
to provide the basic function of the network along with services the infrastructure should
provide while endpoints are user controlled devices which make use of the infrastructure
and the services.
2.1.2 Infrastructure Components
The basic infrastructure used by the scenarios consists of the following infrastructure-
based components. These components provides either a service to endpoints or control
certain aspects, like access decisions, of the network.
Access Point An access point enables the use of wireless connection methods for the
direct connection to the network. It is used by endpoints to gain access to the
network.
Firewall A firewall models the perimeter between the public and the internal zone. It
controls the inbound as well as the outbound network tra c and is able to block
certain types of communication on demand. Access to a particular service requested
by endpoints is also controlled by this device. That is, if a component recognises
an unauthorised service access, the firewall may block this access for the specific
device.
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Intrusion Detection/Prevention System An IDS/IPS system monitors the internal zone
of the network and provides information about intrusions into this network. In this
infrastructure, the network’s tra c along with the state of the platforms is mon-
itored. That is, there are sensors on each component of the infrastructure which
collect data about this particular component. This data is then used by the IDS,
combined with the tra c analysis, for signature and anomaly detection means. The
overall behaviour is controlled by a policy which defines the necessary parts, like
signatures and anomalies. When the system detects a violation of this policy, it
reacts and triggers certain events like a rule change on the firewall. Due to this
behaviour, the IDS can be considered as decision making component of the network
as it decides about the fulfilment of a certain policy.
Vulnerability Scanner This system is responsible for monitoring particular platforms.
I.e., it scans a device and checks for certain properties. The discovered properties of
the particular platform may then be used as input for the IDS or to generate alert
messages.
Network Access Control System A Network Access Control system works in conjunc-
tion with the firewall to allow or disallow the overall access to the private zone. It
therefore takes properties of the device which wants to access the network (i.e. a
smartphone) and verifies them against a policy. Furthermore, a user based access
decision can be made: the user of the device which wants to gain access needs to
authenticate herself in order to be given access privileges. The access decisions as
well as the information collected by the NAC system can be used by other compo-
nents, for example the IDS, in order to allow a more sophisticated decision making
process.
Remote Access System A Remote Access System provides means to indirectly connect
to the network. This can be done for instance by using a Virtual Private Network
Server as Remote Access System. It allows the smartphone to connect through the
internet to the infrastructure.
AAA An AAA (Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting) system provides a back-
end within the infrastructure holding all user and system-specific credential infor-
mation. That is, if another infrastructural component needs user-specific account
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data, it can request these data from this component. This component commonly
works together with the NAC system in order to share user-specific data.
DHCP and DNS A DHCP system is responsible for managing the addresses used in the
infrastructure while the DNS manages name queries. The DHCP provides address-
specific information and the DNS provides information about name queries and
record changes.
All of these infrastructure-based components, excluding the IDS, itself are monitored.
This is done by using appropriate sensors on the particular platforms. These sensors
communicate with the IDS and allow to detect intrusion and react on events within the
network.
2.1.3 Endpoints
Within this infrastructure, only one type of endpoints is in the focus: smartphones. In a
real world environment, there would also be other types, like laptops or special devices
like terminals. More precisely, smartphones connect to the public zone of the network
either directly or indirectly. A direct connection is established if the user of the phone
connects (usually using a wireless network-based connection) at the company’s location to
the infrastructure. An indirect connection is used if the smartphone is used anywhere else.
This indirect connection may then either happen by leveraging the VPN service or via
the cellular network. If the smartphone is successfully connected, they can use services
provided by the network. These services are not explicitly introduced by the reference
infrastructure as they may be of an arbitrary type. Examples for such services are an
email service or a business suite providing calendars and reminders.
As with the infrastructure-based components, endpoints which are connected to the
infrastructure are also monitored by the appropriate sensors. That is, the IDS is aware
about the actual endpoints and their state. This is being used to enforce policies on this
kind of devices.
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2.2 Scenarios
There are four relevant scenarios for this thesis which are based on the ESUKOM [21]
research project. The aim of the ESUKOM project was to develop a solution for inte-
grating smartphones into business and company networks. Due to this, all four scenarios
are based on real world use cases provided by the companies which participated within
the ESUKOM project. Each of the scenario expresses one or more demands an actual
company provided to the ESUKOM project. Furthermore, all scenarios are based on the
reference infrastructure which was also agreed upon within the ESUKOM project. Both,
the reference infrastructure and the relevant scenarios are results of the requirement anal-
ysis within the ESUKOM project. In particular, the first scenario deals with collecting
data from a smartphone in a trustworthy manner. The second scenario emphasises the
need for a policy-based decision making process which includes trust measures. The third
scenario shows the use case of providing certain services of the infrastructure based on
trust and the fourth scenario shows the special case of a forensic evidence collection.
2.2.1 Scenario I: Trustworthy Data Collection for Smartphones
By using smartphones within a company’s infrastructure, they need to be included into
the network’s policy. That is, smartphones are supposed to be controllable on the same
level as other infrastructural components are. To do so, the reference infrastructure’s IDS
can be used. This is possible, as it allows to evaluate certain properties of the smartphone
against the network’s policy, i.e. it is acting as a decision making component. This is
done by collecting data that describes the smartphone and evaluating this data using the
IDS. In detail, the describing data is collected by an amount of sensors located either
on the smartphone directly or somewhere on a component within the infrastructure. If
the smartphone changes certain states which are measured, the sensors will provide the
appropriate data describing this change, allowing the IDS to always operate on the last
measured state concerning the smartphone. As already stated, the sensors may be located
on the smartphone as well as on other devices. Due to the devices being used and deployed
in di↵erent ways, their security level is highly varying. The smartphone itself may be
exposed to more threats in terms of compromise than an infrastructure component like
the DHCP server as it is more likely that the smartphone is being exploited due to its
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usage profile. As the sensors are located on the device, their security level is also highly
varying. Furthermore, this level is not only variable in terms of the device the sensor is
placed on but also in terms of time. A device may be compromised at one point and
starting to act malicious. This malicious behaviour may also apply for the sensor itself,
resulting in false measurements. To counter this, the IDS must be able to receive the
data from the sensors in a trustworthy manner. This would allow the IDS to distinguish
between the trustworthiness of such describing data. Decisions which are made by the
IDS would therefore be based on this trustworthiness, thus the IDS treats describing data
in accordance to their trustworthiness. This allows to use arbitrary sensory sources as
the IDS can decide on its own about the trustworthiness of the data collected by these
sensors.
Example Use Case
Given a smartphone which is used in arbitrary situations and for unspecified tasks. The
user of the smartphone, which is also an employee of the company, installs certain apps on
the device, which may be either malicious or unwanted. A malicious app could for example
start to send a high amount of SMS and thus generates a lot of costs for the user or the
company. Besides an app being specifically malicious, there may also be apps installed
on the device which are considered unwanted from the company’s infrastructure point
of view. That is, if the the smartphone is taken into the infrastructure of the company
the user is working for, the infrastructure needs to react. An example for such an app
would be a program allowing to stream a live feed of the smartphone’s camera into the
internet. This may be critical under certain conditions, for example if the smartphone is
located within a classified meeting situation. To detect the apps currently present on the
smartphone, data are collected on the smartphone. This data is then used by the IDS to
simply perform a signature-based matching of the installed apps against a blacklist the
company holds. If a malicious or unwanted app is detected, the user of the smartphone is
informed and the smartphone’s access to the infrastructure is denied. In this case, the IDS
needs to verify the trustworthiness of the collected data. This is necessary to prevent false
positives as well as false negatives. A false positive would happen if the IDS denies the
smartphone’s access although no particular app is present on the phone. The other case,
a false negative where no enforcement actions are taken, is even more critical: the IDS
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does not detect the app which is actually present on the device. To prevent this, the IDS
needs to take care about the trustworthiness of the data collected. Thus it is able to rate
the data and improve their detection rate. Furthermore, if the sensor on the smartphone
itself is compromised, the IDS detects this as well and takes further actions.
2.2.2 Scenario II: Trust-based Policy Enforcement
As already stated in the first scenario (2.2.1), by using smartphones in the context of a
company’s environment, they have to be integrated in the policy as well. The IDS system
used within the reference infrastructure is being controlled by a policy which defines
reactions to certain events. In detail, the policy that is used for the IDS holds information
about the contextual parts, like time or location, and signature and anomaly parts. These
building blocks define the reaction to certain types of data and their measured values.
As the last scenario showed, data should be collectable in a trustworthy manner. That is,
the IDS can distinguish between data in terms of its trustworthiness. Given this and the
policy situation just described, there is a need for controlling trust related aspects within
this policy. Due to this, the policy must be able to hold trust related elements in addition
to the parts mentioned above. Having this, if the IDS handles a certain amount of data,
it also checks this data’s trustworthiness as it is defined in the policy. This may be on
the one side by evaluating the trustworthiness in a contextual mean, thus the IDS simply
processes only trustworthy data. On the other side, the IDS must also be able to use the
data’s trustworthiness within their policy for signature and anomaly detection. Having
this, the party which is responsible for defining the policy is able to define arbitrary
trust-related cases within the policy. Without this, there is no way of directly using the
possibility of a trustworthy data collection.
Example Use Case
If a smartphone tries to access the private zone of the network, its state is monitored
by the appropriate sensor residing on the device. This sensor collects the appropriate
data from the smartphone and provides it to the IDS. The IDS holds a policy, which
defines certain conditions where the smartphone should be isolated from network access.
Besides conditions that are based on actual data values, like the detection of malicious
apps on the device, there are also conditions which are based on the trustworthiness of
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the data which are collected from the smartphone. If the smartphone now starts to act
weird, i.e. sends implausible data, in terms of the data collected, the IDS recognises this
and lowers the trustworthiness of the smartphone. At a certain point, this results in a
situation where one of the trust-based policy rules matches. As written above, this rule
implies, that the smartphone needs to be investigated further and therefore being isolated
in terms of network access.
2.2.3 Scenario III: Context-related Service Provisioning
With the smartphone being able to access the services provided by the network and
the components located within the private zone, there is a need to distinguish between
di↵erent contexts the smartphone can have. That given, there need to be an authorisa-
tion process which is based on the smartphones state as well as on the context of the
smartphone. The reference infrastructure does also provide means to realise this. The au-
thorisation is first done by evaluating certain data of the smartphones, such like apps or
the smartphone’s operation system. This first step belongs to the last mentioned scenario,
as it is simply a more detailed version of the policy-based enforcement. The second step,
which operates on the smartphone’s context, forms this scenario, which is di↵erent from
the scenario above. There are three types of contextual parameters which are going to be
used to authorise the smartphone in terms of service access. In this case, authorisation
refers to providing the service access-based on the contextual parameters of the smart-
phone. The three types applicable are time related context, location related context and
trust related context. As the name clearly expresses, time related describes the time the
service access was measured by a sensor. This sensor may be either on the service or on
the smartphone. If a service should only be accessed to a certain time, this context is
evaluated. Furthermore, to allow a real provisioning, a service request may be answered
di↵erently depending on the time of the request. The second type, location, allows to base
access decisions and the response behaviour upon the device’s location. Equally to the
time, a service might only be accessed if the device is located appropriately. The last type,
allow to base the service access onto the trustworthiness of the collected data. That is,
the service should only answer requests, if the device is in a trusted shape. Furthermore,
there may be di↵erent reactions of the service-based on di↵erent states of trustworthiness.
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From the technical perspective, the IDS is able to correlate directly on the contextual pa-
rameters and base decisions on this correlation.
Example Use Case
When accessing a service by a smartphone, the smartphone must be connected to the
network. Due to this, there should be already a certain amount of collected data from
the smartphone. To judge about the smartphone’s trustworthiness, the IDS is used to
evaluate these collected data. If there are data with values di↵ering from the expected
values, the IDS lowers the trustworthiness of the smartphone. If the smartphone is now
actually accessing the service, the service uses the infrastructure mechanisms and requests
an access decision from the IDS (i.e. from the logical point of view, the IDS may also deny
access based on its policy). As the trustworthiness of the smartphone was lowered due to
the suspicious data collected by the sensor on the device, the IDS can correlate on the
trust context of the access request. If the context is below a predefined value inside the
policy, the IDS denies the smartphone the access to the service. The same way can be
used to check if the request was made within a valid time, e.g. the company’s working
hours or from the right location, like a location somewhere on the company’s property.
2.2.4 Scenario IV: Secure Evidence
Secure evidence describes the scenario, where it is necessary to generate a proof of an
action or incident (cf. [23, 24]). Usually, such a proof is usable at a legal court. This type
of scenario is not bound to a special type of incident or action. This means, each time an
operation is done within the network, a proof could be generated. While there are a lot of
actions where no proof will be needed, such as an allowed access to a resource or a service
provided by the network, there are also critical operations. Those critical operations are
usually some kind of an incident. Examples are a network-based attack, resulting in data
theft or a denial of service attack. Such incidents usually result in legal actions to be taken,
which require a proof of the incident. The so-called Evidence Generator (EG) is a special
component which extends the reference infrastructure and resides inside the network’s
private zone. The EG takes responsibility for generating the required proof of an action.
As the EG is also part of the network it may be involved in an incident. However, as
the EG is defined as trustworthy, this special case needs to be treated separately and is
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therefore out of scope for this particular scenario. As defined above, to fulfil the needs
when incorporating a smartphone into a company’s network, the reference infrastructure
with the IDS and its sensors is used. Due to this, the EG connects to the IDS, retrieving the
collected data on the IDS and generating the required proof. In detail, the EG takes current
sensor values as well as historic values and bundles them together into the appropriate
proof. The proof consist therefore of the current state of the network as well as the changes
which leaded to this state. The EG provides further operations, which use the proof. As
explained, it is responsible for requesting and retrieving the proof of an action or an
incident. Besides that, it verifies the authenticity and integrity of the proof as well as
attesting the integrity state of an endpoint within the network at the time the proof was
generated. Furthermore, it secures the non-repudiation of the proof itself as well as of the
attested integrity states and, in some cases, secures the confidentiality of the proof and
the integrity states. Considering this, there are several points which need to be addressed
in order to achieve a court-proof evidence generation. As the EG is solely responsible for
providing verified and proven data and the methodology of collecting the information is
unique to each incident or action, the proof provided by the EG must be considered as
true. That is, the evidence generation needs to be done in a trustworthy manner, i.e. the
trustworthiness of the collected data needs to be taken into account. Besides that, the
proof provided by the EG needs to be stored. This process has to ensure, that the proof is
not altered while handling it and that the trustworthiness of the EG can be determined.
If the EG is not treated as trustworthy, the proof is unusable.
Example Use Case
If the IDS detects a severe breach of its policy, i.e. a huge amount of signature and anomaly
conditions have been triggered, it may instruct the EG to create a forensic snapshot of the
current state of the infrastructure. The EG then starts to generate the proof by accessing
the IDS and retrieves a current set of collected data from it. To get a most accurate picture
of the situation, the EG would also request all historic information available. By receiving
this information, it can then create the actual proof. In addition to the data collected
by the IDS using the appropriate sensors, there may be more information included, like
attestation information of particular devices within the infrastructure. After the proof is
created, it is provided for further usage.
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2.3 Requirements
Based on the scenarios described above, six most relevant requirements are derived that
are addressed in this thesis:
R1: Trust specification, calculation and evaluation This requirement describes the abil-
ity to specify, to derive and calculate trust for collected data. It is mainly derived
from scenario 2.2.1 which demands a mechanism that allows the IDS (i.e., the deci-
sion making system) to evaluate the collected data in terms of their trustworthiness.
To do so, it is (1) necessary to specify trust, i.e. derive trust and (2) to use the de-
rived trust within an overall calculation which provides a trust measure per data.
Given the reference infrastructure, to fulfil this requirement, there needs to be a
trust evaluation method (3) for each chunk of data collected and handled by the
IDS. In order to provide this, a trust derivation technique must be defined which
does not only include the components handling the data (e.g. the smartphones) but
also the communication of the data throughout the system. This technique addresses
(1), thus providing a basic measure of trust. Based on this derivation, a calculation
approach can be defined which eventually provides an evaluable trust value for each
chunk of collected data and therefore addresses (2). Besides this, the component
which carries out the decisions made by the IDS needs also to be aware of the trust-
worthiness of this decision. This is necessary to address (3), thus allowing the IDS a
trust-based decision making process in the infrastructure. In addition to the directly
expressed demand in the first scenario, all other scenarios require a solution as well.
This is due to the problem, that every piece of data which is being used for decision
making may be untrustworthy. In detail, if the data is untrustworthy and there is
no way of recognising this, potential unwanted results may be the case.
R2: Trust history The IDS within the reference infrastructure allows to store the actual
collected data and their current sensor values. They are updated each time a new
measurement value is received from a sensor. In its current shape, the IDS does not
store the old (i.e. updated) values of the sensors as it operates event triggered. Addi-
tionally, as there is currently no trust-based evaluation done by the IDS, trust values
are also not stored. Scenario 2.2.4 showed the situation, where the infrastructure’s
current state is pictured. Furthermore, it also included historic data values along
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with their trust state within this picture. Due to this, there is a demand for a storage,
i.e. a history, which stores the old values. In addition to this, the trustworthiness of
the data is changing from time to time and from update to update. Due to this, the
history must not only include the data values but also their trustworthiness at the
time this value was currently valid. Besides scenario 2.2.4, this history mechanism
is also required by scenario 2.2.2. This is due to the correlation of trust values which
is only possible if not only the actual trustworthiness is known but instead a history
of the trustworthiness. To fulfil this requirement, there needs to be a way to provide
both, a data storage and based on this, a history of trustworthiness.
R3: Trust-based correlation The IDS, which is provided by the reference infrastructure
for the task of deriving decisions, is based on collected sensor data. More in detail,
it uses the value of the data which expresses a measurement value from the sensor.
Scenario 2.2.2 as well as 2.2.3 demand the possibility to not only use the data’s
value (i.e. the sensor’s measurement) but also the trustworthiness of this data for
correlation purposes. To derive a decision which is based both on the data’s value as
well as on the data’s trustworthiness, there needs to be a mechanism to allow a direct
correlation on the trustworthiness. That is, the IDS is able to not only include the
data’s trustworthiness into its decision making process, which would be possible by
fulfilling R1, but to solely base the decision upon the data’s trustworthiness instead
of the actual measurement value. Given the previous requirement which demands
a storage of data and their trustworthiness, it is possible to reason upon the trend
of the trustworthiness. This allows for more sophisticated tasks, like a trust-based
enforcement of devices.
R4: Extending policies with trust This requirement addresses the problem of using the
IDS’ policy for trust-based decision making. In short, fulfilling this requirement al-
lows to extend policies with trust. Besides the first and the last scenario, all other
scenarios demand an integration of the trustworthiness into the policies which are
used by the IDS. Without this trust extension, there is no possibility of addressing
the trustworthiness from the policy’s point of view (i.e. using trust within a spe-
cific rule). Given the second scenario, the policy-based enforcement which should
be based on trustworthiness, there must be a way of expressing the conditions and
rules which lead to the described enforcement. Furthermore, providing specific ser-
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vices for di↵erent trustworthiness cases of the collected data is also required. Due
to that, without an appropriate policy integration there may be only a static defini-
tion of cases which results in a system that cannot be configured appropriately. To
solve this limitation, there needs to be an appropriate mechanism to integrate the
trustworthiness into one ore more policies. In addition, there must be also a way to
include trustworthiness into the already existing policy structures of the IDS. This
aims to extend the IDS’ policy in a way to fully support the trustworthiness of the
collected sensor data.
R5: Extensibility in terms of used data and trust calculation methods Scenario 2.2.1
describes the situation where the IDS uses data from arbitrary sensory sources. As
described in the first requirement, the IDS should be able to judge about the trust-
worthiness of these data. Given those two points, it is necessary to support arbitrary
sensors and thus arbitrary mechanisms the trustworthiness is based upon. In detail,
the measurement which is used to derive trust for a chunk of data must not be limited
to a particular type. If the measurement is limited, there is no possibility of using
new sensors within the system as no trustworthiness could be derived. Furthermore,
the calculation process itself must not be limited to a certain type or algorithm.
Without this flexible calculation, there is no way of using new trust measurement
methods as there would be no algorithm supporting these new methods. Given these
two points, it is required, that arbitrary sources may be used to derive trust and
that these trust derivation is flexible in terms of the calculation method used. This
allows also to exchange the calculation method based on the actual domain.
R6: Ability of seamless integration To actually use the system which is described in
the scenario, there is the need to provide it in a most integrable way. That is, it
is required that the system is able to be integrated into existing infrastructures.
Without fulfilling this requirement, it is not possible to deploy the system within a
working environment. When developing a solution for the previous requirements, it
must therefore be taken care of this last requirement. By fulfilling this requirement,
the system can be deployed within an already existing infrastructure in a less intru-
sive manner, i.e. only a minimum of existing components need to be customised in
order to support the whole system.
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Those six requirements need to be addressed in order to support the presented scenarios.
The following chapter presents the relevant related work which has already been done
and which may be used to fulfil certain parts of the requirements. Furthermore, it is
distinguished between research-based approaches and technological-based approaches. All
approaches are compared against the requirements above.
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This chapter evaluates work which has already been done against the identified require-
ments. First, it gives an overview of the research centric work by summarising the most
important research contributions. Second, technologies that provide certain kinds of mech-
anisms to fulfil the requirements are described. Summarising both parts, the assessment
compares the research contributions as well as the technologies against the requirements
and identifies the gap.
3.1 Research-based Approaches
First of all, research-based approaches are presented and discussed. The approaches itself
are categorised within three particular types, thus the evaluation starts with more generic
approaches and finishes with approaches that address specific problems.
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3.1.1 Intrusion Detection
Taking the reference infrastructure and the scenarios which operate upon this infras-
tructure, approaches for intrusion detection are analysed. Based on this analysis, further
relevant categories, in particular work which has been done in the field of di↵erent in-
trusion detection types and trust-based approaches, are analysed. A basic definition and
di↵erent types of intrusion detection systems and their working principles can be found
in [25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. Given the categorisation of intrusion detection made within these
publications, there is one approach which can be characterised as a network-based intru-
sion detection system (cf. [30]) that is tailored for use in smartphone-enabled networks
and infrastructures. Due to its capability of handling smartphones and the combination
of several di↵erent research fields, this approach is analysed first.
CADS
CADS abbreviates Context related Anomaly and Signature Detection for smartphones
and is described in [18, 19, 2]. It allows to collect so-called Features, which represent a
particular property and their measured value of a device. In detail, the Feature consists
of the following relevant elements.
• A Feature id allows to uniquely identify the Feature. Note that two Features may
have the same id if they measure the same property for the same device. This would
be the case, if for example the Feature that has been measured first will be updated
with a new value that represents this measurement.
• The value of the Feature (Feature value) contains the actual measurement value.
E.g., if the Feature holds the IP address of a device, this IP address would be stored
as measured value within this field.
• In addition to this two fields, there is another field which addresses the Feature’s
context. Most important, the time stamp of the measurement is stored as a time
context in this field. Besides time-related entries, the Feature could also contain
another context types, like the location. The CADS approach does not limit this
field to a certain type of context.
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As already stated, the Feature expresses a certain property of the measured device. While
it describes one particular device, the collection may not only be done by and on the
device itself but by arbitrary devices which are located in the same network.
Architecture The architecture of CADS (figure 3.1) is formed by four components:
the Feature Collector, the Feature Provider, the Feature Consumer and the Correlation
Engine. A detailed explanation of the components is given in the following.
Figure 3.1: CADS architecture as defined in [2].
Feature Collector The Feature Collector is responsible for collecting (measuring) and
aggregating the required Features. There may be an arbitrary amount of Feature
Collectors on di↵erent platforms and devices in the network.
Feature Provider The collected Features are sent to the Feature Provider which stores
them. Furthermore, a component may not only request storage of Features but also
the request to retrieve a certain Feature and the request to delete a no longer used
Feature. The architecture demands that there is only one central Feature Provider
as part of the network.
Correlation Engine A Correlation Engine is responsible for accessing the Features and
correlating them to apply anomaly and signature detection algorithms. This is done
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by evaluating a defined policy and the appropriate Features. Prior to its actual
use in the environment, there may be a training phase. This training phase allows
the Correlation Engine to learn the necessary reference values used for anomaly
detection means. The CADS approach does not define the actual method used to
perform this training phase and allows to use arbitrary methods.
Feature Consumer Decisions made by the Correlation Engine are propagated to the Fea-
ture Consumer. Propagate refers to the process of sending the decisions as Features
to the Feature Provider followed by the Feature Consumer accessing these decisions
on the Provider. The Correlation Engine therefore uses Features to store decisions
(i.e. decisions are stored as value of the Feature). These Features are received by
the Feature Consumer (after they where transmitted to the Feature Provider) and
used to trigger and process further actions.
Based on this, a general communication flow within the CADS system can be expressed:
• The Feature Collector sends the Feature to the Feature Provider. The Feature in-
cludes measured values, which are used to describe aspects of the smartphone. For
example, the installed apps on the smartphone may be expressed by a Feature. After
the Feature is received on the side of the Feature Provider, it is then stored within
the Feature Provider’s database, thus keeping it ready for further usage.
• At any time, the Feature is then further transmitted to the Correlation Engine.
That is, the stored Feature is retrieved from the Feature Provider’s database and
then send to the Correlation Engine. Given the example from above, the stored app
measurement would be given to the Correlation Engine which then evaluates the
Feature against its policy.
• After the Correlation Engine has finished processing of this Feature, it may create
another one which is then transmitted back to the Feature Provider. The Feature
Provider takes this Feature and stores it again within its local database. For ex-
ample, the Correlation Engine would make an enforcement decision based on the
app Feature explained above. This enforcement decision would be provided as new
Feature to the Feature Provider.
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• A Feature Consumer can then use this Feature for further actions. That is, the
Feature Provider retrieves the stored Feature out of its local database and sends
it to the Feature Consumer. Within the named example, the enforcement decision
would be provided to an appropriate Feature Consumer, e.g. a firewall. This firewall




















Figure 3.2: Example Flow given by [19].
After the optional training phase, the processing of the Feature starts with the Feature
Collector on the smartphone. In this example case (Figure 3.2), a sensor activation is
measured. The sensor may be the smartphone’s microphone or the camera within this ex-
ample. The Feature Collector takes this Feature and transmits it to the Feature Provider,
which provides the Feature further to the Correlation Engine. The Correlation Engine is
then able to check the Feature’s value against its policy and optional against the learned
reference values. As the condition for raising an alert is not fulfilled yet, the Correlation
Engine does not react on the Feature in this example. This changes when the second
Feature Collector which is located on the IDS within the network measures an increase
of the smartphone’s tra c. This measured Feature is provided to the Correlation Engine
again by using the Feature Provider. Having both Features, the sensor activation as well
as the increase of tra c, the Correlation Engine now raises an alert as both Feature values
together violate the policy in this example. This alert is given to the Feature Provider,
which sends it to the firewall system. The firewall, which acts as a Feature Consumer, uses
the Feature and isolates the smartphone, thus e↵ectively disabling the network access for
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the smartphone. This simple example shows how the infrastructure and the appropriate
CADS components are used.
Summarising this, CADS is capable of performing both, misuse and anomaly detection.
Misuse detection characterises the ability to detect static properties of an entity, i.e.
unwanted configuration like installed apps that are malicious for smartphones. Misuse
detection in the field of intrusion detection has been widely researched, details can be
found in [31, 32, 33]. In contrast to static properties of a system, anomaly detection is
used to recognise behavioural-based actions. That is, CADS is able to detect changes
in the way a particular smartphone devices behaves e.g., a sudden increase of tra c
which may be a hint for a data exfiltration taking place. As with misuse detection, the
technique of anomaly detection is also one basic ability of intrusion detection systems
and has been researched intensively. More information about detailed mechanisms can be
found in [34, 35, 36]. The architecture of the CADS system can be interpreted as a special
version of a hierarchical intrusion detection system (cf. [37, 38]) due to the Correlation
Engine as decision making component operates on high level information. The sensors, i.e.
the Feature Collectors, abstract particular measurements and decide on their own when to
publish a high level alert to the Correlation Engine. Due to this, CADS cannot be seen as
a conservative acting centralised intrusion detection system. In addition, although CADS
is being considered as a distributed intrusion detection system it is not considered to be
peer to peer based with isolated nodes as the final decision making is centralised. Node
and peer to peer based intrusion detection relies on a consensus of several nodes which
form a decision together (cf. [39, 40]). Comparing the approach against the requirements,
it is clearly to see that CADS does not provide a solution to fulfil R1. However, as CADS
provides a Feature-based storage, correlation mechanisms and a policy, R2 to R4 can be
considered as partially fulfilled. The last two requirements (R5 and R6) have also been
considered when developing CADS, thus R5 is partially fulfilled as trust is missing but
R6 is completely fulfilled.
Other approaches
Besides the categorisation of centralised or distributed approaches, intrusion detection can
also be categorised into host-based, network-based and hybrid approaches approaches.
[25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. Host-based intrusion detection systems are used to monitor a
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single platform (i.e. a host), usually by measuring certain aspects of the platform. In
contrast to this, network-based intrusion detection system use a network-based monitoring
approach, for example by analysing the tra c within this network. Both types provide
di↵erent measures to detect certain properties, like malware or ongoing attacks. A hybrid
approach combines both types into a single system, e.g. by using sensors to monitor the
tra c and host-based techniques to monitor a system’s state. However, as the scenarios
require collection and correlation of data, the categorisation used for this chapter is based
on the system being either centralised or distributed. Both categories may consist of a
host-based, a network-based or a hybrid approach. That is, the categorisation used here
can be considered orthogonal to the system-based classification.
In [41] Bidou et al. describe an architectural model based upon the concept of having a
centralised component which evaluates data to detect network intrusion or other threats.
Furthermore, the authors propose an implementation of the centralised component which
is commonly called security operation centre (SOC), thus calling their implementation
SOCBox. It consist of several sub-systems, in particular a module to gather data from
arbitrary sources, an integrated correlation engine as well as several databases (e.g. a
vulnerability database). The overall architecture is able to gather event-based data from
sources like host-based intrusion detection systems and evaluate it against database en-
tries or perform correlation tasks upon the data. Given that, requirements R2 to R4 are
addressed to some extent. While this approach is usable in terms of detecting intrusions or
threats, there are two potential problems. As the SOCBox acts as a centralised component
it may likely be a single point of failure. This first issue is also identified by the authors
and resolved in an improved version of the architecture (see below). Another problem is
the lack of trustworthiness in the data sources. There is no possibility for the SOCBox
to distinguish the received data between valuable or invaluable in terms of trust, thus R1
cannot be fulfilled by this approach. As the approach is rather static, it provides a limited
extensibility (R5) and is di cult to integrate (R6).
Ganame et al. propose an improved version of the architecture described above, solving
the problem of isolated intrusion detection systems. They describe the overall idea in [42],
which is based on gathering network relevant information to recognise attacks. Further-
more the authors distinguish between wide networks and smaller network segments, thus
inventing certain layers of detection within their approach. The lowest layer is formed
by localised detection engines, collecting data from one isolated network segment. The
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result of this detection is then distributed one layer upwards to a so-called global anal-
yser, which has a broader view of the overall network. The authors call this architecture
a distributed security operation centre (dsoc) which is an improvement of their previous
approach which uses a centralised operation centre (cf. [41]). Although this improvement
o↵ers a solution to the single point of failure problem, proposed by the authors in [41],
and allows for more extensibility (R5) it still has some possible drawbacks. Like other ap-
proaches, which may be either centralised or distributed, there is no process of verifying
the trustworthiness of the collected information (R1). That is, the local detection as well
as the global detection engine have no possibility to select received information by means
of their trustworthiness. This could possible result within a situation where a rogue data
collector publishes malicious information, thus triggering unwanted actions.
A good example for countering threats of data exfiltration from inside the network is
presented by Ramachandran et al. [43]. The approach presented by the authors is based on
collection information about the networks standard behaviour, learning this behaviour and
deriving a behavioural model out of the learned information. This allows to detect unusual
behaviour and raising alerts. More in detail, the authors aim is to prevent data exfiltration
out of the network by profiling each host within the network. To learn a hosts profile, data
is collected by using SNMP-based data exchange and calculation based on kernel density
estimation and correlation coe cients (R2 and R3). Although the authors show that their
approach might be promising, there are still some open questions regarding this approach.
Besides others like scalability and applicability (R5 and R6) the main question refers to
the trustworthiness of the collected data. While the model itself is sound, it is rather
limited in terms of verifying the data sources trustworthiness, and thus the data itself. In
particular, this might be a problem when trying to use a behaviour-based model to detect
certain kinds of insider attacks. Comparing this against the requirements, particularly
against R1, the approach o↵ers no solution for trust-based reasoning.
More work has been done in the area of correlating data in order to perform a de-
tection of anomalies or misuse. In [44] Cullingford shows an approach, where multiple
detection engines work together. Aim of this approach is to minimise the false alarm
rate. Although the approach performs well in the scenarios described, the author does not
include the problem of sensors being untrustworthy. Furthermore, by combining several




3.1.2 Trust-enhanced Intrusion Detection Systems
This section summarises work which has been done in the field of intrusion detections
systems that incorporate a trust evaluation.
Zhou et al. give an in-depth overview of the current concepts of intrusion detection
systems in [45]. The summary is given on the background of large scale attacks which aim
on multiple networks but is also applicable for single network IDS concepts. The authors
distinguish between the already mentioned three general types of intrusion detection sys-
tems: a centralised approach, the hierarchical approach and a fully distributed approach.
The centralised approach is based on a single component gathering information by their
sensors in one single point. Furthermore, the sensors provide raw data without any form
of pre-correlation and selection. The hierarchical approach extends this idea by giving the
sensors the ability to filter data and aggregate data. This allows to form a hierarchy of
sensors as well as correlation components which ends on the highest level in one single
component. The CADS system introduced in the previous section can be assigned to this
group of approaches as it has a high level centralised decision making component but is
not based on raw data. The third group of approaches, which is currently widely discussed
in the field of intrusion detection is fully decentralised. That is, all of the sensors perform
a special kind of decision making which consists of some kind of negotiation between the
sensors, which is not based on one single centralised component. The authors also sum-
marise the benefits of each approach as well as the disadvantages. Although they address
problems like developing a single point of failure or the pre-selection of data, there is no
detailed view onto the problem of the sensor’s trustworthiness (R1). Other approaches in
the field of intrusion detection include this issue as a problem and try to develop solutions
for it. In addition, Leckie et al. have also deployed some of the proposed concepts for
di↵erent tasks. In [46] the authors describe an intrusion detection system working in a
collaborative manner based on a peer to peer infrastructure for the detection of phishing
domains.
Cuppens et al. introduce the CRIM intrusion detection system in [47]. The authors
point out, that low level alerts may not be usable to determine if an intrusion is taking
place. Thus, the false alarm rate of such systems that use conventional low level alarms
are rather high. Due to this, the CRIM system combines alerts to a higher level. This is
done by several modules. The first module, the alert base receives alerts and stores them,
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thus providing a data storage (R2). The alerts are received by the particular intrusion
detection components sending their results using the IDMEF [48] message format in order
to exchange the low level results. The second module, the alert clustering, takes the
alerts and clusters them into appropriate groups, thus e↵ectively generating higher level
alerts. Those groups, i.e. clusters, are then merged by the next module. The result of this
alert merging module are so-called global alerts which can now be used by a correlation
engine (R3). This correlation engine, represented by the module called alert correlation,
produces so-called candidate plans which are checked in the last module against the
original intention. If the match is successful, a reaction may occur. The authors have
tested their approach and could prove, that the use of this system significantly reduces
the false alarm rate for the attacks investigated. Additionally, the approach is being
presented as integrable and extensible in terms of data sources (R5 and R6). However, as
trust is not being considered explicitly, the basic requirement R1 cannot be fulfilled.
In [49] Janakiraman et al. propose early, that scalable and reliable network intrusion
detections mechanisms are needed. In detail, the authors focus on the distributed col-
lection of data in conjunction with a distributed processing of this collected data, thus
addressing requirement R2 and R3 without the trust consideration. This negates the iden-
tified problems of single point of failure architectures. Besides that, Indra, an intrusion
detection tool developed by the authors using a peer to peer (p2p) approach for intrusion
detection is presented. Indra allows to share information between peers, thus allowing
to identify attacks which are carried out on several machines independently. Within the
Indra approach, the authors identify several di culties. One of those di culties reflects
the problem of information trustworthiness between peers. That is, as Indra is peer to
peer based and has no central trust authority which would be able to evaluate the infor-
mation in terms of their trustworthiness, a decentralised trust approach (cf. [50]) needs
to be applied. As an example for such a decentralised approach, the authors suggest the
so-called web of trust approach used within PGP [51]. Although this is an early approach,
it already shows the need for trust considerations between data collectors (R1).
Keromytis et al. present another collaborative approach, called SABER, in [52]. Besides
other, the SABER architecture is based on intrusion and anomaly detection components
and a high level coordination infrastructure. The intrusion and anomaly detection system
work by using two methods. The first one is a so-called surveillance detection. It monitors
the network tra c and evaluates it against known bad indications, thus performing a mis-
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use detection based on signatures. The second method, which is used to detect anomalies,
is based on training of normal behaviour. That is, after the behaviour has been learned,
abnormal behaviour (like tra c) creates an alert (cf. [53] for misuse and anomaly detec-
tion methods). SABER uses a publish/subscribe system to inform its components about
events happening in the network or decisions made by the high level control instance. Fur-
thermore, an event-based correlation system is used on the side of the high level control
instance. This allows to quickly react on multiple events, like a DoS attack. The authors
have tested their work in several scenarios, with an overall good outcome. While SABER
may be used as a general framework to build up collaborative system to prevent attacks,
there is one important point missing. The authors do not address the point of attacking
the SABER system itself. I.e. there is no way to determine if a SABER’s component
might be compromised in any form. That is, R1 is not fulfilled by the approach. Further-
more, the system operates on events, thus there is no dedicated storage for collected data
(R2). However, SABER provides an event-based correlation (R3) and is designed to be
extensible (R6) in terms of sources.
As the problems of using data resources which may not be trustworthy were identified, a
lot of work has been published within this area. One of the earlier approaches is presented
by Duma et al. in [54]. The authors point out, that collaborative intrusion detection system
approaches sound promising with limitations due to their trust issues, thus emphasising
R1. That is, although there are promising approaches, they all make strong assumptions
about the trustworthiness of their data sources. This results in a situation, where a data
source might provide false information (intentionally or unintentionally) which leads to a
reaction which was not intended. As the authors have analysed several general approaches
which are not limited to collaborative working intrusion detection systems but nearly all
collaborative working systems which collect information of data sources, the problem of
trustworthiness of data is also not limited to intrusion detection approaches. To circumvent
this problem, the authors suggest a trust management system, which pre-assigns trust
values to all peers and recalculates them based on trustworthiness given by other peers.
That is, they provide a solution for R1. However, they are only using pre-assigned values
which only allow to calculate an initial trust value. If the situation changes, the proposed
system is unable to react on this change. Due to this, R1 must be considered as only
partial fulfilled. As they propose a collaborative approach, R2 and R3 are also fulfilled to
some extent. Extensibility and integrability are not considered by their approach.
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In [55], Fung et al. present an approach to incorporate a trust management system into
a collaborative working intrusion detection system which can be seen as an improvement
of the approach of Duma [54] et al. It is based on communicating test messages between
peers, which actually are host-based intrusion detection systems working together (cf.
[56]), and reasoning based on the answers of this message about a peers trustworthiness.
A more refined version of this framework, also presented by Fung et al. is shown in [57].
Within this paper, the authors propose an approach for a trust-based framework within a
collaborative working intrusion detection system. Furthermore, the aim of the framework
is a peer to peer based intrusion detection architecture, such as Indra [49]. However, the
authors do not address trust issues within its intrusion detection system which relies on a
single headed control instance. That is, the approach presented by the authors focuses on
the trustworthiness of distributed nodes, which represent host-based intrusion detection
systems and which are communicating via a peer to peer layer. To reason about a nodes
trustworthiness, the requesting node sends a so-called test message to the node which is
under investigation. With the test message being a request to rank an alert, the node
which is to be investigated answers with a so-called severity. Furthermore, the node to be
investigated is not able to distinguish between a real alert ranking request and the test
message. As the requesting nodes knows the real severity of the alert, it can judge about
the trustworthiness of the other node by verifying the received answer. This process is
randomly but periodically often performed. Robustness studies made by the authors show
an positive impact by using their model. Another version of the approach is presented
in [58]. Like the previously explained version, the approach is also based on the trust
definition of a Bayesian network (cf. section 3.1.3 and [59]). In di↵erence to the previous
versions of their approach, the authors propose a dirichlet-based distribution (cf. [60])
model to evaluate the test message exchange between particular nodes. Although this
improves the alarm rates, as the paper clearly shows, the problems of founding trust on
test message exchange, which has been described in detail above, remains the same. Due
to this, R1 can be considered partially fulfilled with the limitation that trust is only being
derived by the test message procedure which makes the approach di cult to control (R4)
and inextensible (R5).
Another research field where intrusion detection plays an important role can be found
in the area of cloud computing. In [61] Joshi et al. present an approach for carrying
out an actual intrusion detection within these kind of environments. Their approach is
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based on the use of the services and resource the cloud provides to determine about
intrusion detection. Furthermore, they do not only provide detection mechanisms but
also prevention methods. Although the approach itself might be promising, the authors
only deal in a very limited manner about the problem of deriving trust. That is, as they
make use of inter-domain cloud providers, there must be a mechanism to put trust on
these di↵erent domains, thus assigning trust onto the service providers. The authors do
not propose a particular solution but emphasise, that this problem need to be dealt with.
Intrusion detection is also important in the already mentioned area of wireless ad hoc
networks. Due to this, there has also been a lot of work on establishing e cient ways of
performing intrusion detection in such environments. [62] gives an overview about recent
research results. The approaches which have been developed, can be divided into two
general groups: approaches that deal with trust and approaches which imply their sensors
to be trustworthy, thus not explicitly addressing trust. Particular early approaches of the
second group which can be characterised as building blocks of these research area can
be found in [63, 64, 65, 66]. A selection of more sophisticated approaches are described
in [67, 68, 69, 70]. The first group, which incorporates the measurement of the sensors
used, has also been worked on. Some of the approaches introduced are explained in the
following.
The first approach belonging to this group, called TIDS, is presented by Deb and Chaki
in [71]. Trust is derived from special messages exchanged between the nodes being part of
the network. In detail, each node is able to calculate a trust measurement for each of its
neighbouring node. If the trust derived becomes low in terms of a specified threshold, the
intrusion detection system can react to this event (R3). Furthermore, the trust calculation
is not only used for intrusion detection purposes but also to determine a safe route for
messaging through the network. As the number of potential nodes is not limited but only
nodes may be integrated, R6 can be considered fulfilled partially. The approach presents
a reasonable but not extensible method for deriving and calculating trust. However, the
evaluation method is rather limited as it statically defined to only evaluate it for determine
the route. Thus, R1 is partially fulfilled by the approach while R5 cannot be fulfilled.
Yeom and Park propose the idea to use a special kind of agents to allow an e cient
intrusion detection within the field of mobile ad hoc networks. Their paper [72] uses the
approach of modelling the intrusion detection system based on the human immunological
system. That is, they introduce the named special mobile agents which act like a human
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blood cell. The agent is therefore able to distinguish between actions which are considered
to belong to the normal behaviour of the system and actions which are uncommon, thus
being considered as intrusion. The di↵erences of these two types of actions are based on
the humans blood cell ability to distinguish between “self” and “non-self”. Although the
approach is promising in terms of a distributed intrusion detection, there is no way to
verify integrity of such an agent (R1). This may be critical, even more as the authors aim
to address mobile ad hoc networks which are highly dynamic, if one of the agents becomes
compromised in an arbitrary manner. Due to the properties of a mobile ad hoc network,
the approach is designed with integrability and extensibility (R5 and R6) in mind.
3.1.3 Trust Management and Means of Deriving Trust
A very early approach which aims more in the direction of social trust is introduced by
Aberer and Despotovic in [73]. Although the discussion in this paper emphasises on peer
to peer networks and their trust issues with unknown participants, the findings made
are relevant. This is due to newer intrusion detection approaches commonly are working
as peer to peer systems. The authors point out, that it is necessary to judge about a
participants trustworthiness in order to perform more sophisticated tasks than simple file
transfer. They therefore develop a concept to base the trustworthiness of a participant,
i.e. of a node, on their behaviour. In detail, the behaviour is analysed thus forming a
reputation of this node. This reputation can be computationally be expressed and taken
for further decisions about this node, like communication with it. While the approach
has been already refined, the paper shows clearly, that there is a need for deriving the
trustworthiness of a node in such environments. That is, requirement R1 can be considered
as fulfilled to some extent. A storage for data is not directly mentioned within the paper
although the IDS bases decisions on that data (R2). Using the peer to peer approach,
more nodes may be used, thus providing a good integrability (R6). However, R5, is only
fulfilled in a very limited form due to the problem of only using a node’s behaviour as
trust derivation technique.
While not directly related to distributed environments but also on social interactions
between agents, Miu et al. show the problem of deriving trust in [74] from a rather non
technical point of view. It is made clear, that for example trust is not directly deriv-
able from reputation. This is due to reputation being eventually mutual in the described
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scenario. Furthermore, the authors propose their own model which clearly shows the dif-
ference between trust and reputation, the definition of reputation, the definition of trust
as value which is valid between two parties and the calculation approach for determining
the actual trust. As already explained, the scenario of the others is rather non techni-
cal. Despite this, the concepts described are also to some extent applicable to technical
environments.
Mobile ad hoc networks often require a secure routing of messages transmitted within
those networks. That is due to that problem that nodes connecting to these networks may
be untrustworthy and thus could compromise the message. In [75] Liu et al. propose a
dynamic trust model which allows for a secure routing of such messages in mobile ad hoc
networks. The authors assign a so-called trust level to each node. This trust level indicates
the trustworthiness of the node and allows to select the most trustworthy path through
the nodes a message should take (R1). More in detail, the trust level can take six di↵erent
values, ranging from untrustworthy to very trustworthy. The trust level is calculated using
a special algorithm, based on the input of an intrusion detection system each node must
possess. The authors assume, that the IDS located on each node is possible to detect
attacks which aim to change the integrity of the messages transmitted throughout the
network. Furthermore, they also assume that the IDS on each node can detect other
kinds of attacks of nodes within their radio range. Based on these findings, the trust
level of the neighbouring nodes can be calculated and thus a secure path can be selected.
Although this approach is promising, there are two general problems which need to be
addressed: the distinction of the di↵erent trust level values needs to be mapped for each
particular environment (R5) and furthermore, it must be ensured that the IDS on the
node is able to successfully detect all relevant attacks (R6). In addition, work related to
the proposed idea can also be found in [76].
Another approach is presented by Azzedin et al. in [77]. The aim of the authors is to
develop a trust model for grid computing environments (R6) allowing to define so-called
secure and trustworthy domains. To achieve this, the authors distinguish trust into so-
called identity and behaviour trust. Identity trust expresses the confidentiality about the
authenticity of an entity, thus is more technical-based. Behaviour trust is based on the
reputation of an entity and requires more sophisticated means to be measured. Further-
more, the authors propose the use of a trust level for entities. Like in other approaches,
this trust level may take pre defined values of a limited set expressing the di↵erent stages
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of the entity’s trustworthiness. Besides the trust level, the authors also introduce the con-
cept of direct and reputation-based (indirect) trust. Direct trust can be expressed if two
entities are directly connecting while reputation-based trust is used if there is no direct
connection between the two entities. To actual calculate the trust levels for an entity, the
authors propose a mechanism with several intermediate stages, like a required trust level
for each of the components being part of the calculation. With using this mechanism, the
paper deploys an e↵ective way to calculate the direct and reputation trust (R1) within
grid environments. The part of the identity trust is being considered well known, thus
the authors do not propose special means to determine this kind of trust. This can be
considered as a limitation, e.g. if the identity trust calculation is being compromised in
any way, the overall trust level may be false. Furthermore, no extension possibilities are
discussed by the authors, thus the approach is limited to the proposed mechanism (R5).
Another area where the term trust was introduced in is described by Blaze et al. in [78].
The authors show the drawbacks of authorisation models which are identity-based. That
is, instead of performing an authorisation based on the lookup of a certain identity and
handling some kind of an access control list, the authors propose to use a trust engine.
This trust engine is unaware of the actual identity but is able to derive trust (commonly
policy-based) for the component the authorisation decision is about. Another early paper
founding the area of trust management was published by nearly the same authors as [79].
Although both papers are not directly related to the requirement R1, they clearly show
the need for deriving trust and provide very first approaches on how to do so.
In [80] Thomas et al. picture the problem of using identity related information for
decision making in the area of federated identity management. As the concept proposes,
identities are used to allow for a high scalability in terms of the described federated
environments. The authors point out, that within this context, several distinguished trust
domains can be defined for the service providers used in these federated environments.
These service providers have to rely on identity-based authorisation information, which
may be untrustworthy due to the fact that they are not necessarily calculated from the
context of the service provider’s domain but from the local domain where the access is
originated from. That is, the service provider is unable to judge about the trustworthiness
of the authentication process as it is not part of its local domain. To counter this, the
authors propose to use a so-called level of trust (R1) which measures the strength of the
authentication process and attaches it to the authorisation information (R2). Although
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this idea is not directly transferable into the specific environment presented above, the idea
of measuring an authentication process in terms of its trustworthiness sounds promising
at all.
Authorisation and authentication in open environments is also treated by Bhargava et
al. in [81]. The authors work out, that relying only on specific credentials like passwords to
perform these tasks may not be su cient. This is due to the lack of credentials implying
trustworthiness, in the authors specific scenario for a certain user. To avoid this problem,
they propose the use of evidence (i.e. credentials) and trust to perform authentication
and authorisation. To do this, the paper describes an enhanced role-based access control
scheme, which incorporates a users trust. This trust is based on the behaviour of the user
and may vary. That is, the approach provides another behaviour-based model which can
be utilised to address R1. Due to the fact, that only behaviour-based trust is incorporated,
R1 must be considered only partially fulfilled. Furthermore, the approach itself is limited
to this technique, i.e. there is no extension possible (R5).
The distinction between trust, that is based on an identity and trust which is behaviour-
based is also pointed out by Papalilo and Freisleben in [82]. Their work aims on estab-
lishing trust mechanisms in grid like environments by the use of bayesian networks. The
basic idea of using bayesian networks for trust derivation was already developed in [83].
In detail, the authors define a network, which defines the relationship between identity
trust, behavioural trust and their combinations, simply called trust (R1). However, with a
focus on grid properties. Furthermore, they introduce methods to derive behavioural trust
for an entity by basing it upon measurable features like service quality and processing
speed, which is to some extent controllable (R4). Given these parts, the authors propose a
method for dynamically calculating trust. This allows to determine the trust of an entity
in a fine grained and flexible way, thus allowing to use the approach in di↵erent particular
grid-related scenarios (R5 and R6).
The use of Bayesian networks to describe trust is also used in [59] by Hailes et al. The
approach introduces a trust framework based on a bayesian formalisation. Furthermore,
the formalisation made does not only distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy
but defines a level of trust which may be arbitrary but discrete. The authors derive the
overall level of trust based on the direct trust as well as on recommendation trust. In detail,
the trust derivation uses several sub stages, that are stored (R2), forming an altogether
value (R1). Besides the calculation itself, the framework is also capable of evolving trust.
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The framework is tested again by routing messages through several nodes in a network,
with some of the nodes acting maliciously. Due to this, no direct controllability is given
by the approach (R4). Additionally, the trust derivation (R1) is also limited, which is a
result of the missing bootstrapping procedure. In detail, the authors do not yet present a
method for defining initial trust values.
Another framework which can be used for trust management in distributed environ-
ments is introduced by Sun et al. in [84]. The approach used by the authors consists of
several stages. The first stage, consisting of the basic definition of trust introduces the
authors interpretation of the term trust in computer networks. Based on this definition,
the authors introduce their basic propagation axioms, thus forming the system their man-
agement framework should be developed in. Given these two parts, the authors analyse
several attacks mounted on distributed environments, in particular in the area of routing
tra c through arbitrary nodes. Using the findings made, the authors are then able to
define their trust management system. It consists of five building blocks which handle
the trust calculation (R1), the trust storage (R2), the trust process as well as the detec-
tion of malicious nodes (R3 partially). The actual trust derivation used is based on the
HADOF approach presented in [85]. That is, the authors rely on a technique, where a
node can determine if packets are dropped by another node. While the approach with
its trust management itself can be considered rather promising, the authors limit their
actual trust derivation by the use of HADOF (R1 and R5). While the authors proof their
approach to be e↵ective in the area of node-based ad hoc networks, it is unclear if the
approach is working in other distributed environments (R6). Due to the limitation of the
actual trust derivation (R5), this needs to be investigated further, although the authors
propose their approach to be usable in arbitrary distributed environments.
Complex trust management plays also an important role in the area of wireless sen-
sor networks. In [86] Bao et al. present an approach to leverage a trust-based intrusion
detection system in such an environment. The trust derivation is based on two factors:
so-called social trust as well as quality of service. Social trust is derived from a nodes
honesty in terms of trust [87, 88, 89]. That is, factors like false self reporting and abnor-
mal trust recommendations from nodes are used for derivation purposes. The quality of
service based trust derivation uses technical measurements, like the energy consumption
of a node. Based on this, the authors deploy a trust management system providing a
hierarchical, trust-based intrusion detection mechanism. Furthermore, the authors add
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a probability mechanism to minimise the false alarm rate. While experiments made by
the authors show the approach to be promising, there are still some open question. The
authors themselves propose to intensify the research in the area of trust derivation, like
including more techniques for measuring social trust.
Wang et al. propose the IDMTM, abbreviated for intrusion detection mechanism based
on the trust model. Their paper [89] introduces the IDMTM system allowing an intrusion
detection in the area of ad hoc networks. The idea of the IDMTM system is based on
two parts: the usage of a so-called evidence chain and the measurement of so-called trust
fluctuations (R1). The evidence chain combines several evidence of malicious behaviour
for a certain node, thus it acts as basic policy (R4). That is, the evidence chain holds well
known malicious node behaviour, e.g. particular types of attacks which may be carried
out by a node. It can be seen as a prototype of a node combining all possible malicious
behaviour into one single instance. By taking nodes and matching their behaviour against
this chain, malicious nodes may be detected. This is done by defining a threshold which
indicates the point, where enough parts of the chain are matched, so the node is treated as
malicious. Furthermore, a node’s trust fluctuation is used. Trust fluctuation expresses the
change of a node’s trust level. If this change is greater than a pre defined threshold (e.g.
the trust level’s standard deviation), the node is also being considered untrustworthy thus
being malicious. Combining these two approaches, the IDMTM system is introduced. Un-
fortunately the approach is only usable in node-based environments (R6) and provides no
extension of the trust fluctuation mechanism (R5). By using a simulated environment, the
authors prove their approach to be promising in terms of detection and, more importantly,
in terms of the reduction of false alarms.
Wireless networks may also be used in ad hoc vehicular applications, where they are
realised as multicast networks. Chang et al. propose the use of a Markov chain-based trust
model to determine a node’s trustworthiness in [90]. The goal of the work is to provide a
reliable authentication method which can be used for node authentication in this type of
network. The authors propose to calculate a so-called trust value for a node. This trust
value is based on the previously determined trust manner of the node. This trust manner
is derived from the previous operations a node has performed, e.g. joining or leaving a
multicast group in a trustworthy manner. Using this, each neighbouring node can derive
trust, thus forming the Markov chain-based model (R1). The node with the highest trust
value is then being selected as certification authority used for the actual authentication
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process. While the authentication itself is rather out of scope for this work, the derivation
of trust must be taken into account. The authors not only propose to calculate the trust
values for each node but also to distribute this values for successful selection of a certifi-
cation authority. Although each node is aware of the calculated trust, the building blocks
used for the derivation process are only fixed behaviour-based measurements (R5). The
authors have proven their approach to be promising in the described scenario but also
realise that more work is necessary to use it in other, more general environments (R5).
In [91] Ma et al. propose the synthesize trust degree evaluation model (STDEM) for use
in dynamic distributed environments. Aim of the model is the derivation of a trust level for
a participating component in such environments (R1). The solution given by the authors
is based upon two di↵erent trust derivations and their appropriate combination. First,
a direct trust degree is calculated. This degree is based on means of direct measurable
actions, thus comes from a neighbouring component. Second, the indirect trust degree is
calculated. It is mainly based on the reputation of the component and is being propagated
by recommendations from third parties. The combination of both parts is performed by
a so-called synthesization, which then forms the synthesize trust degree. Part of this
calculation is a previously attenuation of the trust degrees which takes time dependent
trust into account. Simulations made by the authors show, that the approach is useful,
but only within their defined scenario (R6). Furthermore, the trust calculation is fixed,
thus R5 cannot be fulfilled.
Another way of deriving trust is presented by Sadeghi and Stüble in [92]. Their paper
aims to overcome the limitations of the attestation mechanism proposed by the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG). That is, the TCG’s approach (cf. [93, 94, 95, 96]) is based upon
verifying a parties trustworthiness based on certain measurements taken on that party’s
platform. To do this, relevant specifications of the platform are compared against desired
specifications. This introduces the problem, that each particular configuration must be
known in order to provide a reference value for the measurements. Practically, this is
rather di cult due to the nearly unlimited amount of di↵erent platform configurations.
The paper introduces therefore the idea of basing this measurement on properties. Instead
of the actual system-specific measurements, properties express only a certain feature.
This allows to abstract particular features, e.g. a trusted boot process (cf. [97]) can be
abstracted into a property expressing security of a platform. This allows to define a
more general attestation method, which derives a platform’s trustworthiness, that is no
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longer based on the specific configuration of that platform (R1, R5, R6). The definition
of the properties itself is outsourced to a third party. This third party is considered to be
trustworthy and therefore responsible for providing the correct properties, which limits
the fulfilment of R5. There has been more work following this, mostly in the area of using
properties for secure boot applications with available platform configurations and in the
area of providing e↵ective protocols. This work can be found in [98, 99, 100]. While the
trust derivation itself is very promising, at least in the field of using the approach for
attestation there needs to be more work done. This is mostly due to the use of a third
party as property provider. Furthermore, as this approach belongs into the field of Trusted
Computing, a more detailed analysis can be found in section 3.2.
As already stated, grid computing also demands a management of trustworthiness for
the resources provided. Vijayakumar et al. show another approach on how to derive trust
in [101]. The authors goal is to provide a measurement of the trustworthiness of a grid’s
resource provider. In detail, the approach presented calculates a so-called trust factor for a
resource (R1). This trust factor is the combination of so-called security factors and security
attributes. Both parts are combined using a particular function and form the overall trust
factor. Although not written in the paper, security factors can be seen as expression for
the direct trust while security attributes express the indirect trust. In this case, indirect
trust is derived from reputation properties, like the authenticity of a provider. The security
factors, thus the direct trust, is formed by a set of characteristics which may be valid for a
service provider. For example, the set contains entries like intrusion detection capabilities
or anti-virus capabilities. All the entries within this set are weighted in terms of their
impact on the trust calculation. This allows to express di↵erences in terms of trust for
the characteristics. While located in another field, this approach does also base the trust
derivation on some kind of properties, like Sadeghi’s approach [92]. Although this approach
does limit the capabilities which may be used for deriving trust, the idea itself sounds
rather promising. An extended version of the approach can be found in [102].
There has been more work done in the area of trust management and trust derivation.
The approaches presented in [103, 104, 105] all rely on a particular combination of direct
and indirect trust. While direct trust may or may not be addressed, indirect trust is always
derived using a reputation system. Taking all these result, a summary can be given.
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3.1.4 Summary
The first approach presented, CADS, allows a holistic decision making process for smart-
phone enabled environments [2]. Above all, it was developed to address the special prop-
erties of smartphones which are included within a network, thus it provides outstanding
integration and extension capabilities (R5 and R6). Due to this, it is well suited enough
to be used as basic environment. CADS provides capabilities, for example the architec-
ture consisting of Feature Collector, Feature Provider, Correlation Engine and Feature
Consumer which is very useful for solving the problems given by the scenarios. More in
detail, the concept of using a Feature Provider already allows to store the collected sensor
data (i.e. the Features) on a centralised place. This can be considered as a good basis
for the complete fulfilment of R2. Besides this, the Correlation Engine and the related
policy provide also a sophisticated basis for R3 and R4. Although it does not provide any
trust related mechanisms, its smartphone centric approach makes it well usable as basic
environment.
Summarising the first group, intrusion detection approaches in general, it is easy to see
that research has decreased in this area. This is due to the fact, that special environments,
like wireless sensor networks or ad hoc networks need special, thus tailored treatment. In
terms of the requirements stated in section 2, it can be summarised, that none of the
presented approaches o↵ers an out of the box capability to fulfil them completely. Besides
the requirements which demand and easy integration and extension (R5 and R6) and a
policy-based rule definition (R4), none of the other requirements may be fulfilled even
by customising the presented approaches. While the latter ones define their sensors to
be inherently trustworthy, thus negotiating the problem stated in R1, which may be
acceptable in their own scenario, the earlier approaches do not even mention or define the
problem of trustworthiness. Looking back at the latter approaches, some of them recognise
the problem and emphasise that there needs to be more work in order to address it in a
more general way. However, as there is not applicable solution, it comes clear that there
is really an issue when collecting measurements from sensors and basing decision upon
this collected information.
The second group which has been evaluated provides tailored intrusion detection ap-
proaches for particular environments. That is, in di↵erence to the first group, the solutions
proposed are only usable in the specific scenario. This scenario is always given by either
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a mobile and wireless ad hoc network, some kind of sensor network or grid and cloud
computing environments. Due to this, there are several di↵erent intrusion detection types
in this group. Starting by centralised approaches and hierarchical approaches, the range
ends by fully decentralised, peer to peer based approaches. In terms of trustworthiness
(R1), there are two distinct subgroups identifiable in this group. The first group does
not actively research the problem of their sensors trustworthiness, which is mostly due to
the scenario the solution is proposed for does not directly demand this. This subgroup
is rather small as most of the approaches at least include the trustworthiness problem
in their consideration. Due to this, the second subgroup includes some approaches which
demand the addressing of the trust problem. One example for this are all approaches pre-
sented for mobile ad hoc networks. Due to the scenario of nodes which are randomly part
of the network, trustworthiness of these nodes must be addressed. Most of the solutions
made for this node-specific trustworthiness aim into the direction of a secure routing of
messages in such a network.
Taking the third group, which is about deriving the actual trust measurement, also into
account, it can be stated that there are two distinct types of trust. The first type, called
direct trust is formed by specific properties of an entity. For example, if considering a node
in an ad hoc network, this could be the battery consumption of this node where a high or
abnormal consumption indicates a lower trustworthiness. That is, direct trust is also re-
ferred to a direct measurable value derived from a property of the system. In di↵erence to
this, indirect trust expresses trust measurements which have not been made on the entity
itself but are proposed from another system. In detail, a common term used for this is
the reputation of a system. If this reputation is high, i.e. other systems have successfully
operated with this system, the indirect trust of this system can be considered higher.
Furthermore, indirect trust is usually, but must not be exclusively, behaviour-based as it
maps the actions of a certain system into a measurable value used for trust calculation.
Combining these two trust types, an overall measurement for an entity’s trustworthiness
can be expressed. The combination of particular trust indicators, which may even be
more fine grained than just indirect and direct, is also widely researched. The tailored
solutions evaluated here allow for an e↵ective combination and expression of trust, thus
providing particular solutions to R1. While this is necessary in the approaches scenarios,
the calculation methods are always static. That is, none of the approaches presented is
able to change the calculation method in order to address a di↵erent situation. Providing
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a widely usable solution based on these approaches is rather impossible due to this. Ad-
ditionally, the methods used to derive trustworthiness are also very scenario centric, thus
static. They are always based on a limited set of system properties, which is usually not
enhanceable, some kind of test message exchanged or a reputation measurement received
from a third party. This idea of using system properties is rather straightforward and
sounds overall promising. Unfortunately, most of the approaches limit the set of usable
properties and thus making it impossible to apply the solution to arbitrary scenarios. The
same limitation can bee seen for the test message exchange. It is useful in a very limited
manner as this exchange might be compromised. If it becomes compromised, the whole
trust derivation is unusable. The third approach, using reputation information seems to
be promising as long as the methods used on the third party generating this reputation
are clearly defined. This is missing in some approaches. Given this, requirement R5 and
in some cases R6 are not fulfillable by the approaches of this group.
A summarised view on the requirements is given at the end of this chapter. Besides that,
the other overall group of approaches, the technological-based approaches is presented
next. It is based on the Trusted Computing initiative and founds trustworthiness on high
level properties of a system. Although these approaches aim not directly for intrusion
detection and decision making, the idea of using abstracted properties for trust derivation
is rather interesting. Due to this, the following sections evaluate the abilities Trusted
Computing is able to provide.
3.2 Technology-based Approaches
This section presents approaches which are based on one ore more technological specifi-
cations. In di↵erence to the research-based approaches, these specifications are industry
driven to provide best practices for companies. All of the approaches presented here be-
long to the overall field of Trusted Computing (cf. [106] and [107]). Trusted Computing
can be considered as approach which provides means to base the security of a system on a
hardware-based root of trust. That is, the use of trusted computing technologies allows to
verify a system’s integrity. This verification can be done in addition to a user’s verification,
which may for example be done by performing an authentication of the user. Although
the user might behave as expected, trustworthiness can only be derived if the system itself
is also to be considered trustworthy, which is applied by providing a mechanism to allow
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a system verification. There are two overall groups of specifications analysed here: (1)
Specifications that are based on the concept of a Root of Trust and Trusted Platforms as
well as (2) specifications that are based on Trusted Network Connect. Group (1) gives a
definition of trust and provides means to derive and specify trust of a component. That is,
it must be considered here as it presents approaches, which are valuable for the fulfilment
of R1 and R2. Group (2) combines the approaches of group (1) with a standardised proto-
col layer. This protocol layer aims on providing a very high level of platform independence
and interoperability. Due to this, it must be considered as it may provide a solution to
fulfil R5 and R6. Furthermore, the proof of concept implementation of the already pre-
sented CADS approach, which was considered valuable, is based on the second group to
achieve this high level of interoperability. Besides the analysis of the specifications itself,
research-based extensions to the specifications are also analysed here as they may provide
a more detailed (i.e., improved against the specifications itself) basis for the fulfilment of
R1, R2, R5 and R6.
Trusted Computing itself is composed of several specifications which are created and
maintained by the TCG. The TCG describes itself in [107] as a non profit organisation
which is based on a membership principle of industry acting corporations and research
institutions. That is, corporations and institutions can become a part of the TCG and
take responsibility for parts of the specification process. The amount of actual members
is steadily growing since the founding of the group under its previous name Trusted
Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA). Furthermore, the TCG is divided into several sub
groups which deal with a special field of interest, for example an infrastructure group or a
trusted network connect group. Each of these sub groups maintains a particular set of the
overall specifications. The specification process itself can be considered to be semi open to
the public. This means, that there is first an internal, closed phase where the specification
is only available for members to evaluate it, followed by a public review phase where the
group accepts comments from all audiences. Based on these two steps, a specification
becomes published after successful review of both parts.
As trusted computing aims on providing means to place trust on a system, the definition
of trust itself needs to be analysed again. This is done in the following section.
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3.2.1 Trust Definition and Trusted Computing
As written in the previous section, there is no consensus about the term trust and its actual
meaning. However, in order to fulfil R1, a clear definition is necessary. Nearly all of the
approaches presented above have their own definition. Particular di↵erent definitions can
be found in [108, 91, 54]. When evaluating all these definitions which are di↵erent in terms
of their e↵ective results, there is nevertheless one similarity. All found at least a part of
the term trustworthiness on the expected behaviour of a component or system. That is, if
a system behaves the way it was expected, it is considered to be trustworthy. The Trusted
Computing Group uses this basic definition for their own, stating in [109] that trust “is
the expectation that a device will behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose”.
That given, the device can be considered trustworthy if it behaves as expected. Comparing
this definition with the approaches presented above it is clear that the term behavioural
trust needs to be clarified. Behavioural trust is mainly based upon the interactions of
a system between another system. Given the TCG’s definition of trust, this foundation
of behavioural trust cannot be considered as being complete. This is due to the fact,
that the TCG’s definition bases the overall trustworthiness of the system on an expected
behaviour of this system. This must not be mixed up with the behavioural term used
in the approaches above. Instead of measuring the system’s interactions and using them
for trust derivation, the TCG’s definition describes the trustworthy situation of a system
based on the behaviour. In detail, a system may be considered trustworthy if it fulfils
certain requirements and acts like expected due to this. For the remainder of this chapter,
the TCG’s view on trust is used: A system is considered trustworthy if it does certain
actions like it is supposed to. There is no derivation of trust by di↵erent behaviour like in
the approaches presented above. To enforce and measure this expected behaviour, trusted
computing uses a special trust anchor. The following section introduces this trust anchor
and explains the concepts which are used to inherit actual trust.
3.2.2 Root of Trust
The trust anchor used in trusted computing is formed by the so-called root of trust (cf.
[110]) whereon all trustworthiness for a system is based up on, thus building a foundation
for fulfilling R1. As already stated, trusted computing relies on a hardware root of trust.
This hardware root of trust is given by the so-called Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
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(cf. [93, 94, 95]) and the components related to the TPM. The TPM itself is a special
hardware component residing in a more or less protected way on the system’s physical
representation, usually the mainboard. It is a necessary component to fulfil the TCG’s
requirements for a so-called Trusted Platform. The term Trusted Platform is summarised
later in this chapter. First, a detailed view upon the TPM is given, in particular about
the features which provide the derivation of trust (R1).
Trusted Platform Module
The Trusted Platform Module is realised as a microchip providing the necessary functions
to form a trusted platform. Its internal architecture is depicted in figure 3.3. The TPM can
Figure 3.3: TPM architecture defined by [93].
be interpreted as a special kind of cryptographic processor (i.e. a co-processor) which is
statically bound to the hardware. Although the TPM tries not to counter hardware-based
attacks, e.g. accessing the platform in physical means and removing the entries stored
in memory by cooling down this memory (cf. [111, 112]), it provides minimal tamper
resistance. This means, that it should be practically hard to remove the TPM from its
corresponding hardware or compromise it using a hardware-based attack.
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To verify a platform’s integrity a so-called integrity measurement takes place. The result
of this measurement is securely stored using the TPM. This is done by utilising the so-
called Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). PCRs can be seen as a special kind of
memory, holding a size of 20 bytes (i.e. a SHA-1 hash). These 20 byte values may be
measurements of certain system configurations, like a configuration file or a boot image.
The term measuring refers to performing a SHA-1 hash operation with the object to
be measured. The PCRs are initialised with well known values when the system starts
up and may only be changed by the use of a special operation. This operation, called
extend() takes a new value and inserts them into the appropriate PCR. The insert
process is not just changing the PCR’s entry but invoking an algorithm which takes the
stored value, concatenates it with the new value and finally hashes the resulting value






) [113]. This makes it impossible to
simply put arbitrary and desired values into a PCR due to the use of a hash function
and the concatenation with the already stored value. To successfully manipulate this
process, it would be necessary to already change the first value stored within the PCR.
This is rather hard to achieve, as the first measurement performed is invoked by another
special component. This component, commonly referred to as Core Root of Trust for
Measurement (CRTM) is represented by the first program code that is being executed
when the system starts. It is responsible for performing the first particular measurement,
usually the system’s BIOS. The CRTM is placed on some hardware component on the
system (likely on the CPU), it is usually not part of the TPM itself, thus forming the
second part of the root of trust.
After measurements have taken place in the way described, they can be accessed by a
third party. This is done by another function provided by the TPM, the so-called quote
operation. Invoking quote() with the appropriate PCR(s) to be quoted, instructs the
TPM to provide the value stored in the PCR. It is not only provided as plain value but
is signed using the TPM’s key hierarchy. The TPM possesses several keys which may be
used for di↵erent tasks. There is a so-called Endorsement Key, which is unique for each
TPM, thus making it possible to derive that a message signed with this key comes from
a valid TPM. As this implies privacy issues, i.e. always using the same key, there is a
set of derived keys, the so-called Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs). By using this keys, it
is possible to verify if a message signed with one of them comes from a valid TPM but
not from which particular TPM. These keys are used to sign the message generated when
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invoking the quote operation. That is, the PCR value is simply signed with one of these
AIKs so that the verifier can prove this value to be originating from a TPM.
Using this measurement and storing ability, the TPM has another capability which
has to be considered for the fulfilment of R1. This capability, which is called sealing,
allows to bind certain information onto a particular state of the system. That is, sealing
takes informations and encrypts them using the stored PCR values, thus making them
inaccessible as long as the system does not reach that particular state. In detail, when
the system starts up, the PCR stores certain measurements, like the state of the system’s
BIOS and the state of the boot image used. If some of the measured components change,
their measurement value does also change. This implies another PCR value than the
one which the information has been sealed to. It is therefore impossible to unseal the
data without the use of unchanged components. While this mechanism might be used to
securely store information on the system, which can only be accessed if the system is not
compromised, i.e. in a well known state, it provides an even more useful application. It
can be used to only boot the system up, if all measured value are as expected. That is,
it is possible to define a particular state the system must have to properly boot up. If
combining this with a X.509 certificate (as the proof of the system itself), this can be used
to remotely verify, that the system is within an expected state. Due to this, trust may be
derived from this information. The process of verifying this state is known as attestation
and will be explained more in detail in section 3.2.3.
Summarising this, the root of trust in trusted computing-based systems is not only
formed by a single component but by several components and certain values. That is,
there are on one side hardware-based parts while there are also software-based parts. The
hardware-based parts consist above all of the TPM itself. It holds the abilities to handle
the results from measurements in a secure and trustworthy way, thus in a way that there
is no lost in trustworthiness when storing measurements. Besides that, all other hardware
components must be considered also as parts for a root of trust. This is due to the fact,
that hardware-based components cannot be measured by the TPM appropriately. If one of
these components implements malicious functions which are not exposed but used secretly,
there is no way of recognising this. In addition to the hardware, the measurement itself can
be considered as one part which forms the root of trust. In detail, the pre defined values
which are used as reference when comparing the measurements are either interpreted as
trustworthy or untrustworthy values. Untrustworthy values are stored as reference while
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every other value is being interpreted as trustworthy. Taking these two parts, is can be
concluded that a trusted system will act as expected, and is therefore being trustworthy,
if it complies with its hardware parts and the measurements taken. If the second part,
the measurements are not the way they were expected, the process of measuring itself
is still being trustworthy. This allows to securely identify systems which do not comply
to a particular expected state. Furthermore, this allows to derive the actual properties
which need to be taken into account if a system wants to be evaluated in terms of its
trustworthiness, thus providing a particular solution for R1.
Given these building blocks, in particular the TPM, a so-called Trusted Platform can
be defined. A detailed explanation of a Trusted Platform and the concept if a Chain of
Trust is given in 7.2.
3.2.3 Trusted Network Connect
Another one of the TCG’s specification is the so-called Trusted Network Connect (TNC)
specification. It provides a standardised mechanism to use the techniques presented above,
like an attestation of a device within a network. From the requirements point of view,
leveraging certain capabilities of TNC may be well suited to fulfil R5 and R6. This is the
case as one of the primary goals of TNC is to provide a high level of interoperability.
TNC itself can be seen as an improved version of traditional network access control
(NAC) approaches. NAC approaches allow to limit the access a client gets when it ac-
cesses the network. This is done by leveraging approaches like the IEEE 802.1X [114]
which provides a port-based access control. Furthermore, the access decision is usually
based up on a policy defining which client can access which service. In oder to distin-
guish between di↵erent clients, an user authentication is usually performed. In case of
the 802.1X protocol, the extensible authentication protocol (EAP, [115]) is responsible for
performing the actual authentication. In addition to this, there are three roles defined:
the so-called supplicant, an authenticator as well as an authentication server. The term
may be slightly di↵erent for another actual NAC implementation, although the role itself
is the same. The client, which requests access to the network takes the role of the suppli-
cant. A switch is commonly used as port-based access device, thus taking the role of the
authenticator. The third component, often depicted by an AAA server takes the role of
the authentication server. If the supplicant now requests access to the network, it commu-
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nicates this request to the authentication server. This is done through the authenticator,
which only allows this kind of tra c from the supplicant. Practically, the protocol used
for this kind of communication is EAP-based from the supplicant to the authenticator
and RADIUS [116] based from the authenticator to the authentication server. In detail,
the EAP messages are encapsulated into the RADIUS protocol appropriately. As already
mentioned, a user authentication is commonly carried out within this process. That is,
the authentication server first checks the user’s credentials and based on the result of this
check and the network’s policy makes a decision. This decision is then communicated to
the authenticator and consists of the information (a) whether the supplicant is allowed
to access the network and if it is allowed (b) which kind of access is granted. The au-
thenticator carries out the decision appropriately, thus connecting the supplicant to the
network or denying access.
As easy to see, the access decision made by the authentication server is solely based
on the user of the supplicant, not on the supplicant’s properties itself. This may be a
problem, if the access decision should also be based on particular features of the suppli-
cant. For example, security related features like the supplicants patch level or certain anti
virus countermeasures may be one of the aspects which form a decision. To allow for a
check of those, some NAC approaches allow to measure the supplicant’s system. That
is, these approaches are able to determine the system’s integrity and base decisions on
this integrity. A commonly used concept to achieve this, is to use an agent on the suppli-
cant which is responsible for performing the measurements and to communicate them to
the authentication server. A problem arises when compromising this agent: it may send
false measurements of the system, thus making the measurements useless as they are not
trustworthy (cf. [117, 118]). Due to this, there is the general question about trusting the
measurements done on the supplicants side. Trusted Network Connect now provides a way
of putting trust in the received measurements by leveraging the capabilities of a trusted
platform. TNC can therefore to some extent be seen as an enhanced NAC approach.
TNC provides the following capabilities, which are a mixture of common NAC abilities
and exclusively trusted computing-based solutions.
Platform Authentication A Platform Authentication ensures two things: (1) the authen-
ticity of the platform itself and (2) the integrity of the platform. Authenticity of the
platforms means, that the platform which is communicating with the networks is
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exactly that platform which was expected to do this. The second point, the in-
tegrity (2) is measured on the platform and evaluated on the server’s side. If it is
as expected and the authenticity (1) was ensured, the overall process is considered
successful. While the integrity may also be considered in an insecure way by other
NAC approaches, the platform’s authenticity is introduced by TNC.
Endpoint Policy Compliance The authorisation process for a particular platform is based
on the integrity measurements done on that platform and a policy. This policy spec-
ifies the di↵erent cases in which a platform may or may not get access. For example,
the policy could hold information about the operating system or the platform’s
patch level.
Access Policy In addition to platform-specific decision making, the user of the platform
should also be taken into account. This may be done by using standard approaches
(i.e. 802.1X) to perform an additional user authentication.
Assessment, Isolation and Remediation If the platform is not allowed to access the
network due to not complying with the network’s policy, the platform is to be
isolated. Isolation can be distinguished into two cases. The first case denies every
access to the network, thus e↵ectively interrupting all communication possibilities
between the network and the platform. In the second case, the platform is placed
within a special quarantine network segment. Within this segment, the platform
has the possibility to solve the integrity related problems which lead to its access
denial. This is for example done by providing access to particular update servers
allowing to platform to update certain applications or the OS. After resolving has
taken place, the so-called remediation can be carried out. Remediation allows to
re-assess the platform’s properties again and if the platform is now policy compliant
(i.e. the platform authentication is successful), access can be granted.
Architecture
The TCG provides an architecture which allows to realise the features explained above.
The most overall version of this architecture is depicted in figure 3.4. The architecture
consists of two conceptual parts. The left side, which provides the functions like platform
































































































Figure 3.4: Overall TNC architecture [96].
IF-MAP specific extensions. This section first deals with the left side, while the right
side is explained later in section 3.2.3. A more detailed version of the left side is shown



































Figure 3.5: Detailed TNC architecture without IF-MAP [119].
architecture consists of logical entities, denoted by blocks and standardised interfaces,
denoted by the prefix IF. Communication either via a network or by processes are shown
by lines, in some cases with arrows indicating the flow of the communication. There are
three components defined by the architecture, which map the roles that were explained
for general NAC approaches. They are realised as vertical sections in the architecture.
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The Access Requestor (AR) takes the role of the supplicant, thus requesting to access
the network. It is usually an endpoint device like a laptop or a smartphone. The Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) is responsible for providing or denying this requested access. It
therefore acts as the authenticator. Commonly, a switch which is capable of performing
port-based access control is used as component for this. The third component, which is the
Policy Enforcement Point (PDP) is responsible for evaluating the AR’s measurement and
comparing it against a policy, thus making a decision about whether the AR should gain
access or not. It is therefore in the role of the authentication server. The three components
and their communicational patterns are divided horizontally into three di↵erent layers.
Beginning with the lowest layer, the so-called Network Access Layer, via the Integrity
Evaluation Layer and ending on top in the Integrity Measurement Layer.
A detailed explanation of the TNC architecture is given in 7.3.
Policies
Three di↵erent logical policies can be identified, whereas logical refers to the policies
being di↵erent in their means while they may be physical located within one file. The
three types are the IMV policies, the TNCS policy and the NAA policy. The IMV policies
control the evaluation of the particular measurement values. They are only valid for the
appropriate IMV and there may be more than one of them, each for every IMV. These
kind of policies control for example which patch level of the system is valid. The second
type, the TNCS policy controls the decision making of the TNCS. This is necessary as
the TNCS receives a suggestion from each IMV, thus it may receive an arbitrary high
amount of di↵erent suggestions. The TNCS policy controls which kind of decision is made
based upon the several suggestions, thus it e↵ectively controls the weighting of all di↵erent
aspects measured. By the use of this policy and the suggestions, the TNCS can perform
a decision making process. Although this decision is the final action from the TNC’s
concept point of view, the Network Access Authority has the overall decision. To control
the behaviour of the NAA, another policy is used. This NAA policy holds aspects like the
di↵erent users and di↵erent groups which may be treated di↵erently. All of these policies
are needed in order to define allowed states for a client.
In addition to these PDP-specific policies, there may be a fourth kind of policy. As
the AR is located on the client device, there is one problem in terms of privacy: the
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measurements which are performed may contain arbitrary data about the client. This
leads to a situation, where the user of the client has to trust the infrastructure about
not collecting the user’s information. As smartphones may contain sensitive information,
which the user don’t want to share, it is necessary to provide a way to at least inform
the user about what is collected and give her the choice to decide. Although this is not
directly addressed in the TNC specifications itself, there is some research-based work
which provides a solution for this and allows a wider use of TNC.
Bente et al. introduce a concept called client side policy in [120]. It allows the user of
an Access Requestor to be actively part of the TNC handshake by accepting or denying a
measurement request. This is done by defining a so-called client side policy (cf. figure 7.5
and listing 7.1 for an example), which is based on the IF-M specification [121] and allows
to define which attributes may be measured or not. In addition, the concept also limits
the measurement abilities to the defined attributes. This limits the server in requesting
arbitrary things from the client. In detail, the policy is placed by enhancing the architec-
ture of TNC, shown in figure 3.6 and thus also extending the message flow (see figure 7.6).
As it easy to see, the Access Requestor is enhanced by a Policy Manager (PM), which
Figure 3.6: Extended TNC architecture [120].
handles the necessary policy interruptions. As long as the TNCS accesses properties and
attributes that are defined as allowed, the whole process is the same as in standard TNC.
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If the TNCS wants to access arbitrary, undefined properties or disallowed attributes this
is denied and an empty message is returned to the TNCS. Although this approach ensures
the privacy to some extent, it depends on the TNCS’s policy used on the PDP. That is, if
one of the attributes which has been denied by the client is considered highly valuable, the
PDP certainly won’t allow access without it. Nevertheless, the approach allows to deploy
the TNC architecture in fields that demand privacy considerations, as already stated like
in smartphone enhanced environments.
Remote Attestation
Going back to the features trusted computing provides, remote attestation is the most
valuable one in terms of deriving trust (R1). Given all the techniques and concepts from
the previous sections, like the root of trust or TNC as communicational framework, remote
attestation can be explained in the following. Furthermore, there are several research
approaches which allow for more sophisticated attestation approaches. Some of them are
also shown and evaluated.
Remote attestation describes the actual process of receiving integrity related informa-
tion from the client which describe the platform’s state and which can be considered
trustworthy under some circumstances. As already stated this is done by measuring the
platform’s properties and extending them into the TPM’s PCR(s) e↵ectively building a
measurement chain. When verifying the measurements, the final value is retrieved from
the TPM. This is done by performing a quote operation for the appropriate PCR(s).
Within this quote operation the values are signed by the TPM with a key, allowing it to
verify the validity of the TPM. This is necessary as the TPM is one of the root of trusts for
a trusted platform. The key which is used to sign the quoted values are one of the already
described AIKs. The connection of this AIK is given due to the AIK being derived from
the TPM’s EK and by establishing a relationship of the AIK and EK. This is done by an
external party, a so-called privacy CA, which signs the AIK and attests that it belongs to
a valid TPM. Also this process is rather straightforward, it demands that the privacy CA
acts trustworthy. This is necessary as if the privacy CA provides its information to the
verifiers of the signed PCR values, the verifiers would be able to uniquely identify the plat-
form each time an interaction with this platform takes place. To circumvent this problem,
Brickell et al. propose the so-called direct anonymous attestation approach (DAA) in [122]
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and [123]. The DAA introduces a tailored protocol, which allows to derive the validity of
an AIK without the use of a privacy CA. It is a rather complex protocol but allows to
avoid the privacy limitations if using the privacy CA approach. Independently of using
the DAA or privacy CA approach, the verifier is able to reconstruct the measurement
chain. This is due to the platform not only sending the quoted values of the PCRs but
also a log, the so-called stored measurement log (SML), which includes all information
about the measurement steps that were carried out on the platform. Given the quoted
PCR values and the SML, the verifier can rebuild the measurement chain on its own and,
if everything is as expected, by performing each measurement step described in the SML
on its own should come up with the same value that was received from the platform. The
SML itself is not secured at all as this is not necessary. If there are di↵erences between
the SML and the actual measurement chain, e.g. in case the SML was compromised, the
verifier won’t reach the final value, thus it recognises that something is not as expected.
The process of measuring each component of the platform based on hashing of the
executables of this component is the TCG’s proposed standard approach for attestation.
It is called binary attestation, and relies conceptual solely on the measurement of binaries
on the systems. This imposes some questions, with some of them already being mentioned.
The main problem of binary attestation is the scalability of this approach (cf. [124, 125]).
To get a complete picture of the system, every component (i.e. every binary) needs to
be measured. Given an actual system with a common operating system like a Linux-
or Windows-based one, there is a rather high amount of components which need to be
measured. Even if it would be possible to measure all components in a reasonable way, for
example in a reasonable amount of time as hashing takes some time per file, the approach
does still not scale very well. This is due to the fact, that each time the system reboots
things are changed on the platform. Even without the user doing something, like storing
new programs or files, the system also changes. In particular, every time the system
updates itself, the changes are even of higher impact. This leads to a situation, where
each reboot would require new reference values, which is practically very ine cient. To
counter this, the system can be divided in several distinct compartments [126, 127, 128].
One of these compartments may be interpreted as security critical and be set to a read
only state which prevents changes to it, even when rebooting. Although this idea provides
some more usability, the problem of changing system configurations through updates and
the high amount of possible system configurations remains.
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To perform an actual remote attestation, the TNC framework may be used. TNC
provides a full set of methods to perform a remote attestation in a interoperable manner
(R1, R5 and R6). There are no problems if performing this while the client (i.e. the
AR) is directly connected to the network, not using some kind of VPN approach. If the
access is provided through a VPN tunnel, the TNC framework proposes several means
to allow for an attestation. First of all, the VPN gateway takes over the role of the
Policy Enforcement Point, thus being responsible for enforcing the access to the network.
Furthermore, the approach strongly relies on the VPN being established using IPSec [129].
This is due to the fact, that the TNC handshake is proposed as being part of the Internet
Key Exchange performed within the IPSec negotiation phase. In detail, TNC demands
version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2, [130]) as only this version if
capable of encapsulating the appropriate TNC-specific packets. This can be seen as a
limitation, as there are several other technologies for establishing VPN connections (e.g.
[131]). Addressing this limitation, there are approaches which allow to perform a remote
attestation in VPN environments.
Schulz et al. propose an approach in [132, 133] which also extends the IKEv2 protocol
in order to support a remote attestation. The aim of this work is rather in the area of sim-
plicity and e ciency to support arbitrary attestation approaches. In detail, the approach
negotiates the exact version of which kind of attestation is carried out in the phase of ne-
gotiating the IPSec’s security association. The attestation negotiation is therefore done by
introducing a new structure which allows to communicate about the attestation method.
The actual attestation process is done after the IKEv2 part is nearly finished. In this
phase, attestation data is communicated between the parties and a final connection is
only established if this phase is successful. The approach itself does not rely on TNC, but
provides e↵ectively the same functionality with the improvement of supporting arbitrary
attestation techniques. As with the TNC approach, the VPN implementation itself has
to be changed in order to support the IKEv2 and attestation data enhancements, which
renders this method only interoperable in a very limited way.
Besides this approach, Baiardi and Sgandurra propose another approach in [134]. Al-
though their work is mainly about performing a remote attestation within a so-called
overlay network, they do also rely on a VPN environment. In di↵erence to the previous
approaches, this environment is based on OpenVPN [131].In order to perform a remote
attestation, the authors enhance OpenVPN itself. In detail, a particular plug in is im-
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plemented adding remote attestation to the OpenVPN components. Comparing this to
Schulz’s approach mentioned above, the concepts are similar to a certain extent. Both ap-
proaches use the possibility to customise and extend the VPN components. Besides that,
the approach of Baiardi et al. only allows for a conventional binary-based attestation.
Another common point for both approaches is that they do not aim at interoperability
as both require changes to the software components providing the VPN environment.
Another approach based on TNC aims to provide this interoperability.
In [135] Bente et al. propose an idea to perform a TNC-based attestation without the
need to change components responsible for the VPN connection. It is based on the second
version of the IF-T [136] protocol, which provides a method for communicating TNC
messages using an already existing ip-based connection. In detail, a TLS secured tunnel is
established which allows to perform a remote attestation. This is done by allowing the AR
in its initial state to communicate with only the PDP. A packet filter is used to enforce this
communication and operates on the VPN gateway so no other communication is possible
for the AR. After the handshake is finished, the filter may open up the network. Although
software is unchanged if using this approaches, some special components are added to
the architecture (figure 7.7 for details). There needs to be the packet filter, which acts as
Policy Enforcement Point and to provide real interoperability a so-called PEPd1 which
provides IF-PEP functionality. Figure 3.7 depicts the changed flow of messages. The steps
which are carried out by using this approach are as follows.
1. First of all, the VPN connection is established. This is done in a regular way, i.e.
without any TNC or attestation-specific means. Due to this, there are no changes
to the VPN software necessary. The VPN tunnel is established after this step.
2. Next, the TNC handshake starts. The necessary components on the AR perform
the required measurements and the results are communicated via the IF-T protocol
through the established VPN tunnel.
3. The PDP receives these results, as the packet filter allows the AR to communicate
with the PDP. It does not allow any other communication at this time. The PDP
can therefore perform the evaluation of the received results.
1The d indicating this as a daemon component.
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Figure 3.7: Changed message flow for VPN [135].
4. If the evaluation was successful, the PDP sends the enforcement instruction back
to the PEP. The PEPd is now responsible for receiving this message, as the packet
filter is usually not able to understand IF-PEP protocol-based messages.
5. Due to this, the PEPd is also responsible for triggering a rule change of the packet
filter. This rule change intends to allow network access for the AR.
6. The actual process of changing the rules is then performed by the packet filter itself.
In detail, it simply updates the rule set in order to allow the network access.
7. Finally, the access recommendation is communicated to the AR. Although this step
is depicted last, it may happen in parallel to the previous steps, as soon as the PDP
has sent the access recommendation to the PEPd. Finishing this, the AR gets access
to the network.
The approach provides also means to isolate an AR if necessary. This is done by instruct-
ing the packet filter with a specialised rule set which only allows access to a particular
isolation network. Furthermore, the approach not only provides interoperability due to
it’s straightforward integration but also support for arbitrary attestation methods. Such
other methods are shown in the following.
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As already stated, binary-based attestation has several drawbacks which are mainly
based on the poor scalability of the approach. Furthermore, there are also environments
which provide other, more tailored, means to attest the integrity. The approach of an
attestation based on properties rather than on binaries presented by Sadeghi et al. in [92]
was already explained in section 3.1.3. The idea of this approach is to define a platform’s
properties, like security relevant properties, and use a third part to translate the binary
measurements into property-based measurements, thus e↵ectively attesting the proper-
ties. The problem within this approach is the use of a third party which maps actual
configurations to properties. As with the privacy CA-based approach, this introduces pri-
vacy related problems, as the trusted third part might spread identifiable information.
In [137] Chen et al. introduce a protocol which solves this problem. This is done by us-
ing specialised signatures types, which allow to map configurations on properties without
the use of a third party. Using this refined version, property-based attestation provides
a promising way of deriving trust without the scalability problems introduced by plain
binary attestation. Some more views at property-based attestation are given in [138].
Another approach using properties is presented in [139]. It does not define properties in
the same way as the property-based attestation approach does, as it aims on dynamically
measuring a platform’s state. Thus, properties are defined as constraints a program2
must fulfil in order to be considered trustworthy. These constraints are based on pre
defined behaviour profiles programs possess when executed. At runtime, these properties
are measured, thus providing a dynamic version of the remote attestation approach.
Moving forward from trusted computing-based approaches, another attestation ap-
proach aiming at embedded devices is introduced in [140]. This approach, called SoftWare-
based Attestation for Embedded Devices (SWATT) is being able to verify the memory
contents of a device from an external party. This is done by providing a special verification
algorithm to the embedded device, which is able to generate memory-based checksums.
If an external party needs to verify memory contents, it sends a challenge to the device.
The device then calculates a checksum in a well defined manner, including some time
critical constraints, and responds to the verifier. Like in the TCG’s approach, the verifier
is able to do the same with the reference memory content and can therefore proof the
answer correct. If the answer is unexpected or the calculation time di↵ers, the device’s
memory is interpreted as compromised. In di↵erence to the TCG’s attestation, SWATT
2I.e., an executable and its instantiation at runtime.
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only uses a software-based root of trust (cf. [141]). This is possible for this area as an
embedded device has a defined architecture, as well as defined components and software.
While not directly addressing the field of problems the TCG’s approach aims for, this
approach can be used to attest embedded devices and thus provides a possibility to derive
trust for such devices. An improvement of the pseudorandom memory traversal concept
SWATT is based on is given in [142]. In this paper, the authors propose to use a SWATT
like approach to determine the trustworthiness of a node in a sensor network. It is done
by taking an amount of distributed nodes to determine the integrity state of another
node. Results of simulations show, that the approach allows not only to detect one single
compromised node but also works for more than one node.
Going back to the core attestation scheme proposed by the TCG, there is another
approach which tries to circumvent the problems of both, the TCG’s binary approach
and the property-based approach. This approach, called behaviour-based attestation, is
presented by Li et al. in [143]. It is based on two conceptual parts: a trustworthy boot-
strapping of the system to initialise the necessary components and second the monitoring
of the system’s behaviour. The authors propose to use the techniques introduced in [144]
to achieve a secure bootstrapping procedure. They do not propose other, in particular
new means for this area. The second part, the behaviour monitoring is based on a policy.
This policy defines expected behaviour on the verifiers side. On the client’s side a special
module is responsible for monitoring the behaviour and measuring it appropriately. This
module is secured by the bootstrapping of step one. The actual attestation is based on
the measurements of the behaviour which are communicated to the verifier. The verifier
is able to rebuild this behaviour and can compare it against the policy which defines
expected behaviour, thus trustworthy behaviour. Although behaviour can be considered
a rather good indicator for the trustworthiness, it is unfortunately not the only one (cf.
direct vs. indirect trust). Due this, the authors approach is only able to record and attest
the results of untrustworthy actions. It is not able, unlike the other approaches, to com-
pare a certain state of the system. Nevertheless, there might be applications, where this
kind of trustworthiness may be considered enough in order to derive trust.
Naumann et al. propose another behavioural-based attestation approach in [145]. In dif-
ference to the approach presented above, it is based on the low level binary measurements
which are mapped to a behavioural policy. That is, a pre defined behavioural model is used
to describe a policy. This policy is used as a reference for future attestations. Given the
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platform of the client, a framework introduced by the authors is used to abstract low level
binary measurements in a high level behavioural form. That is, the behavioural model
of the actual platform is derived by a defined set of binary and property-based measure-
ments which allow to map a specific configuration to a specific behavioural pattern. This
pattern is used to perform the actual attestation. Based on the pre defined behavioural
model, the pattern is matched against the policy. The policy is capable of defining ex-
pected behaviour as well as unexpected behaviour. This allows to include all platform
relevant properties, which e↵ectively reduce the problems of the approach presented prior
to this one.
Another approach which uses the behaviour of a certain piece of code as attestation
base is introduced by Haldar et al. in [146]. It is called semantic attestation and uses a
special architecture, which includes a trustworthy virtual machine running on the plat-
form. Programs which are intended to run on the platform are loaded into this virtual
machine. A policy on the verifiers side defines which behaviour is considered trustworthy.
The program runs within the virtual machine, which makes it possible to monitor it’s
behaviour in a sandbox like environment. The behaviour defined in the policy is then
evaluated against the behaviour that was monitored in the virtual machine. This process
renders the actual attestation, as the verifier decides based on the monitoring results.
The approach demands for a secure virtual machine environment as the verifier puts trust
into the observations made by the virtual machine. Due to this, it is also necessary to
enable a secure bootstrapping of the client. Furthermore, although the approach might
be used for arbitrary types of programs, the authors describe it explicitly for the use of
java executables running in a trusted java virtual machine.
Given the area of mobile security, Naumann proposes an approach to perform a remote
attestation for the Android platform in [147]. It is based on the usage of the Integrity
Measurement Architecture [148] in order to start a Chain of Trust from the kernel level.
However, the authors do not rely on existing open source software that provides the
necessary functions. Instead, they implemented a mini TPM emulator as well as a mini
TSS with a rather limited functionality. Furthermore, the paper proposes two attesta-
tion methods: so-called application level attestation and so-called class level attestation.
Application level attestation measures installed apps prior to their execution. A problem
arises as the established chain of trust cannot be considered complete. This is due to the
fact, that the approach does not measure the Android Java framework constituting of
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a set of core libraries. To overcome this limitation, class level attestation is used in the
overall approach. In detail, each single Java class is measured after it is loaded but before
it is executed, thus fixing the otherwise broken chain of trust. While it can be considered
as a complete attestation scheme, the approach solely relies on standard binary attesta-
tion, thus not covering the specific permission model of the Android platform and thus
only partially fulfilling R1. Furthermore, the class level attestation approach increases
the number of taken measurements linear to the number of the app’s Java classes, which
makes the poor scalability of binary attestation even worse. This poor scalability directly
a↵ects the fulfilment of R6 as it is di cult to integrate within an arbitrary amount of
devices. Furthermore, R5 must also be considered not fulfilled as the approach does only
rely on the binary-based attestation mechanism.
An approach which includes the special properties of the Android platform is presented
by Bente et al. in [149]. The authors propose an attestation scheme which relies on the
permissions given to the apps installed on that platform. That is, as permissions control
the behaviour of the apps by limiting their access rights, this approach can be seen as a
very special kind of a behavioural-based attestation. The approach is not only based on
simple evaluation of permissions given to apps but also on complex conjunctions of them
(see figure 7.8 and 7.9 for examples). Furthermore, the approach relies on a custom rom,
which allows to attest the Android platform’s basic systems, such like the kernel and the
virtual Java environment. This is done by leveraging the IMA [148] system which performs
a binary measurement of all static components, up to the application layer. At the point of
the application layer, the permissions for each installed app are attested (R1). That is, the
verifier receives two parts: a proof of the basic system based on a binary measurement and
the measured permissions for each app. A policy defines which permission combinations
are trustworthy. More information, in particular about the detailed message flow and the
performance of the approach can be found in section 7.7.
Bente et al. propose another approach for a Google Chrome (cf. [150]) based environ-
ment in [151]. It can, to some extent, be seen as another version of the permission-based
approach presented above. However, it aims on performing a remote attestation for the
Chrome OS platform, which has some features allowing also to base the attestation upon
the installed apps. In detail, Chrome OS provides a well defined basic system, including
the kernel and everything up to the Chrome browser. This basic system is secured in-
herently by a specialised version of a trusted boot. That is, the Chrome platform verifies
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the integrity state of the system and only boots the system if its state is as expected.
Apps provide application level functionality and are run inside the Chrome browser’s
sandboxed environment. Due to this, the approach provides two things: first it attests
that the measurements made are originated from a valid Chrome platform and second,
measurement results of the apps installed inside the browser. Proving the platform to
be a Chrome device is enough, as the trusted boot ensures the system’s integrity. If the
proof can be given, it must have been a valid booted Chrome system answering the proof
request. This puts the root of trust to some extent on the side of Google as the approach
relies on their trusted boot. The actual measurements are taken from the applications in-
stalled on that platform, thus residing in the Chrome browsers sandbox. They are based
on several properties, for example the manifest defining such an app or the actual binaries.
More details of the approach are shown in section 7.8. Using this approach, an e↵ective
remote attestation can be performed for Chrome OS-based systems. In di↵erence to the
TCG’s binary attestation, the approach is able to measure at a higher level by using the
properties of the particular apps.
Given all these di↵erent approaches, it can be concluded that there are a lot of possi-
bilities of deriving the actual trustworthiness of a device, thus providing basic methods
for fulfilling R1. Furthermore, it is noticeable that there are well suited approaches for
most of the relevant device classes, in particular for Android-based smartphones. These
approaches can be used in order to fulfil parts of the requirements. Besides that, it is also
clearly to see that none of the approach provides an all together solution which is able
to fulfil all requirements, in particular R2 and R3 are not considered at all. This is due
to the specific scenarios the approaches are intended for in addition to their fundamental
research-based characteristics.
IF-MAP
As written in section 3.2.3, TNC consist of two conceptual parts. Figure 3.4 depicts both
parts, with the concept responsible for providing attestation possibilities shown on the
left side of the figure. The other part, which consists of the specification for the so-called
Metadata Access Point (MAP) concept forms the right side of the figure. The standardised
interfaces (IF-MAP) are mainly specified in [152] by the TCG.
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IF-MAP can be seen as a special version of a content-based publish subscribe sys-
tem (cf. [153]). That is, there are entities which provide information to an authority and
other entities which subscribe to this authority based on a specific content and consume
the appropriate information. More in detail, there are two logical components defined in
IF-MAP. The first one, which is called MAP Client (MAPC), is responsible for (a) pub-
lishing information and on the other side for (b) consuming information. There may be
an arbitrary amount of such MAPCs in an IF-MAP enabled network. The second compo-
nent, the so-called MAP Server (MAPS) is the central authority responsible for receiving
published information from the MAPCs and handling the appropriate subscriptions for
other MAPCs. Examples for MAPCs are flow controllers of the network or simple clients
providing logging information. Using the provided information, the MAPS creates and
maintains an internal graph structure depicting the information and to some extent their
relationship. The graph is based on so-called identifiers and so-called metadata. Identifiers
are nodes which represent some kind of a key element making a set of information identi-
fiable while metadata are data which describes this key element. A device identifier may
for example possess certain capability metadata expressing certain abilities of the device.
An example graph is depicted in figure 3.8, the grey elements represent identifier while
the green and red elements show metadata. Furthermore, green depicts infrastructure
related metadata while red shows smartphone metadata. The example itself shows a pos-
sible graph for an environment consisting of the CADS system, one or more smartphones,
infrastructural components like a DHCP server and a TNC-based PDP (e.g. [154]).
The basic specification of IF-MAP does not define which metadata should be used. It
only defines the abstract relationship between identifiers and their metadata. The par-
ticular metadata is either specified in addition (cf. [155, 156]) to the basic specification
or must be specified in a vendor-specific way for the particular environment. That is, in
order to actually use IF-MAP, all MAPCs and MAPSs must be able to understand the
data exchanged. Interoperability can be achieved if the standardised metadata is being
used as each of the components may not be from the same vendor but all must implement
the standard specifications.
The CADS approach which was explained in section 3.1.1 is also, from the implementa-
tions point of view, based on the IF-MAP standard. The concept of the implementation
consists of two parts: the mapping of the appropriate components like the Feature Collec-




























Figure 3.8: Example graph.
detail by Bente in [2]. The CADS architecture is formed by four logical components: the
Feature Collector responsible for measuring Features, the Feature Provider which han-
dles the storage of the Features, the Correlation Engine which evaluates Features and the
Feature Consumers which somehow process Features. Each of these four components are
mapped to the explained IF-MAP roles of MAPC and MAPS. Figure 3.9 depicts this par-
ticular mapping of the IF-MAP roles within the CADS implementation. As it is easy to
see, the Feature Collector, the Correlation Engine and the Feature Consumer are mapped
as MAPCs. The only component being a MAPS is represented by the Feature Provider.
This is rather straightforward, as the Feature Provider is responsible for collecting and
providing Features from and to all other components. Furthermore, CADS demands that
there is only one Feature Provider and one Correlation Engine. This corresponds at least
for the Feature Provider with the IF-MAP approach, as there is usually also only one
single MAPS. In addition to this, there may be an arbitrary amount of Feature Collectors
and Feature Consumers, which is also as supposed as they act as MAPCs.
IF-MAP defines the communicational means only for exchanging data in a publish sub-
scribe based manner. The semantics of the data itself is defined in additional specifications
or must be self (i.e. vendor-specific) defined. In case of the CADS system, the IF-MAP
provided specifications were insu cient to handle the requirements the CADS system de-
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Figure 3.9: IF-MAP mapped CADS architecture [2].
mands (cf. [2]). Due to this, CADS uses its own vocabulary of metadata, which is strongly
based on the Feature concept of CADS. This vocabulary is mainly based on Features and
Categories. While Features, as already explained, encapsulate measurement values in con-
junction with contextual information, Categories are used to structure Features. In detail,
for each smartphone which is measured, a Feature tree, consisting of Features in its leafs
and Categories in its branches is constructed. This Feature tree is stored on the Feature
Provider, i.e. on the MAPS besides the standard IF-MAP graph, thus being an extension
to the standard graph. Figure 3.10 depicts such an example graph which results from the
use of the CADS system in an IF-MAP environment. The graph consists of two logical
areas: the upper area which represents standard IF-MAP elements and the lower which
is CADS-specific. The standard IF-MAP part in the upper area is constructed through
the use of other IF-MAP based components. Such components can be for example an IF-
MAP enabled flow controller or a sensor capable of publishing IF-MAP metadata. CADS
components are only able to operate on CADS-specific data (lower area), as they only
encapsulate the necessary information, like contextual information for the Features. This
means, to use standard metadata, a special MAPC would be required in order to trans-
late these standard metadata in the CADS-specific Feature format. An easier approach
to do this, is to simply extend the appropriate MAPC with the functionality to directly
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Figure 3.10: IF-MAP example graph with CADS elements [2].
publish Feature-based metadata. Although CADS can only operate on its own elements,
the Correlation Engine is capable of publishing back standard metadata under some cir-
cumstances. Due to this, CADS may also act as a decision engine providing decisions for
standard IF-MAP enabled components. Furthermore, the graph being created by the use
of the CADS components is only usable by components which are able to understand
the Feature-based semantic. This is only given for logical components which are either a
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Correlation Engine or a Feature Consumer. That is, if another component is intended to
be included in the CADS graph, with the term included referring to the ability to use the
Feature-based metadata, it needs to be either defined as Correlation Engine or as Feature
Consumer, whereas Feature Consumer is more likely.
Given that, the communicational flow created by the CADS component can be shown in
a more revised version. Figure 3.11 depicts this flow with the steps being explained in the
following. The components which are involved are two Feature Collectors (FCol-1/2), the


























Figure 3.11: CADS communication flow [2].
1. The first Feature Collector starts by measuring a certain property of the device and
creates a Feature for this measurement.
2. After that, the Feature Collector request storage for this Feature on the Feature
Provider. In detail, this is done by publishing this Feature as IF-MAP metadata
and providing it to the MAPS which includes it in the CADS-specific sub graph.
3. The second Feature Collector continues by measuring another Feature.
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4. This Feature Collector also requests the Feature Provider to store the previously
measured Feature. As with the first Feature Collector, this is done leveraging IF-
MAP and performing a publish into the appropriate sub graph on the MAPS.
5. The Correlation Engine retrieves both stored Features from the Feature Provider.
Seen from IF-MAP this is done due to the use of a subscription from the Correlation
Engine for CADS-specific metadata. That is, each time CADS metadata (Features)
are published by a Feature Collector, the Correlation Engine is triggered and is
provided with the Features from the MAPS.
6. Using this data, the Correlation Engine is now able to evaluate the Features against
the policy. This policy defines actions based on certain measurement values and their
combination, additionally including contextual information. Based on this evalua-
tion, a new Feature which expresses the Correlation Engine’s decision is created.
7. This decision holding Feature is then again stored (i.e. published to and stored) by
the Feature Provider.
8. A Feature Consumer, which has an appropriate subscription for this kind of Feature-
based decision metadata is now able to retrieve this decision.
9. Using this received Feature for an arbitrary purpose, the final step is finished.
As these steps and the CADS mapped architecture shows, IF-MAP provides a rather
straightforward way of using the CADS concept. By providing the necessary mapping
for the appropriate components and the definition of the Feature-based metadata format,
the IF-MAP based implementation approach can be easily extended. This can be used to
fulfil R5 and R6 when providing a proof of concept implementation.
3.2.4 Summary
Trusted Computing provides two basic abilities: the trust derivation approaches and the
framework-based approaches which are conceptional as well as implementation centric.
The trust derivation is given by the concept of a trusted platform possessing several
capabilities which allow to put trust into this platform. Furthermore, trust is not only
derived from software but founded by several hardware-based parts forming a rather
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strong root of trust. Besides the TCG standardised approaches, there has been some
work in this area, not only for the root of trust itself but also in the area of attestation.
This work shows several promising aspects, which may be leveraged in order to establish
a mechanism for evaluating trust, thus fulfilling R1. Unfortunately, neither the TCG’s
standardised approach nor the research-based approaches provide a way to perform a
trust evaluation in the reference environment out of the box. Furthermore, none of the
approaches fulfils the other trust-related requirements R2 and R3. A policy (R4) is given
and explained by some of the approaches. However, all of the approaches tailor their policy
for the selected use case.
The framework-based approaches provided by Trusted Computing are used to allow
for a high level of interoperability, thus aiming in the direction of R5 and R6. Although
not directly related to the trust-based requirements, it is rather promising as it allows to
implement systems which can be integrated into existing architectures. This is due to the
fact, that the new component simply needs to implement this standard as well if the envi-
ronment the component should be included is based on the standardised approach. While
not directly useful for the conceptual approach, this benefit needs to be considered when
actually building and implementing the system. In detail, the current implementation of
the CADS system is based on such a standard and therefore provides a solution R6.
3.3 Assessment
Based on the findings made for the related work in both parts: research- and the technology-
based approaches, this section summarises the most important points for each of the re-
quirements stated in section 2. First of all, an overview table shows both, research- and
technology-related approaches and their particular fulfilment of the requirements. Based
on this, a detailed discussion of each requirement summarises the chapter.
The following table (3.1) summarises the fulfilment of the requirements for the most
important approaches shown in the previous sections. The approach is either named or
referenced by the authors who proposed it. Approaches are aggregated into one single
entry if there are more than one version of it, i.e. the entry summarises all features of the
particular versions of this approach. The TCG-based approaches are categorised by either
they are TNC-related or not. A — indicates a non fulfilled requirement, a O indicates a
partly fulfilment and a + a complete requirement fulfilment. It is clearly to see, that there
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are a lot of useful approaches which address some of the requirements. However, there is






























































CADS [2] — O O O O +
TIDS [71] O — O O — O
SABER [52] — — O O O O
Yeom et al.[72] — — — — O +
Sun et al. [84] O O — O — O
HADOF [85] O O O — — —
Bhargava et al. [81] O — — — — O
Hailes et al. [59] O + — — O —
SOCBox [41] — O O O O —
DSOC[42] — O O O O —
Duma et al.[54] O O O — — —
CRIM [47] — O O O O —
Zhou et al.[45] — O O O — —
Papalilo et al. [82] O — — O — —
Bao et al. [86] O O — O — O
Fung et al.[58] O O — — — —
Liu et al. [75] O — O — — —
Chang et al. [90] O O — O — O
Azzedin et al. [77] O O — O — —
STDEM [91] O O — — — O
Ramachandran et al.[43] — O O — — —
PBA [92] + — — O O O
Vijayakumar et al. [101] + — — O — O
IDMTM [89] O — — O — O
TCG’s Trusted Platform + O — — O —
TCG’s Trusted Network Connect — — — O O +
Table 3.1: Fulfilment of the requirements (R1-R6) by the most important approaches pre-
sented in this chapter.
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In general, it can be easily recognised, that the CADS approach already provides means
to include smartphones within a company’s infrastructure. Besides that, it also fulfils some
of the requirements partially or provides a very good basis for their solution. Although it
does not incorporate trust, it provides a powerful decision making system and was designed
with reusability and integrability already in mind. Furthermore, it can be summarised that
there is no single approach fulfilling all of the requirements in a satisfying way. Given this,
it is necessary to develop an own approach which is capable of fulfilling the requirements.
A detailed assessment against the requirements is given in the following. It does not only
emphasise the problems with the shown approaches but does also present aspects which
may be used in the own approach which needs to be developed.
R1: Trust specification, calculation and evaluation In order to fulfil this requirement,
an approach must be able to allow a specification, a derivation and a calculation of
trust as well as provide an evaluation method for this trust. Given the approaches
presented in this chapter, it can be summarised that one group does not address this
problem while the other group provides means to evaluate the trustworthiness of
components. As the first group does not address this problem, because their infor-
mation collecting components are treated inherently trustworthy, it cannot provide
a solution to fulfil this requirement. The second group cares about trustworthiness
of their sensory components. This is mostly demanded by the scenarios of the single
approaches. However, they do not directly address the trustworthiness of the col-
lected data but the trustworthiness of the components collecting this data. Given
this requirement, it is necessary to address trustworthiness for the collected data and
not only the component as this kind of view does not address the communicational
part which is responsible for exchanging the collected data. Besides that, there are
some reasonable approaches about deriving trustworthiness for a component. They
may be included as part of an overall solution. The TCG-based approaches o↵er
the same benefits: a reliable method for deriving trust for a certain component (i.e.
a system being part of a network). Furthermore, the trust derivation is based on
a hardware secured root of trust, which can be considered very reliable. However,
as with the other approaches, the communication channel itself is not taken into
account. While the trust derivation in form of a remote attestation itself is secured
by signing means, which is necessary to provide the proof for a valid TPM, a mea-
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surement of a sensor of such a system is not directly addressed. As it is the same
for the research-based approaches, a rather useful method for deriving system and
component-based trust is given while there is no way to cover the whole data ex-
change process. Given all these points, it can be summarised, that while there are
promising approaches to allow for a component-based trust evaluation, there is no
approach combining both component and communication-based trust. Due to this,
a solution to fulfil this requirement allowing an e↵ective trust evaluation may be
based on some of the approaches but must incorporate more sophisticated means in
order to completely fulfil this requirement.
R2: Trust history To fulfil this requirement, an approach needs to be able to (1) keep a
history of the collected data (i.e. the measurements taken by the particular sensors)
and (2) a history of the trust assigned to this values. Nearly all of the research centric
approaches presented in section 3.1.3 do not provide a direct method to fulfil this
requirement. While some of them are able to keep track of updates of measurement
values (1), thus e↵ectively allowing to establish a history, they do not allow to keep
track of the change in trust. This is due to two limitations: either the approach does
not incorporate trust or trust is only derived for the currently stored measurement
values. However, as table 3.1 and the particular explanations show, there are two
approaches which provide a basic history function including trust. Unfortunately,
these two approaches lack in fulfilling other requirements, in particular they are
either not integrable or not extensible. The approaches presented by the Trusted
Computing concept and the related research ideas do also not address this. This
is because both ideas do not aim at recording measurement values but more on
attesting a particular state of a system at a certain time, without keeping track of
the state change of that system. Summarising this, to fulfil this requirement, the
solution must be able to support both: the trivial case of keeping track of data
changes (i.e. new measurement values) as well as the more sophisticated case of
keeping track of this data’s trust changes.
R3: Trust-based correlation To allow the decision making component provided by the
IDS in the reference infrastructure a sophisticated process of decision making, the
IDS itself need to be able to directly use the trustworthiness for their calculation.
That is, the IDS should not only be able to distinguish between trustworthy and
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untrustworthy sensor data but also being able to use the actual value of trustworthi-
ness for their decision making process. Given the research-based approaches, there
are some which support this kind of correlation. In detail, approaches used for in-
trusion detection in distributed networks that depend on trustworthiness of their
nodes (e.g. in sensor networks), the nodes trustworthiness is indeed used to derive
intrusion detection decisions. These approaches therefore calculate a node’s trust-
worthiness and correlate upon this trustworthiness. This provides a way of fulfilling
this requirement. However, all of these approaches have several constraints, like the
particular environments or the very limited trust derivation. Due to this, they can
render a promising base for building a solution fulfilling this requirement. Besides
that, the TCG-based approach provides no way of correlating values directly. This
is due to the fact, that their main goal is to provide a mean to judge about the in-
tegrity state of a particular platform. As they do not provide a correlation method,
they cannot be used as a solution to fulfil this requirement. However, it can be sum-
marised that there are approaches which allow to provide means for a trust-based
correlation. They need to be tailored into an overall solution.
R4: Extending policies with trust This requirement summarises the possibility to actu-
ally use the trust related functions in a policy-based way. That is, by fulfilling this
requirement, it is possible to define arbitrary trust related constraints within one
or more policies. As the reference infrastructure used by the scenarios already pro-
vides a policy which controls the details of its decision making process (i.e. the IDS’
policy), it must be possible to also address the trust issues within this policy or at
least in some way to influence the decision making process. Most of the approaches
presented in the related work section support such a policy in a more or less e↵ective
form. However, this policy is always tailored for the specific scenario given in that
approach. There is no generalised version to be found in the approaches. Although
that means that there must be a particular new solution to fulfil this requirement,
the ideas which are described in the approaches may be used. Given the TCG-based
approaches it is a rather similar situation. Although there are means of defining
constraints and expressing rules in a policy defined, they do not directly address
this requirement here. This is not only due to the particular scenario of the Trusted
Computing approach but also due to the properties which should be expressible in
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that policy. As the TCG approach does not aim onto the part of decision making
but only on attesting the trustworthiness of a platform, it is not su cient to simply
use the TCG’s policy approach. The same limitation a↵ects the attestation-based
approaches: most of them use somehow a policy, but this policy is insu cient for
expressing a trust-based reaction. It is therefore necessary to define a rather tailored
policy which incorporates the trust-specific functions.
R5: Extensibility in terms of used data and trust calculation methods As sensors
should be placed on arbitrary systems in the network which can have arbitrary prop-
erties, the trust derivation must be very flexible. That is, it must be able to define it
also in an arbitrary way to be able to use sensors from di↵erent, unlimited in terms
of their type, systems. Due to this, the method used for calculation must also not
be defined statically. Without this, it would be impossible to switch from one trust
deriving method to another, as the algorithm responsible for actually calculating
the trustworthiness would be unable to work on the changed method. Due to this,
it is necessary to provide means for using flexible data sources to derive trust and
to be flexible in terms of the actual trust calculation. Taking these requirements
and evaluating it against the research-based approaches, it is very clearly to see,
that most of the approaches are rather limited in terms of extensibility. Although
some are designed with extensibility in mind, they miss the trust consideration, thus
only providing extensibility in terms of the data of sensors. The approaches which
keep trust in mind allow for adding a limited set of means of deriving trust, in
particular through adding reputation trust. Due to this, there is no approach which
is able to define the trust derivation factors in an arbitrary way. This limitation
is even stronger when evaluating the calculation methods used by the approaches.
Nearly all approaches stick to one single algorithm, which may be rather complex
but not interchangeable. This leads to the fact, that some approaches come in three
or more versions which di↵er just by small changes in the calculation algorithm.
To circumvent this, a flexible and freely definition of this algorithm is necessary,
also if considering the e↵ectiveness of such an algorithm. As research results show,
most algorithms are improved over time. Given the attestation-based approaches,
most of them are very freely in their definition of trust deriving sources. This is
due to the fact, that the attestation approach is not bound to a particular set of
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properties but rather on measuring everything valuable on the platform. Due to
this, the properties used for deriving the trustworthiness of this platform may be
defined by combining components that should be measured. This really allows for
the use of arbitrary system properties. Due to this, the TCG-based approaches,
mainly the attestation approaches, provide a good building block to construct a
solution that fulfils this requirement, although they lack the definition of an actual
trust calculation algorithm.
R6: Ability of seamless integration To allow an integration into an existing infrastruc-
ture, in particular into the reference infrastructure, this requirement must be ful-
filled. Looking first at the research approaches, nearly none of them aims to provide
a integrable solution. This is due to the fact, as they aim on a particular problem for
a particular environment, which is very common for this kind of contribution. All
of these approaches would need to be tailored and generalised in a rather complex
manner in order to make them integrable. Given the TCG approaches, this is a little
bit di↵erent. Due to the TCG approaches addressing the requirement of interoper-
ability, especially when evaluating the framework-based approaches provided by the
TNC specification, they are integrable by design.3 As the current CADS implemen-
tation is already based upon a TCG defined specification, it can be summarised
that these specifications fulfil the requirement of a seamless integration to a high
level. Due to this, the TCG’s approach provide a good technological building block
in order to fulfil this requirement.
Given the evaluation and table 3.1, it is clearly to see that there is no approach known
which fulfils all requirements in a satisfying manner. However, there are some concepts,
which provide a good start and seem very promising for the inclusion into an overall con-
cept. In particular, the Trusted Computing-based approaches provide reasonable mecha-
nisms in terms of trust specification and derivation (R1) as they introduce the concept
of remote attestation which allows to measure a platform’s state, thus providing a mean
of trust derivation for this platform. Besides that, approaches like Property-based Attes-
tation ([92], cf. [101]) provide a more refined version of the remote attestation approach,
particularly a more flexible trust derivation (R1), which will be considered within the
concept. Furthermore, the only approach which provides already a smartphone centric
3With the integrability based on the requirements given by the TCG.
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view combined with a decision making system and a high level of integrability as well
as extensibility is the CADS approach (cf. 3.1). As explained, it was designed to provide
means to transparently use smartphones in business environments, however without the
consideration of trust. While not addressing R1, CADS fulfils R2 to R5 partially as well as
R6 completely. Due to this, CADS provides some basic concepts which can be considered
very helpful in order to completely fulfil all of the requirements named here. Given that,
CADS is chosen as the basis for a domain-specific solution which fulfils the requirements.
This does not imply, that the concept presented in the next chapter is only usable with
the CADS approach. On the contrary, CADS is only one possibility of a domain-specific
mapping. That is, di↵erently to the approaches named in this chapter, the overall concept
aims on fulfilling all requirements. Doing so, the reference infrastructure is enhanced in
a way, that it is able to deal with trust in a sophisticated manner. It is not only able
to evaluate the trustworthiness of collected data binary-based but also to correlate on
this trust keeping track of value changes. Furthermore, it allows to express trust within
its policies and provides the same integrability the CADS system does. A concept which
provides all these possibilities is developed in the following chapter.
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The following chapter o↵ers a solution to the problems shown in the previous chapters.
The solution itself is divided into three parts: (1) the definition of a generic model, (2)
the definition of the trust model relying on the previously defined model and finally (3)
the domain-specific mapping.
4.1 Generic Model
This section defines a generic role model and associated operations which can be carried
out by the roles. Furthermore, a mapping process of the generic elements is given.
4.1.1 Role and Operational Model
The following section describes the generalised model, which allows a decoupling of actual
components and their actions. Figure 4.1 shows the model in detail. As it is easy to see,
Figure 4.1: Generic Model.
the model operates not on particular components but on generic roles. These generic roles
are case-specific assigned to each relevant component. Besides the roles, there are also two
types of generic operations defined. These operations are responsible for the actual part
of working on the data collected. The collected data represents the device’s state, i.e. it is
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data from a sensor monitoring the device. It is therefore defined as so-called Feature. The
definition of the term Feature was already given in 3.1.1, based on the definition made in
[2]. The term is used for the remainder of this thesis.
Roles
In order to decouple the components from actions, the model defines three distinct roles:
(1) the sender, (2) the provider and (3) the receiver role. They are explained in detail in
the following.
Sender The role of the sender is mapped to components which are responsible of the
initial creation and propagation of a Feature. In detail the sender performs three actual
tasks.
Feature Creation This is the first sub-step of the overall model. It takes place when a
Feature is initially created, whereas created means measuring a Feature or aggregat-
ing several Features into one. Measuring refers to the process of receiving properties
of a given system and putting them into the appropriate Feature type. Aggregating
refers to the process of using already existing Features, which may have been mea-
sured before, and combining their values into a single one inside a newly created
Feature.
Feature Preparation The preparation sub-step takes place after the Feature was success-
fully created. It is necessary to allow a further processing of the Feature. In detail,
the created Feature will be prepared for the transmission within this step. This
process consists of making the Feature available until the actual transmission step
will be initiated and if the transmission step is about to start creating an actual
transmittable representation of the Feature. This representation, i.e. the message
which will be communicated later, may consist of more than one single Feature.
Feature Transmission The final sub-step the sender is responsible for is the actual trans-
mission of the prepared message consisting of the Feature. To perform this step, the
sender simply selects the provider the message should be transmitted to and per-
forms the task of communicating the message via a network-based connection.
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Given these steps, the role of the sender is mapped to each actual component which is
responsible for measuring and collecting Features.
Provider The second role is the role of the Provider. A Provider is responsible for re-
ceiving Features from arbitrary Senders and preparing them for further processing. To
perform this task, the Provider distinguishes it work into three sub-steps.
Receipt of Feature After the Sender has started the Feature transmission, this sub-step
can be performed on the Provider. The transmitted message will be received and
one or more Features which are marshalled within the message can be extracted.
The communication which needs to be carried out in this step is not limited to the
sending and receiving process described above, but can also be carried out in a more
complex way, including an arbitrary amount of communication steps.
Feature Storage and Preparation This step takes responsibility for storing the extracted
Feature in an appropriate way and to reload and prepare the Feature if requested.
Storage is simply performed by putting the Feature into an appropriate container
whilst reloading takes the Feature out of this container. After reloading, the Feature
is prepared into a message equalling the message type that was used by the Sender
in its preparation step.
Feature Transmission The prepared message, which may again consist of several Fea-
tures, can be transmitted to the receiver. This is done in this last sub-step.
Receiver The last role assigned to the component which finally receives the Feature and
uses it is called Receiver. The working process of the receiver is divided into two separate
sub-steps.
Feature Receipt This step equals the receiving sub-step carried out on the Provider.
That is, the Receiver needs to unmarshall the message which was received from the
Provider thus extracting the contained Features. After the Features are extracted,
the Features can be further processed which is done in the next sub-step.
Feature Processing The Receiver uses the Features that were extracted in the last sub-
step to perform arbitrary tasks. The exact process the Features are used to, depends
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on the actual Receiver. The model itself does not limit the types of processing which
may be done within this step.
Having these three roles, it is possible to express specific behaviour within one model.
Specific behaviour means, that in one case a Feature may be sent from component A via
component B to its destination which may be component C. Another case with the same
components may be that a Feature flows from C via B to A. Using the generic model, the
role-based flow is always the same independently from the actual components. This allows
to base further definitions upon this model without the need to distinguish between the
particular cases. Although the roles are su cient to map the case-specific components, the
actual operations which are performed between the components (or in general between
the roles) need to be defined as well.
Operations
Figure 4.1 depicts the roles as well as the operations which are carried out between and by
them. There are two kind of generalised, i.e. abstract, operations: (1) the so-called process
operation and (2) the so-called transmit operation. The properties of these operations are
explained in the following.
Process The process operation is carried out by and on a particular component. It
describes the action of processing a Feature. Processing can be distinguished into the
following types.
• Creation of the Feature itself. This can, as already described, be realised by mea-
suring certain properties and generating a new Feature or by aggregating already
existing Features into a new one.
• Storing a Feature for further actions and retrieving a stored Feature out of a storage
container.
• Using the Feature for arbitrary actions.
Although a generic process operation must be of one of these types, it is important, that it
can only be of one and the same type to a certain point of time. That is, it is not possible
to combine several types into one single process operation. Besides this, it is easy to see,
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that these types of the process operation summarise a subset of the role-specific steps
described in section 4.1.1. The missing steps are assigned to the second type of generic
operation.
Transmit The transmit operation defines the communication-based transmission of a
Feature. In contrast to the process operation, two components (i.e. roles) are part of this
operation. It consists of the following steps.
• The preparation of the Feature which is intended to be transmitted. This step
summarises the task of taking one or more Features and marshalling them together
into one, transmittable message. As a precondition of this step, a process operation
may have happened.
• The actual transmission step. Based on an arbitrary communication protocol, the
created message is sent from the first component to the second one.
• The second component receives the message and unmarshalls the appropriate Fea-
tures out of the message. A process operation may happen after this step.
In contrast to the process operation, which is of one actual type, the transmit operation
always consists of this three steps. That is, all three steps in this exact order need to be
carried out.
Combining these process and transmit operations allows to describe the handling pro-
cedure of a Feature within a particular system like CADS in an abstract manner. All
possible cases of the Feature flow can be expressed by using the operations defined. Using
the roles and the operations together, an abstract system can be formulated which is able
to represent the actual system used.
4.1.2 Operational Flow
The generalised flow, which expresses all distinct Feature flow cases, consists of the fol-
lowing steps.
1. The creation or aggregation of the Feature and its additional preparation is the first
step. It is performed within the process
Sender
operation running on the Sender.
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2. After the Feature is prepared for the communication process, it will be communi-
cated by the Sender to the Provider. The Provider receives the Feature and prepares
it for further usage. The transmit
Sender
operation is responsible for this task.
3. After successfully receiving the Feature, storing and reloading the Feature on the
Provider is handled within the process
Provider
operation.
4. Finally, the communication between the Provider and the Receiver is performed
within the transmit
Provider
operation. It is responsible for transmitting the Feature
from the Provider to the Receiver.
These steps summarise the flow of operations within the model.
Formal Representation
The representation consist of three di↵erent parts: (1) the roles and (2) operations which
where explained above as well as (3) a formal representation of the Feature. The roles
(1) are simply represented by their appropriate name, thus the Sender is represented as
Sender, the Provider is assigned Provider and the Receiver is represented as Receiver.
As already used, the operations are defined as their abstract version mapped onto a









. Following the explanation made above, there is no final
process operation running on the Receiver defined. The Feature itself (3) is represented
by a ⇣, following the notion used in [2]. The formal representation assumes, that all oper-
ations are able to work directly upon and with the Feature. This means, that the actual
method used for communication (i.e. the protocol and the protocol data) is not part of
this representation and needs to be addressed when mapping this representation to the
particular case or scenario. Besides this limitation, the flow of operations can now be









This representation is used later in this thesis to show the particular trust related exten-
sions to the flow. As it is easy to recognise, all operations take only one argument. While
this is fully correct for the process operations as they are working on one component (or on
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a role) it is an abbreviation for the transmit operation. The representation of the transmit
operation only takes the sending source as argument. This is possible because the model
defines the destination of the transmit operation uniquely according to the transmission
source.
This formal representation allows to extend the model easily, for example by simply
adding more operations or roles. Furthermore, it is a necessary building block for the
following chapters.
4.1.3 CADS-specific Feature handling
As explained in section 3.3, the CADS approach is well tailored for smartphones and
provides a basic decision making system which can be used in order to provide a domain-
specific extension. To allow this extension, the model presented here must be applicable to
the CADS approach. This means, the CADS system must be expressible using the generic
model. This section provides a mapping to not only show this possibility of mapping but
only to provide a foundation for the domain-specific extension which is addressed later in
this chapter. Furthermore, it can be considered as an example on how to map a particular
system using the generic model.
Within the CADS architecture (section 3.1.1), there are two distinct cases of Feature
handling, thus there are two cases how a Feature may flow through the system. The
first case describes the situation where a Feature Collector is sending data to the Fea-
ture Provider and finally to the Correlation Engine. The second case takes place if the
Correlation Engine is sending a Feature to a specific Feature Consumer.
Case I
The first case describes the situation, where a Feature Collector sends data to the Corre-
lation Engine. This for example could happen, if a Feature Collector located on a smart-
phone measures certain elements of the device and wants to send this measurements to
the Correlation Engine. After the Correlation Engine receives this measurements, it can
perform arbitrary tasks upon this data.
The case itself is divided into several independent steps, which are carried out in a serial
order. That is, the ordering of these steps is always the same.
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• The first step is the creation of the Feature on the Feature Collector’s device. This
can be done by simply measuring a certain property of the device using the Feature
Collector or by aggregating other Features which have already been measured. After
finishing this step, the Feature which is to be sent to the Correlation Engine is
prepared for the next step.
• The Feature Collector is now able to send the Feature to the Feature Provider.
In detail, this is done by using an appropriate communication method in order to
transmit the Feature from the Collector to the Feature Provider. Although it is not
defined which type of communication is used as this is a domain-specific property,
it is defined that this step is a logical step. That is, the transmission itself must not
necessarily be performed by using a real network-based communication method but
can also be done by using an inter process-based communication type for example.
As a result of this step, the Feature Provider now possesses the Feature.
• Having the Feature successfully received, the Feature Provider now stores the Fea-
ture until the Correlation Engine requests the Feature for further processing. If it
is requested, the Feature Provider retrieves it from its database and prepares it for
the next step.
• The next step is the transmission of the Feature from the Feature Provider to the
Correlation Engine. This step equals the first transmission step, where the Feature
Collector sends the Feature to the Feature Provider.
• Finally, after the Correlation Engine received the Feature, it can process the Feature
further.
Figure 4.2: CADS Case I.
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This process of collecting, preparing and transmitting the Feature is summarised in figure
4.2.
Case II
Beside the situation where one or more Feature Collectors are sending their collected Fea-
tures to the Correlation Engine, there might be the case of sending a Feature originating
from the Correlation Engine. This could for example happen after the Correlation Engine
has evaluated some rules and one of the rules is triggering an enforcement, thus creating
an enforcement Feature which is sent out to a device capable of performing the actual
enforcement.
Details of this case are as follows.
• At first, the Correlation Engine needs to create the appropriate Feature. This can
be done by simply generating a completely new Feature, or by aggregating already
existing Features into another Feature. After the Feature is created, it is being
prepared for the next step.
• The Correlation Engine sends out the Feature to the Feature Provider. Besides a
di↵erent sending source, this step equals the transmission steps of the first case. That
is, after this step has been carried out, the Feature is ready for further processing
on the Feature Provider.
• As the Feature Provider successfully received the Feature, it can be stored and kept
ready for transmission to the next component.
• When the Feature is requested by the Feature Consumer, the Feature Provider can
now send it to the Consumer. As all transmission steps, besides changing sources
and destinations, it is equal to the other transmission steps.
• After the Feature was received by the Feature Consumer, it may be further processed
and used.
The overall flow of these steps is summarised in figure 4.3. As the generic steps which
have to be carried out are equal in both cases, the flow can be generalised.
94
4.1 Generic Model
Figure 4.3: CADS Case II.
Generalised Flow
As stated above, the steps and their associated operations are to some extent equal in both
cases. Due to this, the overall process (i.e. the steps necessary) of Feature creation/pro-
cessing and Feature transmission can be expressed in a more generic way:
• The first step takes responsibility for creating the Feature on the appropriate com-
ponent. This is done by either aggregating already measured Features or by creating
a new Feature. Besides the creation of the Features, this step is also responsible for
taking the Feature in a transmission-ready state.
• The second step describes the transmission process between the first component
and the Feature Provider. That is, after the Feature was created and prepared for
transmission within the first step, it actually gets transmitted within this step.
• As third, the Feature is stored on the Feature Provider and after some time again
prepared for the second transmission to the receiving component.
• Finally, the Feature is sent by the Feature Provider to the receiving component.
In contrast to Case I and II, there is no final step of Feature processing on the receiving
component. This is due to the fact, that (1) a Feature processing may not happen on this
component and (2) that the processing itself is out of scope.
While this generalised flow o↵ers a possibility to express the Feature processing with
one notation, it is not possible to use generalised components. Due to this, it must still
be distinguished between the specific component used at this point. For example, it has
to be distinguished between the Correlation Engine and the Feature Collector as sending
component. As defining a Trust Model would also imply to distinguish between those
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components and thus limit the usability and flexibility of the model, a further general-
isation is necessary at this point. This generalisation was already given by the abstract
model above. Due to this, the next section shows how to map this generic model to the
particular CADS cases, thus showing the process of instantiation.
Role and Operation-specific mapping
To allow definitions based on the generic model, the roles and operations need to be
mapped upon the CADS-specific cases.
Mapping roles to components Using the abstract model, the components defined
within the CADS system can be mapped to roles as follows.
• The component Feature Collector always takes the role of a Sender, thus it is not
important which actual case is handled by the Collector.
• As already outlined, the Feature Provider is always in the role of the Provider. Equal
to the Feature Collector’s mapping, this role never changes throughout di↵erent
cases.
• The Correlation Engine cannot be mapped to only one role in a static manner. That
is, the Correlation Engine is either a Receiver or a Sender. It is a Receiver if and
only if it is used within a case I specific scenario. If it used in a case II-specific
scenario, it operates as a Sender.
• The last component, the Feature Consumer, always takes the role of a Receiver.
Like every other component but excluding the Correlation Engine, this assignment
is independent from the actual case.
Having these mappings, definitions describing the CADS system can now be formulated
in a generic manner. As this mapping only reflects the relationship between components
and roles but not their operations, an operation-specific mapping needs to be defined.
Operational Mapping To map the actual CADS cases, the model defines four particular
operations based on the abstract process and transmit operations: two process operations
and two transmit operations. The process operations are bound to the Sender and the
96
4.1 Generic Model
Provider, while transmit is carried out between the Sender and the Provider as well as
between the Provider and the Receiver. They are defined as the following.
• The measurement or creation of a Feature, i.e. the measurement operation which
the actual Feature Collector performs in its role as Sender, is called process
Sender
.
• The operation transmitting the Feature from the Sender to the Provider, which may
be for example the communication between the Feature Collector and the Feature
Provider, is called transmit
Sender
.
• As next, the operation used is the process
Provider
operation, which is performed after
the Feature was received on the Provider. This operation is usually carried out on
the Feature Provider.
• Similar to the first transmission operation, the operation which is used by the Re-
ceiver to retrieve the Feature from the Provider is called transmit
Provider
. This
happens for example, if the Feature Consumer receives a Feature from the Feature
Provider.
By using these operations and including them in the model, thus gathering roles and
their operations, it is possible to express the CADS-specific cases in an abstract manner.
Furthermore, this model may be used to add new cases to the CADS system. Besides
that, it is now possible to express a generalised flow which is based upon the roles as
acting parties and their operations as actions which will be performed.
As easy to see, there is no final process operation defined for the Receiver. Due to this,
the model does not define the final step of Feature processing. This is necessary to allow
arbitrary processing methods to be included within the model to not limit the applicable
cases for the model. It does not define that there is no final process operation allowed but
defines that the operation performed may be arbitrary in any form.
4.1.4 Model Summary
To represent arbitrary cases of Feature flows, the model developed above can be used. It
consists of two generalised parts: an abstract role definition where roles can be mapped
to particular components in a case-specific manner. And, as the second part, two abstract
types of operations: process and transmit. Putting the roles and the operations together,
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a generalised flow can be formulated. The developed flow is able to represent particular
specific cases without the need to address the change of the actual components used. That
is, it is possible to develop further extensions in terms of trustworthiness based on this
model without the need to address each case separately. Besides that, the model defines
also a more formal representation.
Giving an example of the instantiation process of the model, the two CADS-specific
cases can be mapped into a generic representation. This allows it to define further mech-
anisms, in particular the trust model, up on the generic model with the e↵ect of the
definition being applicable to the particular specific system which would be CADS in this
example. The case-specific mapping necessary to consider a trust extension of the CADS
system in a more general way is only one area of use for the model. It may also be used
as a representation for other systems which can be mapped. To express another system
by using the model, the applicability of the model needs to be analysed. That is, it is
necessary to define the exact mapping of operations and roles onto the system’s specific
properties. If it is possible to map a system, all developments which are based on the
model may be assignable to the system as well.
To allow the assignment of the model to di↵erent systems, the following section gives
a short guideline on how to map roles and operations onto arbitrary systems.
Instantiating
First of all, the Feature needs to be mapped into the system’s environment. As the Feature
represents the informational unit, with information being defined as data attached with
semantic knowledge (cf. [157, 2]), it has to be instantiated for the type of information
used within the system. An actual example is given later in this section. Second, the
roles have to be appropriately mapped to existing components. This can be done by
categorising the components based on if they are an informational source, an informational
sink or a neutral component in terms of information. Sources of information should be
considered as Senders, while sinks should be considered as Receivers. Neutral components
need to be investigated further, based on the logical way the information flows within
the system. Due to this, it is necessary to analyse this logical flow within the next step.
To do this, like in the CADS system, cases have to be defined expressing the system’s
operations. In theory, it is necessary that all possible cases defined, thus covering the
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whole potential of the system. For a practical instantiation, it could be enough if those
cases are defined, which should be expressed in the abstract model. Having those cases
and therefore the logical flow of information, the elements (i.e. components) which are
part of the flow and neither a source nor a sink can be treated as Providers. This should
result in the fully defined mapping of the three roles allowing to take care about the
operational mapping. This is also the direct next step, the mapping of operations. This is
done in two phases: the mapping of the process operations and the mapping of the transmit
operations. The process operations are defined to be carried out by the Sender and the
Provider. Thus, the characteristics of the components which were identified as Sender
and Provider need to be analysed. This analysis is done in terms of their impact on the
information handling. By taking the explanation of the operations made in section 4.1.1
into account, it is clear that the process operation of the sender must express the creation
or aggregation of the information as well as the preparation. On the Provider’s side, storing
and reloading needs to be defined for mapping the process operation. Completing this
step, the process operations should be well defined for the system allowing to address the
transmit operations. This is done in a similar manner, which means that the statements of
section 4.1.1 need to be fulfilled. Transmit must be defined as the logical transmission of
the information between the two components connected to this operation. It is important
to understand, that transmit expresses the logical communication. This means, that if
the communication of the information runs across several components, which do not alter
or access the information but only communicate it, these components will not be given
a specific role. Having defined all the operations, the mapping is completed and may be
verified on the system.
A summarised form of the steps necessary for instantiating the model are given in the
following.
1. Definition of the Feature as informational unit: it has to be defined which informa-
tion is communicated throughout the system.
2. Categorisation of the system’s components into (a) information sources, (b) infor-
mation sinks and (c) neutral components. Components which are type (a) or (b)
will be assigned the Sender and Receiver role appropriately. Components of (c)-type
need to be investigated further.
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3. Analysis of the informational flow within the system to isolate cases. As a result,
(c)-type components can be either treated as Providers or treated as irrelevant for
the model to system mapping.
4. Mapping of the process operations based on the model’s definition for this operation
type. Equally, mapping of the transmit operation based on their abstract definition
and the flow which has already been analysed to isolate the cases.
If one ore more of these steps cannot be successfully finished, the system might not be
applicable for an abstract expression based on the above defined model. In this case, there
needs to be checked if the model needs to be extended to cover the system.
Example
A syslog (cf. [158])-based logging system is used as a simple example. The system consists
of three components: the syslog-client (SYC) producing log messages, the syslog server
(SYS) which stores and holds the logging information and a program (EMA) that takes the
syslog messages and generates email-based alerts. Taking this, the system is structured as
SY C SY S EMA. To map the abstract model, the first step is the Feature definition. As
the system communicates syslog messages expressing certain system states, the Feature
is being defined as such a syslog message. The next step is the categorisation of the
components into information sources and sinks. As the system’s type of information (i.e.
Features) are syslog messages, it needs to be categorised appropriately: the SYC is a source
while the EMA is a sink. Due to this, the SYC can be considered as Sender while the EMA
can be considered as Receiver. Although the SYS may be considered a sink, it is none
as the final destination is the EMA. As the system has only one relevant case in which
the SYC creates a log message, sends it to the server from where the EMA takes it and
generates an email, the analysis of the flow to isolate cases is rather simple. Furthermore,
as there is only one (c)-type component, the SYS is given the Provider role. The mapping
of the operations can also be done based on the analysis of the single case. Process on the
Sender defines the creation of the syslog message by an arbitrary daemon on the SYC.
Process on the SYS defines the successful receipt (not in terms of communication) and
storage of the message until the EMA accesses the message to generate an alert. Transmit
is defined as using the syslog protocol to communicate the message between the SYC and
the SYS, which is the first transmit operation, and the communication between the SYS
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and the EMA, forming the second transmit operation. As it is easy to see, the second
transmit does not actually map network-based communication but logical communication
between the SYS and the EMA. The actual communication could be based on a pipe for









. It is easy to see, that the last transmit operation no longer operates on the syslog protocol
but on the actual message (e.g., text). As explained above, this is due to the EMA using
not syslog to access the message. Concluding the example, by taking this mapping, all
assumptions and extension which are made on the abstract model can be applied for the
syslog system as well.
Given the abstract model, which allows to express the system not longer based on their
specific cases but in a more abstract manner, it is now possible to develop a trust model.
4.2 Trust Model
Using the abstract model defined in the last section, it is not possible to make trust-
based assumptions in such a system. This section develops the second part of the overall
solution: the trust model enhancing the abstract model. To do so, a trust definition is
given first. This definition acts as a building block for all further developments as it
defines uniquely what can be considered trustworthy. After this definition, the source
of trust is introduced. That is, which parts of the model are used as building block to
derive trust fulfilling the trust definition. With having the properties to base the trust up
on, a method for combining these and to actually derive trust in a measurable manner
is developed. Continuing the overall development of the trust model, special properties
are addressed and followed by the definition of the process of trust derivation. As all
these approaches are based on the abstract model, this model is extended in terms of the
Feature flow as well as in terms of the underlying data model. That is, a new data model
which is able to represent the trust model is also developed. Finally, the trust model is
instantiated for the CADS system, also showing the extended CADS-specific cases.
The aim of this section is to introduce an extended version of the abstract model defined
above. This version allows a reasoning about the trustworthiness of Features. It aims to
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fulfil the requirements given by the scenarios. The first area that needs to be addressed in
order to develop the trust model is a basic trust definition. This is done in the following
section.
4.2.1 Definition of Trust
To allow a reasoning about trust which is valid throughout the whole system as well
as for each Feature, a trust definition needs to be made. This creates the foundation
not only to allow the reasoning and evaluation itself but also the base to derive and
calculate the trust. There are some definitions of trust already (cf. section 3.1.3, 3.2 and
[59, 85, 87, 88, 89, 92, 101]), which can be used and extended to suite the needs as part
of the approach. All of them are based more or less on the expected behaviour. Given
that, the definition which is used for the trust model presented here is based upon the
TCG’s definition [96] which has already been explained in section 3.2. It is used here, as
the TCG’s definition summarises the aspect of basing trust on expected behaviour into
a consolidated form. It can be considered consolidated, as the TCG itself is driven by
di↵erent stakeholders that agreed upon this definition. Due to this, the definition can
be considered as widely accepted. It is based on the behaviour of components, thus is
only applicable for components and expresses that if a component behaves as expected
it can be considered trustworthy. More in detail, as long as a component does what it
is intended to, it is trustworthy, negligible if the task itself may be considered as being
malicious. By using this definition, it is possible to reason about the trustworthiness of
components. In this case, reasoning describes the process of taking a measurement of the
trustworthiness and evaluating it against an expected value. That is, if a component acts
as it is supposed to, due to the TCG’s trust definition, the reasoning of the component’s
trustworthiness should be positive. As it is easy to see, this definition is only applicable
for component-based systems, as the TCG’s trusted computing environment is. For using
this definition in the approach presented here, it has to be extended. This extension is
done in two steps: the first step is to define what can be reasoned about as components
are not applicable here. The second step is to define what is used as a measurement base
for trustworthiness. While the first definition is given in the following, the second part is
postponed until further elements of the trust model have been developed.
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The TCG’s definition reasons about the trustworthiness of components by measuring
their behaviour and comparing it to the expected behaviour. As the approach only defines
roles which can be mapped to actual components when instantiating the model, the trust
could only be defined up on these abstract roles. This is rather di cult, as the roles
do not imply a unique behaviour of the mapped components. I.e. di↵erently behaving
components might be mapped to the same role making it di cult to define their behaviour
simple and uniquely. Furthermore, the TCG’s definition aims to isolate the components
as critical actors. That is, a compromised and untrustworthy component has always an
actual influence on the system. Within the approach, this is di↵erent: a component might
be compromised but Features sent out by this component could still be valid under certain
circumstances. This fact shows the main di↵erence in terms of trustworthiness of the two
systems: while the components are the most important part in the TCG’s system, the
Feature is most important here. Due to this, the definition of trustworthiness must be
based on the validity of the Feature itself. It is therefore defined, that the measurement of
trust expresses the integrity of a Feature not of the components or roles. This integrity can









, it is easy to see
that the operations are an important part in the overall Feature creation and transmission
process. Due to this, the basic trust definition can be based on these operations and the
TCG’s behaviour-based definition: as long as the operations act as expected, the integrity
of the Feature which the operations are working on does not change. Based on this, trust
is defined as expected behaviour of the particular operations. Combining this with the
exchanged Features, the following definition is used:
A Feature is considered trustworthy if and only if all operations handling this Feature
perform as expected.
This basic definition would allow a reasoning about trust if there are means to judge
about the operations behaviour in terms of handling the Feature. This is addressed in the
next section.
4.2.2 Security Properties
Besides the definition of the trustworthiness itself, the most important part is the source
for deriving trust. This section introduces special properties allowing this and thus forming
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the basic layer of the trust model. Furthermore, the question how trust is derived and
where from it is being derived is addressed.
As already stated, trustworthiness describes a Feature’s integrity and is derived from
the behaviour of the operations which work on this Feature. To reason about the trustwor-
thiness it is therefore necessary to introduce actual means to judge about the operations
behaviour. This judgement must fulfil two criteria: (1) it must be able to express the
overall behaviour of the operation and (2) it must be able to rate the behaviour. This is
necessary to not only distinguish between benign and malicious behaviour but to distin-
guish between di↵erent grades of the particular behaviour.
The solution to fulfil criteria (1) is the introduction of so-called security properties (cf.
[92, 101]). These security properties are given to each operation defined within the model.









. A single Security Property (SP ) is defined as property characterising the
behaviour of a particular operation. An arbitrary amount of such SP s may be assigned to
a single operation. The properties are not limited and can be defined and used freely, thus
allowing to define them case and instance-specific. When defining them, they have to be
attached to the appropriate operation, meaning that there may be di↵erent properties for
each of the operations. Examples for such security properties are the usage of Transport
Layer Security [159] for the transmit operations or a platform secured by a trusted or
secure boot (cf. 3.2 and [97]) for process operations. Using these properties, expected
behaviour can be expressed for the operations although there is yet no way to classify this
behaviour. To allow this classification and fulfil the second criteria, so-called ratings are
used.
Ratings
Ratings (!) are measurements which allow a scoring of particular security properties.
That is, a rating allows to classify the behaviour expressed by a security property. In
order to provide maximum flexibility, the approach does not define the codomain of the
ratings nor any kind of rating type as this definition must be specifically made for the
domain and the instance the system will be used within. In general, each of the defined
SP is assigned an appropriate !. That is, by using this rating, the SP is weighted in
104
4.2 Trust Model
terms of it’s trustworthiness. Although a codomain is not defined, ratings are allowed to
have negative values, thus allowing to have SP s which express untrustworthy properties.
The relationship of the security properties and their appropriate ratings can be ex-
pressed as SP := !. This means, that each security property must have a rating attached
to it. Using the examples of TLS and tboot given above, these properties could for example
be characterised in the following way: (usingTLS)
transmit
:= 5 and (tbootSuccess)
process
:=
10, with 5 and 10 being the appropriate rating.
Security Property Map
The conceptual component holding all assignments of security property and rating is called
Security Property Map (SPM). It is necessary to allow the usage of dynamic ratings per
SP . Dynamic ratings are another basic building block of the trust model. Currently, the
mapping between a security property and their rating can only be made in static manner.
That is, once the rating is set and the system is running it cannot be changed. As this
is very limiting and prevents changeability of ratings at system runtime, dynamic ratings
and their assignment are introduced. Dynamic ratings are defined as ratings which can be
changed at each time, thus they are changeable when the system is running. This allows to
react on events which have influence on one or more operation’s SP s. If for example, the
transmit operation is secured by TLS, as shown above, the rating could be initially high.
If, at some point an error of the TLS-enabling library is recognised, the rating could be
dynamically lowered to indicate this event. Furthermore, the SPM holds the association
of the SP s to their appropriate operations. Each property defined within is attached to
one or more operation. The TLS property which was given as example, would be attached
to a transmit operation while the trusted boot property could be attached to a process
operation (which was already implicitly done when showing the example).
The actual structure of the SPM is divided into two parts: the static part which defines
the security properties and their operational attachment and the dynamic part holding
the ratings for the properties. Static must not be mixed up with final in this case, it only
expresses that entries made in this section cannot be altered. Although there may be new
entries added, the ones which are already defined can only be deleted. That is, a change of
entries within this section is still possible, but only in the way of deleting the old entry and
adding a new one. This is necessary as this section acts as key for referencing the dynamic
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That is, it simply holds the properties and their associated operations. The rating is
referenced from the dynamic part of the SPM and defined as !
RatingIndex
= RatingV alue,
thus the dynamic part would look like the following when using the examples from above.







As it is easy to see, the references used in the static part are simply based on the
index of the rating. That is, if a rating needs to be changed a lookup procedure must be
performed in order to change the correct rating. The lookup is responsible for discovering
the reverse mapping of the rating as the SPM defines a forward reference only. This
means, that there is a direct path from a property to its rating by using the index while
there is no direct path backwards. Due to this, the lookup procedure needs to traverse
the properties the rating is to be changed for and select the correct ratings appropriately.
Security Property Records
By using both, the security property and its dynamic rating per operation, the basis for
calculating the trustworthiness of the Feature handled by these operations is given. Unfor-
tunately, this approach still has some limitations: it only allows to assign one specific prop-
erty and its rating per operation, resulting in only four properties characterising the whole
system. This might be enough for very basic instances but is very limiting. To overcome
this limitations, a further extension encapsulating the SP s need to be introduced. This
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extension is called Security Property Record (SPR) and simply represents a set of multi-
ple security properties. In detail, there may be one security property record per operation,
thus resulting in four SPRs. Each SPR itself is unlimited in terms of the amount of secu-
rity properties attached to it. It is simply defined as SPR
operation
= {SP1, SP2, ..., SPn}.
The SPR does not encapsulate the actual ratings for the security properties as this link
is established by accessing the security property map. This allows to change ratings al-
though the property the ratings is defined for is already part of a SPR. Enhancing this,
the SPR may be re-evaluated at any time and incorporates the rating which is currently
defined for the properties that are part of the record. The assignment and lookup of the
ratings is performed by another (i.e the second besides the SPM) conceptual component.
Security Property Record Manager
The Security Property Record Manager (SPRM) is the conceptual component responsible
for assigning (1) the appropriate property to an operation and (2) the correct rating to
that property at any time it is requested. Furthermore, (3) the SPRM takes care of
changing ratings for SP ’s dynamically.
The assignment of the properties (1) is performed in several sub-steps: first of all, when
an operation is carried out, the SPRM is able to identify the exact type of operation.
That is, it can distinguish between the four operation types defined above. With having
this information, it accesses the SPM in the next step and performs a lookup which
property is assigned to that operation. It then takes the property (or more properties if
there are more defined for this operation) and puts them into the operations SPR, finally
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attaching this SPR to the operation. The algorithm used for this task is shown in the
following.
Algorithm 1: SPR construction.





foreach SP : mapSP in SPM do
spType = getSPType(mapSP);




The second responsibility of the SPRM is the mapping of the appropriate ratings
for an operation’s SPR. As with the forward mapping of the properties to an opera-
tion’s SPR this is also done in several steps. As a precondition, there must be some
kind of request which needs to access the actual ratings of the properties stored within
a security property record. This could be for example an event, where it is necessary to
calculate an actual trustworthiness of the operation. After the request has been made,
the first actual step done by the SPRM is to retrieve the SPR of the operation where
the ratings are requested for. Having this SPR, the SPRM can now perform and in-
verse lookup on the security property map. In particular, for each property stored in the
operation’s SPR, the SPRM searches the appropriate SP entry in the static part of
the SPM . This entry is then used to access the actual rating in the dynamic part of
the SPM . The SPR’s data structure is then expanded with the retrieved ratings, thus
adding the rating for each SP in the SPR. To allow this addition of ratings, the so-called
Rated Security Property Record (RSPR) is used. The format of the RSPR is defined as
RSPR
operation
= {(SP1,!SP1), (SP2,!SP2), ..., (SPn,!SPn)}. It could equally be expressed
as RSPR
operation
= {(SP,!)1, (SP,!)2, ..., (SP,!)n}. In addition to this, the process of
looking up all ratings of a SPR’s properties and the construction of the appropriate
RSPR must be performed as one single, i.e. atomic, step. This is necessary to prevent
the construction of an invalid RSPR in case of a rating change: if ratings are changed
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while the RSPR is constructed, it would hold new (valid) as well as old (invalid) ratings
in a mixed form. The summary of the algorithm is shown below.













foreach SP : mapSP in SPM do







It is easy to see, that the algorithm waits until an actual request is received. Further-
more, it also locks the SPM access exclusively. This is done in order to prevent the
problems with updating certain ratings while simultaneously constructing the RSPR.
The process of changing the ratings in a dynamic fashion (3) is also performed by the
SPRM . To perform the actual rating update based on a certain property, the SPRM
must receive the new rating. It therefore takes the tuple (SP
operation
,!) as input. Besides
the update process, this tuple can also be used to initially set the ratings and/or the
security properties itself. As this process equals the update procedure, it is not explained
additionally but as part of the update algorithm. After the SPRM received this tuple, it
accesses the SPM as soon as possible. That is, if a RSPR construction is performed at
the same time, the SPM is locked until the RSPR has been constructed. In this case, the
SPRM first finishes the construction before starting the update procedure. If it is able to
access the SPM it looks up the property given in the tuple. If existing, the appropriate
rating is changed by navigating to the correct entry via the index. If there is no property
entry, a new one is created in the static part of the SPM . Moreover, the index-based link
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between the rating is created and the rating itself is set. The update procedure itself must
run exclusively in order to prevent problems with inconsistent ratings or properties. Due
to this, the algorithm also locks the SPM and the lockSPM() as well as unlockSPM()
functions only return if there is currently no lock on the SPM . The complete update
algorithm is summarised below.





















if spFound == false then






While the tuple (property per operation and assigned rating) the SPRM uses for
this update procedure is defined, the process of its construction is not. The construction
must be performed by external components which possess information about how to map
operations and their ratings appropriately. To give an example, this could be done by
performing a remote attestation (section 3.2.3) on the component the rated operation
will be assigned to. In detail, the presented attestation approaches like a permission-
based attestation [149] for an Android-based smartphone, can now be leveraged for this




Deployment of Conceptual Components
Besides the procedures the SPRM performs on the SPM , the deployment of both com-
ponents needs to be defined. This is necessary as the underlying component (i.e. where
the SPRM and the SPM will be deployed at) need to fulfil certain conditions in terms of
its trustworthiness. In addition, the conceptual deployment itself hast to be based on the
abstract roles defined above. There is no way of defining the deployment based on actual
components as the approach does not specify these components. That is, the SPRM and
the SPM need to be assigned to one of the roles and have to be mapped to the actual
component when instantiating the approach, as well as the role itself . To select a role, it
must be first defined if the SPRM and the SPM can be deployed as one logical compo-
nent. As there is no need for having both components in a standalone manner, they can
be deployed as one single combined (SPRM/SPM) component for simplification reasons.
Furthermore there is only one role, the Provider, which is applicable to hold the combined
components. Besides other which will be explained later, this is due to the fact, that the
Provider is the central role within the approach’s architecture, thus having connections
to both other roles. To actually deploy the combined SPRM/SPM the Provider has to
be trustworthy under any circumstances. That is, if it becomes compromised, the stored
SPM as well as the processing SPRM might be compromised. As they both form the
basis for deriving trust, the overall trust calculation would be compromised. Due to this,
when instantiating the model and implementing it, there need to be special measures to
ensure the integrity of the Provider itself.
Property Summary
The security property approach introduces three main conceptual parts: the properties
(SP ) and their set (SPR) itself, the SPM and the SPRM . Security properties are de-
fined as arbitrary characteristics which express the trustworthiness of a certain operation.
To measure this trustworthiness they are determined by ratings expressing the actual
trustworthiness of the property itself. security property records encapsulate an arbitrary
amount of SP s for one operation. If an actual rating is attached, a Rated SPR is gen-
erated. The properties and their ratings, which may change in a dynamic fashion, are
stored within the security property map. The map itself is used by the security property
record manager which takes care of changing the map and creating the SPR as well as
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the RSPR. Both the SPM and the SPRM are located on the Provider. Based on these
components, the actual approach for calculating the trust can be introduced.
4.2.3 Trust Calculation
This section introduces the calculation of the actual trust. It therefore introduces the
so-called Trust Level (TL) expressing this calculated trustworthiness. Furthermore, there
are some intermediary steps which have to be carried out in order to calculate the overall
TL. These steps are also explained within this section.










first part of the trust model added security properties encapsulated in a security property
record and weighted in terms of trust by a rating. Therefore it has been defined, that each
of the four operations has a SPR attached to it. This SPR is being used to (1) retrieve the
current ratings for the SP s stored within it (i.e. generating a RSPR) and (2) to calculate
the trustworthiness of this operation. Based on this, the overall trust level which combines
the trustworthiness of all four operations into one measurement can be calculated. This TL
does not express an operation’s trustworthiness but the trustworthiness of the Feature that
was handled by these operations. The first step, the creation of the RSPR is performed
by using the SPRM in the manner shown above. As with the SPRM itself, the trust
calculation is performed as part of the Provider. That is, each time the Provider is in
charge of handling a Feature, the TL for this Feature is being calculated. The calculation
of an operation’s trustworthiness (2) is done by calculating the so-called Security Level
(SL) for this operation.
Security Levels
The SL combines the ratings of an operation’s SPR into a single value. That is, to
evaluate the SPR (i.e. the RSPR) of an operation, a generic rating Function (rF ) which
composes an arbitrary amount of ratings together into the SL is used. The function is
defined in the following way.
rF ({!}) = !1   !2   ...   !n
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In detail, to calculate the SL of an operation, the Provider takes the SPR for this op-
eration and retrieves the assigned rating (using the SPRM) for each SP of the SPR.
These ratings are then composed by using the defined rF to calculate the SL. While the
codomain of the rating itself is not defined, the codomain of the SL is defined as value of
[ 1, 1] allowing a scoring (cf. [35]) of the SL values. Using the calculations parts which






SP1 ,!SP2 , ...,!SPn
◆
with SP 2 SPR
operation
That is, the SL of a certain operation is calculated by combining each rating of the
operation’s security properties using the generic rating Function. Due to the fact that
there are four operations defined by the model, four di↵erent SLs can be calculated. The
algorithm used by the Provider is depicted in the following. It uses the RSPR generated
by the SPRM as input and calculates the appropriate SL.




















As a single SL only expresses a trust measurement of a particular operation, there needs
to be another mechanism to combine the SLs of all four operations into a single value.
Besides that, the SL already allows a reasoning about trustworthiness of one operation
which may be useful under certain circumstances. The construct to aggregate the single
SLs into one value is introduced in the next section.
Trust Levels
As already shown, the trust model uses so-called trust levels (TL) to express a Feature’s
trustworthiness. That is, the TL combines the previously calculated SLs into a single
value. In order to explain the calculation, the trust definition made in section 4.2.1 needs to
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be applied to the concept of trust levels. It has been defined that the model allows to reason
about a Feature’s trustworthiness by evaluating the trustworthiness of the operations
used to handle this Feature. That is, operations are rated in terms of their expected
result. This is done by defining properties and appropriate ratings for the operations.
Combining these ratings, an overall measurement for the operations trustworthiness can be
calculated (i.e. the SL). As there are four operations carried out when handling a Feature,
the combination of these four SLs build the overall TL. This TL is the overall trust
measurement of the Feature. It is based on the ratings of all operations properties. That
is, the trust level expresses the trustworthiness of a Feature based on the trustworthiness
of the operations that have been used to handle this Features. The term trustworthiness
is defined as the behaviour of an operation in terms of Feature handling. Given this trust
definition of section 4.2.1, a more refined version which is based on this trust level can be
formulated: A Feature is considered trustworthy if and only if its trust level is considered
trustworthy. That is, if the calculated trust level for the Feature lies within a trustworthy
range (this range may vary depending on the particular values used), the Feature itself is
considered trustworthy.
The trust level is defined as composition of all SP s which are assigned to the four
operations and allows a reasoning based on the assigned properties (i.e. their ratings).
Another function, the so-called Trust Function (tF ), which expresses this composition is
therefore simply defined as combination of all four SLs.












The particular method used for the combination itself depends on the actual domain
the model is instantiated for, thus needs to be specified for instantiation. Besides that,
due to the codomain definition of rF ([ 1, 1]) the domain of tF is also defined as value of









































Summarising this, the overall process of calculating the trust level for a certain Feature
consist of three phases: (1) the assignment of security properties (SP s) and their appro-
priate ratings (!), (2) the calculation of four SLs with one for each operation by using the
rF and (3) finally the calculation of the TL by using the tF and the previous calculated
SLs. This process can be expressed in the following simple manner.




As it easy to see, the first steps are already defined as algorithms shown above. The
missing final algorithm to put all parts together and forming the overall TL is shown
below. It simply takes the four SLs and combines them using the tF into one single TL.































Due to the SLs encapsulating most of the previously made calculations, the combination
of them into one single value is rather straightforward. Using the result of this algorithm,
the final TL, a reasoning about a Feature’s trustworthiness can be done. Due to the
Provider being responsible for performing this algorithm and thus calculating the TL
⇣
,
there is one problem: it needs to know the last SPR
transmit
FP
. As this step represents
the feature request of a Receiver, the actual properties of the transmit operation are only
known after the Provider received the request and can determine the SPR by using the
SPRM . This may not be a problem if only one single Receiver is used as the operation
could be predefined but if there are more Receivers, the last SPR is unknown until the
request was received by the Provider. To address this problem, phases are introduced
within the next section.
4.2.4 Phase Extension
To solve the problem stated above, the TL calculation is being divided into two phases
and thus there are two actual types of trust level. The first type, being calculated when a
Feature was processed on the Provider is called Phase 1 Trust Level (TLP1
⇣
). Equally to
that, the second type is called Phase 2 Trust Level (TLP2
⇣
). The previously defined trust
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level without a specific phase is still used in an abstract manner where phases are not
relevant. The phases which define either the phase 1 or phase 2 trust level are defined and
explained in the following.
Phase 1
Phase 1 describes the combination of the first three SLs into one single TLP1
⇣
. It therefore






. The phase 1




























This means, after a Feature was received and processed by the Provider, the TLP1
⇣
is
calculated. It expresses only the trustworthiness of the Feature based on the first three
operations. The algorithm used to calculate it is a limited version of the complete algo-
rithm which was shown above.
Algorithm 6: Calculation of the TLP1
⇣


































It is easy to see, that the tF takes only the first three SLs as input, thus only using
the first three SPRs and their properties to calculate the TL.
As already stated, the phase 1 trust level can be calculated each time a Feature was
received and processed by the Provider. The TL is then stored in special structure, which
will be explained later. If the Provider receives a request for the Feature from a Receiver,
it can initiate the procedure to calculate the second phase.
Phase 2
This phase consists of the calculations made in the first phase as well as the trustworthiness
of the last operation (transmit from the Provider to the Receiver). This is due to the fact,
116
4.2 Trust Model
that the SPRM can only determine the final SP s for the transmit
Provider
operation if it
knows the actual Receiver the Feature should be sent to. For example, if there are security
properties expressing a communication channels integrity (e.g. if it is encrypted), the exact
property can only be assigned if the communication channel is known at assignment time.
As with phase 1, the second phase describes the combination of all four SLs into one
single trust level. This trust level is then called phase 2 trust level, short TLP2
⇣
. It consist









, thus in di↵erence to the TLP1
⇣
it also encapsulates the last operation.
The algorithm used has already been shown as Algorithm 5, this is due to using all
four SPRs again. The only di↵erence is that the algorithm is no longer referred to as
calculateTL(...) but as calculateP2TL(...) where the arguments are all four SLs.
While the phase 1 trust level is globally valid, the TLP2
⇣
is only applicable for the
requesting Receiver. That is due to the TL being calculated exactly for this Receiver as
it takes SP s from the last transmit operation to this Receiver.
Phase-based Flow
The overall flow when handling Features and calculating trustworthiness consist of the
two phases added above. That is the following steps are carried out.
1. Processing of the Feature on the Sender. As already explained this consists of cre-
ating and/or aggregating the Feature and preparing it.
2. Transmission of the Feature to the Provider using a protocol capable of transferring
the Feature appropriately.
3. Processing of the Feature on the Provider, thus storing and retrieving the Feature.
4. Calculation of the phase 1 trust level by the Provider. It uses the SPRM and SPM :
the SP s of the first three operations are taken to calculate the TL. The TL is then
stored and kept ready for further use. Every time the Feature is being re-received
by the Provider, the TL will be recalculated using the last values set in the SPM .
5. If a Receiver wants to access the Feature, the Provider calculates the TLP2
⇣
for
the last transmit operation as it knows the Receiver at this time. It attaches the
calculated TL to the Feature.
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6. The Feature and the TLP2
⇣
are transmitted to the Receiver which was requesting
the Feature.
In addition to the Provider being trustworthy as it calculates the TLs, the transmission
of the TLP2
⇣
needs to be secured as well. If it is done via an unsecured channel, the calcu-
lated TL might be compromised. Although the concept does not enforce it, it is strongly
recommended to sign the TLP2
⇣
in order to make sure that the Receiver can determine the
source of the TLP2
⇣
. In contrast to the evaluation of the last transmit operation, signing
the TLP2
⇣
is enough as the Provider is considered trustworthy. Furthermore, it is also




4.2.5 Feature Handling on the Provider
As already outlined, the Provider takes care of calculating the trust level of a Feature
on certain occasions. This section defines which occasions it is responsible for. Mainly,
there are three types of handling processes the Provider can perform. The first one is the
creation of a Feature, the second one encapsulates the process of updating an already
created Feature and the last one handles the deletion of a Feature. Figure 4.4 depicts the
life cycle formed by these three types.




If the Provider receives a Feature from the Sender it has never received before, it creates
a new entry for this Feature and stores it locally. That is, the term creation refers not
to the process which is done on the Sender but describes the type of process operation
performed by the Provider. In addition, the Provider calculates the TL, first the TLP1
⇣
and if it is requested the TLP2
⇣
. The Feature creation can only be performed as long as
the Feature has not already been created.
Feature Update
If the Provider receives a Feature from the Sender which has already been received it
updates this Feature. It is not important if the Feature is received the second time (thus
the previous handling operation was Feature creation) or n time (previous operation was
update). Besides the update of the Feature, the Feature’s TL is also updated. That is, the
Provider simply performs a recalculation of the TL thus including potentially updated
ratings. This recalculation applies for both types of the TL considering that the TLP2
⇣
is
only recalculated after the Feature was requested by a Receiver.
Feature Deletion
A special kind of handling is the deletion of a Feature. While the other two handling
procedures receive a Feature from the Sender which should be stored, this type receives a
Feature which is flagged for deletion. This indicates, that the Feature should be deleted
what is then done by the Provider. In addition, the TLP1
⇣
for the Feature is also deleted.
The overall algorithm realising these three types of Feature handling by the Provider
is shown in the following. The Sender is only capable of telling the Provider to receive or
119
4 A Concept for Trustworthy Smartphone Integration
delete a Feature, it is not able to express a Feature update. This is due to the fact, that
another Sender may have already sent the same Feature.
Algorithm 7: Feature handling on the Provider.
Data: Sender request type type ,may be either add or delete





if type == add then
update = false;
foreach ⇣ : storedFeature in ProviderStorage do



















While the first two types are straightforward, the deletion introduces a problem: there
is no way to indicate the trust level for the Feature deletion. That is, the current model is
unable to express the trustworthiness of the deleted Feature and of the operations used to
delete the Feature. This is problematic as there is now way to recognise if a compromised
component has deleted a Feature indicating this component’s compromise. Due to this,
another conceptual part is needed which is introduced in the following section.
4.2.6 Snapshots
While the current conceptual parts allow to store the TL that is currently valid for a
Feature that is available on the Provider, it does not store TLs for deleted Features as well
as old TLs for updated Features. This leads to the problem shown above and in addition
to the problem of recognising changes of the TL when updating a Feature. To circumvent
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this, the trust model uses so-called snapshots. These snapshot preserve the actual state
of a Feature including the Feature itself as well as the Features trust information. The
Trust information includes the aggregated TL as well as the RSPR which consists of the
SP s and their appropriate ratings. That is, the snapshot stores the ratings which where
assigned to the properties at the time the TL was calculated. By using these snapshots,
it is possible to evaluate the change of the TL or its parts (SP , ratings) and to compare
older values against the actual value.
There are three types of snapshots which correspond to the Feature’s handling phases
on the Provider. Due to this, the types are a so-called Create Shot, an Update Shot and a
Delete Shot. These snapshots are always generated when the appropriate handling phase
is carried out. The last snapshot which has been created always represents the current
state. That is, if a Receiver accesses a Feature and its Trust information, the snapshot
that has been created as last (thus being the newest snapshot) is given to render the
Feature’s actual state in terms of trust. This implies, that every time a Feature handling
on the Provider takes place, a snapshots is being created.
Snapshots are only generated for TLP1
⇣
. That is, the trust information stored in the
snapshot does not include the RSPR for the final transmit operation. Due to this, the
TLP2
⇣
is only valid for the most recent snapshot and cannot be applied to older snapshots.
This is necessary, as there is no way to determine the last transmit operation as this de-
termination relies on the properties of the actual Receiver. These properties are unknown
before a Receiver’s actual access request is being received.
Create Shot
The Create shot is generated when a new Feature is received on the Provider. The term
new refers to the Providers view on the Feature and means that the Provider has never
received this Feature before. This snapshot type therefore stores the trust information
which is valid if a Feature is newly created on the Provider. Analysing the overall Feature
life cycle on the Provider, it is clear that there can be only one Create Shot for a Feature.
This is due to the Feature only being created once. If the Feature never gets updated nor
deleted, this type of snapshot remains the most current all the time.
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Update Shot
The Update snapshot is created each time a Feature is updated, which occurs if the
Provider receives a Feature again. Due to this, there may be an unlimited amount of
Update Shots, which is contrary to both other types. As with the other type, each Update
Shot stores the Feature’s value and the associated trust information that were valid at the
time of updating. If the Feature is updated but not deleted, the lastly created Updated
Shot expresses the Feature’s current trust state.
Delete Shot
If a Feature is intended to be deleted, a Delete Shot is being created. It consists of the
Feature’s last value prior to its deletion and the trust information of the update which
instructed the deletion. Due to this, the Delete Shot holds information about the SP s of
the operations that where performed to delete the Feature making it possible to evaluate
this deletion. As a Feature can only be deleted once, there is only one Delete Shot. This
Delete Shot forms the final state of the Feature as well of the Feature’s trust information. If
the Feature is updated again, a new Create Shot is generated. This behaviour corresponds
to the Provider’s Feature handling model. This type of snapshot can be used to determine
the state of the Feature prior to its deletion and, more importantly, to recognise which
Sender (including this Sender’s SPR) triggered the deletion of the Feature.
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The following algorithm summarises the snapshot extended handling of Features on the
Provider.
Algorithm 8: Snapshot extended Feature handling on the Provider :
handleSnapshot(type, ⇣).
Data: Sender request type type ,may be either add or delete
Feature received ⇣
received
Result: Feature processed ⇣
processed
and the Snapshot
if type == add then
update = false;
foreach ⇣ : storedFeature in ProviderStorage do





























The actual trust calculation used in the approach consists of three main parts: the defini-
tion of properties and their ratings, the calculation of the trust level and the extension of
this Level into phases and snapshots. The properties, ratings and appropriate components
where already defined in the last section. This section introduced the trust level which is
being calculated in two sub steps: first the calculation of a SL based on the operation’s
RPRS. Second the combination of these SLs into one single trust level. As the SL of
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the last transmit operation is only known at certain times, the trust level is divided into
two types. While the TLP1
⇣
expresses the Feature’s trustworthiness only based on the first
three operations, the TLP2
⇣
includes also the fourth operation. Due to this, the TLP1
⇣
is
globally valid for a Feature while the TLP2
⇣
is only valid for a particular Receiver. To
allow reasoning about deletion of a Feature and the change of trust, snapshots are used.
There are three types of snapshots, each representing one phase of Feature handling on
the Provider.
By using this parts of the trust model, the approach allows to reason about a Feature’s
trustworthiness. Furthermore it allows to build a history in terms of trust change of a
Feature and to distinguish between the trustworthiness of a Feature stored on the Provider
or already placed on the Receiver.
4.3 Data Model
To actually use the parts of the model and their appropriate trust building components,
a data model encapsulating Features and their trust information is needed. Figure 4.5
depicts the overall architecture which is based on the so-called TrustLog. Besides the
TrustLog and the Feature stored in it, it consists of several sub elements mapping the
components of the model. These elements are assigned to three layers which are explained
in the following in a bottom up manner. That is, Layer 1 forms the basic building blocks
while Layer 3 forms the top.
4.3.1 Security Property Layer
The lowest layer consists of the elements mapping the security properties and their ap-
propriate records. It is depicted in figure 4.6.
SecurityProperty
The SecurityProperty element encapsulates one single security property and its rating.
It is not bound to a specific operation, thus the same element may be used for several
operations. The rating itself is actually stored to allow an evaluation of new rating values
(if the rating was changed meanwhile) versus the stored value. The SecurityProperty
element is the most basic part of the data model and does not use other subclasses. When
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Figure 4.5: Complete TrustLog data model, including all layers. The Feature (marked by
a blue frame), is given by the CADS model (see [2] for more details of the
Feature data model).
the overall TrustLog is created, the Provider generates a SecurityProperty element for
each security property that is part of the Feature’s trust calculation. If more than one
operation uses the same SP , there may be only one SecurityProperty object for this SP
which is being used several times. This is possible as long as the operation references
exactly the same SP .
SecurityPropertyRecord
The SecurityPropertyElement allows to map an operation’s actual SPR into the data
model. That is, for each operation which was part of the Feature handling the TrustLog is
being created for, a SecurityPropertyElement will be produced. The element consists of an
amount of n SecurityProperty elements which represent the SP s that are stored within a
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Figure 4.6: Security Property Layer of the TrustLog data model, whereas the coloured
elements depict the appropriate classes of the layer. The relationship between
the classes are given be the arrows which include the appropriate cardinality.
SPR. Because of the data model’s SecurityProperty element actually storing the ratings
besides the SP s, the SecurityPropertyElement maps the RSPR rather than the SPR
only. This is due to the SPR being unable to hold ratings. The SecurityPropertyRecord
is being used by the layer above.
4.3.2 Phase and Snapshot Layer
The second layer maps the conceptual parts of the phases and the snapshots as part of
the data model. It therefore consists of elements which represent the snapshot types and
elements which represent the two di↵erent phases. The layer is depicted in figure 4.7.
Snapshot Elements
There are three snapshot elements mapping the Create Shot, Update Shot and Delete
Shot. They are named equally to the conceptual components: CreateShot, UpdateShot
and DeleteShot and are created according to the algorithm shown above. That is, every
time a new Feature is stored and thus a new TrustLog is created, the first snapshot is
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Figure 4.7: Phase and Snapshot layer of the data model with the appropriate elements
shown as coloured classes. Cardinality and class relationship is indicated by
the appropriate arrows.
created as CreateShot. Every time an update for an already stored Feature is handled
by the Provider, a new UpdateShot is generated and associated with the appropriate
TrustLog. Finally, if a Feature is going to be deleted, the appropriate DeleteShot is created
and stored.
The Snapshot elements themselves consist of the Feature’s stored value, i.e. not the
whole Feature element but only the value of it. Furthermore a timestamp is stored allow-
ing to track when the snapshot was created. Besides that, three SecurityPropertyRecord
elements are attached to the Snapshot. That is, there are only three as snapshots are
only created for phase one. The SecurityPropertyRecord elements may be di↵erent but
can also be the same if di↵erent Snapshots reference exactly the same SecurityProper-
tyRecord element.
Phase Elements
There are two elements which map the appropriate phases onto the data model, they
are simply called Phase1 and Phase2. Both types consist of the calculated SL with the
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di↵erence, that Phase1 holds only three SLs while Phase2 holds four SLs. This is equally
to the amount of operations which are considered by the appropriate phase. Besides the
calculated SLs, the phase elements also hold the SecurityPropertyRecord for each SL.
While Phase2 references four SecurityPropertyRecord elements directly, Phase1 references
Snapshots. There are exactly one CreateShot and one DeleteShot as well as an arbitrary
amount of UpdateShots referenced. The creation of these Snapshots is done according
to the method mentioned in 4.3.2. That is, the SecurityPropertyRecord elements are not
directly referenced by the Phase1 element but indirectly through the Snapshot elements.
Phase2 can reference the SecurityPropertyRecord element directly, as there are no snap-
shots in the phase 2 flow of the model. This is due to the calculation of the TLP2
⇣
only
being valid for on single Receiver as well as being carried out just before the final transmit
operation is performed. The layer 2 elements can now be used in order to create to overall
TrustLog element.
4.3.3 Feature Layer
The upper layer, depicted in figure 4.8, consists only of two elements: the Feature itself
and the TrustLog element which references the Feature. The root used within this data
model is also rendered by the TrustLog, i.e. the Provider stores TrustLog entries for each
Feature it is handling or it has handled.
TustLog
The TrustLog itself consist of the already mentioned reference to the actual Feature and
to the appropriate phase elements. Furthermore, it holds the calculated trust levels, in
detail the TLP1
⇣
as well as the TLP2
⇣
. The trust levels represent the particular valid TL, i.e.
the TLP1
⇣
that is based on the last snapshot and the TLP2
⇣
which was just calculated for a
certain Receiver. They are refreshed each time a TL is recalculated which would be in case
of another Receiver for the TLP2
⇣
and in case of update or delete for the TLP1
⇣
. Besides
this direct storage of the TLs, it references the two phase elements already explained. It is




Figure 4.8: The Feature layer of the data model shown by coloured elements. Arrows
indicated the relationship between the classes including their cardinality.
Feature
The Feature element itself simply holds the actual Feature and is referenced by the Trust-
Log. It consists of the unique Feature id, the value of the Feature, the type of the Feature
and the appropriate contextual information. It is described in detail in [2].
Summary
The data model introduced in this section allows to store the necessary parts of the
trust model on the Provider. It consists of three di↵erent parts, each one depicting the
appropriate area of the model. The main element of the data model is used as storage
root for Features and their attached trust information on the Provider. That is, for each
Feature handled a TrustLog data structure is created and used for further actions.
4.3.4 Provider State Machine
The previous sections introduced the trust measurement as well as their calculation along
with a data model allowing to adopt the overall concept. As it was already stated in
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those sections, the Provider is responsible for performing all necessary steps, thus also
for answering requests from other roles in the model. While the sections introduced the
necessary parts to perform the trust calculation on the Provider, there are still two parts
missing: (1) the types of requests the Provider is able to answer and to handle and (2) the
detailed operations of those requests the Provider has to perform. These missing parts
are introduced within this section and finalise the conceptual model.
Given the trust concept above, it is easy to see, that there are di↵erent type of states in
it. That is, the trust calculation is always separated into several sub steps that need to be
performed. Furthermore these steps need to be performed if a certain type of request is
received by the Provider. Based on this, three di↵erent types of requests can be defined.
Sender Requests The so-called Sender Requests are the request which map the action if
a Sender transmits a new or updated Feature to the Provider. As the name states,
the request is bound to the Sender role and thus can only be triggered by a message
from the Sender.
Receiver Request The other role-specific request type is the so-called Receiver Request.
Inversely to the Sender Request, this type is triggered by the Receiver, namely in the
case when a Receiver needs access to a Feature stored on the Provider. Furthermore,
this type is also bound to the specific role thus can only be triggered by a Receiver.
Reasoning Request The last type, which is di↵erent to the first two types in terms of
the accessing component, is the so-called Reasoning Request. This request is used
to access one or more TrustLogs directly on the Provider. That is, it is not bound
to a specific role but can be triggered by every one. Even more, it can be triggered
by components which have not been directly mapped to roles. The request itself
is needed for an overall trust reasoning of the collected Features. For example, by
using this type it is possible to gain an overview about the trust situation of the
complete environment (given that it is fully integrated).
To handle these types of requests in a defined manner, the Provider uses an internal state
machine. This state machine realises each type of request and encapsulates the necessary
sub steps to fulfil the request. Furthermore, it defines the transitions between the sub steps
and determines also when a request type is finished. This renders the Provider ready to
process another request. The overall state machine is depicted in figure 4.9 and will be
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explained by each request type in detail in the following sections. By using and adopting
Figure 4.9: Provider State Machine including all relevant paths.
this state machine, the Provider is able to process the request types shown above com-
pletely. Furthermore it is able to perform the Feature handling as it was described in the
abstract model part. To fully use the concepts defined here, it is necessary to implement
this state machine. The general transitions through the states in the Provider can be di-
vided into three parts: (1) the receipt of the appropriate request, (2) the evaluation of the
request itself to gain the request type and (3) finally the actual handling of the request.
Although the general flow is always the same, there are three distinct paths inside the
state machine, one for each request type.
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Sender Requests
As already explained, the Sender Request expresses those types of requests which update
or create a Feature on the Provider. They are triggered by components mapped to the
Sender role. As the type does not define if the request itself consist s of an update or
a creation, the Provider needs to determine this. This is partially already handled by
algorithm 8, which decides about the type of snapshot creation and thus needs to know if
the Feature is already known. The path the request is handled within the state machine
is shown in figure 4.10. As depicted, there are six di↵erent states the Provider can have if
Figure 4.10: Sender Request path of the state machine, indicated by coloured elements.
handling this type of request. Two of these states are applicable for every request type: the
state of waiting and the request received state. These states match the above describe part
(1). Within the waiting state, the Provider does not perform any action but waits for an
incoming request. If this request is inbound, the Provider receives it and changes its state
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into the request received state. At this time, all the data which belong to this request (but
not the Feature) are on the Provider’s side. Based on this information, the Provider decides
about the request’s type and changes into the appropriate path. In this case it steps into
the Sender Request path shown in the figure. With stepping into this path, the Provider
receives the actual Feature and changes it state to Feature Received. When analysing the
defined operations in the model, the state change from Request Type to Feature Received
occurs exactly when the transmit
Sender
operation is finished in this type of request. Due to
the Provider possessing all necessary information to fulfil the request, it can now advance
further. As this request type is only applicable for phase 1, the Provider’s next step is
to receive all necessary RSPRs. This is done by querying the SPRM in a reasonable
way which responds with three RSPRs, that are based on the operations that have been
carried out to handle the Feature up to this point. When the Provider has successfully
gained the appropriate RSPRs, it changes its state into SPR Received. In the next step,
the Provider changes into the state Snapshot Created. It is reached when the Provider
has successfully generated the appropriate snapshot for the Feature it has received. This
may be either a CreateShot, an UpdateShot or a DeleteShot. Having reached this state
and thus created the snapshot, the Provider continues the trust calculation by calculating
the three security levels as well as the Phase1 element storing those SLs. Furthermore, it
creates the overall TrustLog structure which combines all elements into one single entity.
After it has created the TrustLog, it is stored appropriately inside the Provider’s storage
area. The Provider changes its state to Log Stored, thus finishing the request handling. As
the Provider needs to be able to handle further incoming requests, the last step is to wait
and thus changing back into the Waiting state where it was before it starting handling
this request.
Although the Provider calculates the SLs and the Phase1 elements in this type of
request, it is not necessary by all means. That is, the calculation of the SLs as well as
the creation of the phase elements are only done, considering the data model, because the
Provider needs to attach the snapshot anywhere. The abstract flow of this request type
does not enforce the calculation of the SLs. This is due to the fact, that the final trust
level is only calculated when one of the other request types is being handled. In order to
provide always trust levels of highest possible freshness it is unavoidable to calculate the
TL just in time when it is being requested. If a more complex data model is being used,
which is able to support snapshots that are not directly bound to a phase element, it is
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possible to store the TrustLog and the snapshots only, without taking care of the SLs
and the phase elements. In this case, the Provider would not request the RSPRs but the
SPRs only to assign them properly.
The following algorithm summarises the handling process for this type of request with-
out considering the drawbacks of the data model. That is, the SLs are not calculated and
the algorithm assumes, that snapshots may be directly attached to the TrustLog. Further-
more, it makes use of algorithm 8 and 1 to create the actual snapshot and determining
the correct type.
Algorithm 9: Handling of Sender Requests : handleSenderRequest(type).
Data: type type of the request (add or delete)








foreach ⇣ : storedFeature in ProviderStorage do




















As already shown, after the Provider has finished handling the request, it enters the
Waiting state again and is ready to process another request.
Receiver Requests
The second request type the Provider handles is the so-called Receiver Request. It is
triggered by a Receiver which requires to access, thus receives, a Feature from the Provider.
The path which is used within the state machine is shown in figure 4.11. The main parts of
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this request type are the receiving of the request itself, the retrieval of the stored TrustLog
out of the Provider’s storage and finally the calculation of both trust level types and the
providing of the Feature and the TLs to the Receiver. Starting in the Waiting state again,
Figure 4.11: Receiver Request path of the state machine depicted as coloured elements.
the Provider first receives the request including its type and enters the Request Received
state. It then has to decide, based on the type, which path it takes, as by receiving this
request type it enters the Feature request branch. That is, the first two states as well
as the decision transition are the same as for the other request types. With entering the
appropriate branch, the Provider enters the state Feature Request Received by actually
receiving the Feature id from the Receiver. To reach the next state Log Retrieved, the
Provider accesses its storage and retrieves the appropriate TrustLog structure for the
Feature id received in the request. If there is no TrustLog existing for the Feature id
given, the Provider responds with an empty message to the Receiver, thus indicating that
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the request Feature was not found. For the ease of understanding, this part is not directly
shown in the state machine’s figure but should be taken into account when implementing
the Provider’s logic. Given that the TrustLog could be retrieved, the Provider is now in
the state Log Retrieved. It can now proceed further by starting the actual trust calculation
based on the TrustLog’s elements. The first step is to calculate the three security levels
for phase one. This is done by taking the last snapshot stored in the TrustLog and thus
getting the stored SPR for each operation. Those three SPRs are then used to retrieve
the three RSPRs, which include the actual rating of the SP s by querying the SPRM .
The SPRM accesses the SPM and retrieves the currently valid ratings as already shown
above. Using these ratings, the SL for each of the three operations can be computed and
additionally stored in the appropriate phase element of the TrustLog. Finishing this step,
the Provider enters the state P1 SLs Calculated. This state is not only used exclusively
by this type of request but also by the reasoning request type. Due to this, the Provider
re-checks the request type to proceed into the correct branch: In case of this request type
it needs to proceed with the phase 2 calculation. This is done by retrieving the SPR
and based on this building the RSPR for the final transmit operation. It is possible to
get these values at this time, as the Provider knows which Receiver requires to access
the Feature by simply checking which Receiver was the source of the request. Based on
this information, the SPRM is able to determine the correct security properties for this
operation and thus attaching the correct ratings into the RSPR. After this has been
done, the Provider is in the P2 SPR Retrieved state from where it continues by adding
the SPR just retrieved into the phase 2 element. Finishing this, the Provider is in the P2
SPR Added state which indicates that all necessary information for the next few steps
are available. This makes it possible to start the actual calculation process. As it has
already calculated the appropriate SLs for phase one, it only needs to calculate the last
SL for phase two. It therefore takes the RSPR gained in the last step and performs the
SL calculation, finishing it by putting the SL into the correct phase element as part of
the TrustLog. By doing so, it reaches the state P2 SL calculated where it holds all four
SLs in their appropriate phase elements. It is now able to process to the next state by
calculating the final TLP2
⇣
. This is done using the appropriate function to combine the SLs
into one single value. This value is then written into the TrustLog. After this has been
carried out, the Provider enters the P2 TL Calculated state which represents the final
state of this request’s calculation part. The only step remaining is the actual providing of
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the TrustLog. This is done in the next step: the Provider transmits the TrustLog (and the
attached Feature) to the requesting Receiver, thus entering the state Data Provided. This
finishes the handling of this request type. As already explained in the first request type,
the Provider enters the state Waiting again in order to continue with further requests. The
algorithm to handle this request type is shown in the following. It combines the already
shown algorithm 2 and algorithm 4.
Algorithm 10: Handling of Receiver Requests : handleReceiverRequest(FeatureId).
Data: FeatureId identifying the requested Feature












calculateP2TL(SL1, SL2, SL3, SL4);
The algorithm itself consists mainly of calls to already defined functions, thus it com-
bines the parts shown above into one.
Reasoning
The last request type the Provider is able to handle is the so-called reasoning request.
The branch inside the state machine is shown in figure 4.12.
Aim of this type is to provide a possibility to retrieve the TLP1
⇣
for each Feature stored
on the Provider. This allows to perform a trust-based reasoning on top of the trust values
of all known Feature which could be for example used to gain an overall impression of
the environments trust situation. The reasoning request branch of the Provider’s state
machine consists of two main parts: the retrieval of the appropriate TrustLogs and the
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Figure 4.12: Reasoning path inside the state machine (shown as coloured elements).
calculation of all necessary TLP1
⇣
. In detail, the reasoning request itself consists of a list of
Feature ids or nothing but the request itself. If the request is received without any Feature
id, it indicates that the Provide should answer with all trust levels for all Features it has
stored at this time. The handling process of this request type begins as usual with the
Provider receiving the request itself and thus entering the state Request Received from
the former state Waiting. It then decides about the request type, which is in this case a
reasoning request and enters the appropriate branch by reaching the state P1 TL Request
Received. If there are Feature ids given, it retrieves only these TrustLogs or if there are no
ids given it retrieves all stored TrustLogs to continue. The next part equals the phase one
SL calculation part of the receiver request type with only one di↵erence: it is done multiple
time. That is, the calculation of the appropriate SLs is done for each Feature id received or
for each Feature stored on the Provider. After this was finished, the Provider is in the P1
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SLs Calculated state. This is the same state it reaches when handling a receiver request,
thus the Provider has to check the request type again for further proceeding. In this case,
the type indicates, that a reasoning is requested and thus the TLP1
⇣
for each Feature given
is required. Due to this, the Provider takes the calculated SLs for each TrustLog (i.e for
each Feature) and combines them by using the tF () into the TLP1
⇣
. As a result of this, the
Provider reaches the state P1 TL Calculated where it holds a list of all calculated TLP1
⇣
s.
To finish this request type, the Provider needs to transmit the calculated trust levels to
the requesting component. The particular method for transmission is not defined within
this model although the model demands that the channel used for transmission must be
secured to avoid compromise of the calculated values. This could be done for example
by signing the trust levels appropriately. After the transmission is finished, the Provider
enters the state Data Provided which renders the final stage for this request type. As with
the other request types, in order to be able to handle further requests, the Provider waits
again and thus finishes in the state Waiting.
The algorithm used for this request type is shown in algorithm 11. It makes use of
the SL calculation (algorithm 4) as wells as the P1 trust level calculation (algorithm
6). For simplicity purposes, the retrieval of the RSPRs for each SL and their connected
operations are encapsulated into getSL3ByFeatureId(id). The detailed algorithm used
to perform these intermediary steps are shown in the algorithm below.
As described above, the algorithm decides if it should process all stored Features or
only a limited list and then calculates all necessary parts. Based on these parts, the trust
level is calculated and stored into another list which is then sent to the component which
was requesting the reasoning.
Summary
The state machine of the Provider is responsible for the correct handling of the request
types supported. There are three of these types: the Sender Request, the Receiver Request
and the Reasoning Request. The Sender Request is triggered by a component possessing
the Sender’s role and consist of the sub types add or delete. Add indicates, that the sender
wants to update or add a new Feature to the Provider’s storage. The Provider takes the
Feature in this case and stores it along with the Feature’s attached security properties.
In case of a delete subtype, the Provider tags the appropriate Feature as deleted in its
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Algorithm 11: Handling of Reasoning Requests : handleReasoningRe-
quest(FeatureId).
Data: Feature id list fids
Result: Transmitted list of P1 TLs
if fids.size > 0 then
P1TL[fids.size];
for i = 0; i < fids.size; i++ do
SL[3] = getSL3ByFeatureId(id);
P1TL[i] = calculateP1TL(SL[0], SL[0], SL[0]);
end
else
P1TL[ProviderStorage.FeatureCount]; i = 0;
foreach ⇣ : storedFeature in ProviderStorage do
id = storedFeature.getId();
SL[3] = getSL3ByFeatureId(id);
P1TL[i] = calculateP1TL(SL[0], SL[0], SL[0]);
end
end
storage. The second type, the Receiver Request, is triggered by a Receiver which wants
to access (i.e. retrieve) a Feature. It tells the Provider therefore the Feature id. Based
on this id, the Provider retrieves the Feature out of its storage and calculates the trust
level (phase 2) for this Feature. The calculation is based on the currently valid rating
values of the attached properties. After the TL has been calculated the Feature including
its Trust properties is sent to the requesting Receiver. The third type of requests is the
Reasoning Request. It used to retrieve an arbitrary amount of phase one trust levels from
the Provider. This list can be used for further tasks, e.g. for evaluating the overall security
situation of the environment. If the Provider receives this type of request, it calculates
the appropriate TL (phase one) for each Feature requested or for all Features stored.
It then transmits these calculated trust levels to the requesting component. These three
request types map the necessary functions given in the model to the Provider and allow




Although all required parts of the trust model are now defined, there is one additional
point that needs to be addressed: the integration of a policy. Section 4.2.2 defines a part
of this policy already which needs to be extended in order to encapsulate all necessary
information and make it available to the Provider. That is, there needs to be a policy
which is used by the Provider and holds all relevant information in a domain-specific way.
This section therefore defines the abstract policy for the Provider, which is then mapped
into the environment.
The policy consists of three parts, whereas two of these parts are already defined by the
SPM . Furthermore, the policy holds another section, abbreviated FS, which encapsulates
the necessary functions as well as auxiliary definitions needed for these functions (e.g.,
domain of the values, value constraints, ...). That is, the policy is defined as the SPM
part and the functional part. The SPM part is divided into the already explained static
and dynamic part. The static part holds the security properties while the dynamic part
holds the ratings for these properties. Although the SPM may also be referenced rather
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The domain-specific policy may use a certain policy language which allows to express the
elements defined above. This section does not determine this specific language as there
may be di↵erent languages in di↵erent environment. If instantiating the overall model for
a specific environment, the language needs to be determined appropriately.
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4.4 Domain-specific Extension - TCADS
The remaining part of the overall concept is the domain-specific mapping of the previously
introduced approaches, thus building up TCADS [18]. TCADS abbreviates Trustworthy
Context related Anomaly and Signature Detection for smartphones. First of all, the cases
which have been explained in section 4.1.3 are extended in terms of the ability to measure
trustworthiness. This is done by mapping the conceptual parts to the two CADS-specific
cases. That is, while the role model described in 4.1 abstracted the CADS-specific cases to
one single general representation, this section takes this representation as well as the trust
model based on this representation and maps it back on the specific cases, thus making
it specific again.
4.4.1 Case I
As already described, the first case summarises the process where a Feature Collector
sends a Feature to the Correlation Engine. The trust extended architecture is depicted in
figure 4.13. It is based on the architecture that was used without trust.
Figure 4.13: Case I in TCADS.
As shown in figure 4.13, there are defined operations that are carried out in the order
given within the abstract model. That is, the Feature Collector first processes the Feature,
then transmits it to the Feature Provider where it is processed again. Finally the Feature
is transmitted to the Correlation Engine and used further. Due to this, the roles which
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where given to the components are the Sender for the Feature Collector, the Provider
role for the Feature Provider and the Receiver role was assigned to the Correlation En-
gine. Each operation that is used to handle the Feature is extended by an appropriate
security property record which is then being used to calculate the Feature’s trust level.
Furthermore, the architecture contains both defined phases. The first phase runs until the
Feature Provider finishes the processing of the Feature while the second phase includes
the final transmit operation from the Feature Provider to the Correlation Engine. The
Feature Provider also holds the Policy used for the trust-specific parts (SPM , functions).
4.4.2 Case II
The second case expresses the situation where the Correlation Engine sends a Feature to
the Feature Consumer (via the Feature Provider), for example an enforcement decision
which should be processed by a firewall component. The extended version is depicted in
figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14: Case II in TCADS.
Equally to the extension of the first case, there are now components which possess the
role of the Sender (Correlation Engine), the Provider role (Feature Provider) and the
Receiver role (Feature consumer). The appropriate phases are also mapped, thus phase
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one summarises all operations but the last transmit while phase two includes this last
transmit. Each of the operation is extended by a particular SPR being used to calculate
the TL. As in the first case, the Policy is located on the Feature Provider again.
Besides the mapping of the cases itself, the TCADS architecture provides the following
additions by using the trust model.
4.4.3 TCADS Features
Given the Correlation Engine with the CADS architecture, there is the already described
problem of determining if a Feature is trustworthy. That is, the CE cannot distinguish
between Features which are correct (in terms of their encapsulated data) and thus useful
and Features that may not be useful due to providing false data. Using the trust extension
(the complete TCADS system), the Correlation Engine is now able to make a decision
in terms of a Feature’s trustworthiness. To do this, the CE simply uses the calculated
trust level of the Feature and the attached snapshots. In addition to the decision of an
existing Feature’s trustworthiness, the CE can determine if a deletion of a Feature has
been trustworthy as well. If, for example, the CE receives two Features which measure
the same issue but with di↵erent actual measurement values, the CE would use the one
with a higher trust level. In particular, this for example may happen if one of the Feature
Collectors has been compromised. The trust extension provides a way of recognising this.
Besides using a Feature’s trust level directly, the CE can now be used to influence
the trust calculation itself. This is done by defining rules which operate on certain trust-
specific properties, for example on a SP ’s rating. In detail, if the CE recognises that a
Feature Collector provides implausible values (i.e. Features), it can lower the rating of
certain SP s which characterises this Collectors process operation. To do so, the Corre-
lation Engine may use a special Feature type to directly communicate with the Feature
Provider and calling the SPRM to change these ratings. This change will then happen
but only if the trust level of the CE’s Feature is high enough. If the ratings could be suc-
cessfully changed, the Feature Provider would recalculate the Feature’s trustworthiness.
This method allows to create a cascading system between the Correlation Engine and the
Feature Provider, being able to make decisions in multiple communication rounds (CE to
FP, FP to CE, CE to FP).
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Another addition which may be used by the Correlation Engine is the direct correlation
of trust values. That is, instead of using a Feature’s value for correlation purposes, the
CE can now make use of the Feature’s trust level. E.g. the CE could monitor a certain
Feature’s TL and base a trend analysis on this level. If the trend becomes too negative,
further investigations could be triggered by the CE. Besides using one trust level only, the
CE could use a reasoning request and monitor all calculated TLP1
⇣
for the environment.
This allows for a large scale monitoring.
4.4.4 Direct and Indirect Trust
Going back to the concept of direct and indirect trust which was presented in section 3.1.3,
both types of trust derivation can be found in the TCADS system. The concept of using
security properties for a basic trust foundation allows for having particular properties that
can express either direct trust or indirect trust. Direct trust is usually inherited by specific
properties of an operation, like the used algorithm or the used security layer for that
particular operation. Indirect trust, usually a representation of a system’s reputation, can
also be expressed via the construct of a security property. In di↵erence to the direct trust
expressing SP s, which are set by the use of the SPRM deriving the actual ratings from
particular properties like a remote attestation, the indirect trust expressing SP s are rated
by external1 components. In detail, the TCADS system is able to express indirect trust by
the use of a cascading relationship between the Provider and the Correlation Engine. If the
Correlation Engine recognises certain Feature Collectors as untrustworthy, it can report
this back to the Feature Provider. The Feature Provider uses this information and changes
the appropriate rating of the corresponding SP . In fact, this is the process of changing an
operation’s trustworthiness by a particular reputation given for this operation from a third
component. Due to this, providing special SP which are based on such cascades allow for
an easy use of indirect trust. Besides using the Correlation Engine for this task, another
external component may be leveraged to report reputation of a certain component. This
is then mapped back to a particular operation carried our on or by this component.
1This can be also done by leveraging the SPRM ’s capabilities but is triggered from outside.
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4.5 Assessment
This chapter introduced three parts forming the trust model and by using this model,
the domain-specific TCADS system. The first part, the generic model, introduced roles
and operations. Roles are later used to map all CADS-specific cases into one architectural
layout while operations express the abstract handling of the Features in the CADS system.
Roles as well as the operations allow the abstract and generic definition of the trust model.
This is done in the second conceptual part which introduced a reasonable definition of
trust. So called security properties and their evaluational parts, the ratings, are then
used to derive the actual trust measurement. This is done by calculating security levels
for each operation that is part of the Feature handling process. These security levels are
finally combined to one single value which is called trust level. To address the di↵erent
stages of the Feature handling, the trust level is divided into a phase one and phase
two part. Phase one represents all operations until the Feature is stored on the Provider
while phase two adds the transmission to the Receiver. Based on this, a trust level for
each phase can be calculated. The calculation itself is done on the Provider’s side. The
trust model defines a state machine therefore, which encapsulates all request types that
the Provider can handle. The third conceptual part takes the trust model and maps the
concept back to the particular TCADS cases, thus enhancing the architecture and giving
a domain-specific system to actually deploy. Finally, the additional features that can be
used on the Correlation Engine’s side and benefits of the extension were shown.
To conclude this chapter, a detailed summary of the fulfilment of the requirements is
given in the following. It is shown, which particular part of the concept can be used for
certain requirements.
R1: Trust specification, calculation and evaluation Fulfilment of this requirement al-
lows to distinguish between Features in terms of their trustworthiness. Using the
approach presented here, this is done by defining security properties and calculat-
ing a trust level based on these properties for each Feature. The security property
approach allows to specify and derive trust for a particular operation. The trust
level provides trust calculation and evaluation. There are two sub types of this trust
level: phase 1 and phase 2. The phase 1 trust level allows to generally evaluate the
Feature based on the handling of the Feature until stored and kept ready on the
Provider. Phase 2 allows the final Receiver to evaluate the Feature, but this time
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also including the last handling on the Provider. Furthermore, the evaluation ap-
proach is based on a holistic foundation, as it includes all handling operations for a
particular Feature, thus allowing to express di↵erent parts for the overall trustwor-
thiness. The domain-specific extension, TCADS, provides an evaluation method for
a Feature’s trustworthiness by introducing a trust-aware decision making system for
the use in smartphone environments. Based on TCADS, an actual evaluation of a
Feature’s trustworthiness is possible for the named scenarios. Given these points, in
particular the trust level concept of the generic trust model and its domain-specific
usage, this requirement can be considered completely fulfilled.
R2: Trust history To provide a method for keeping track of Feature changes and in ad-
dition to that to changes of a Feature’s trustworthiness, a history function must
be provided in order to fulfil this requirement. The approach presented here does
this with the so-called snapshots. Each time a change of the Feature is made on the
Provider, a particular snapshot for this change is allocated. Furthermore, not only
for value-based Feature updates but also for trust changes, which might happen if
a rating of a particular security property is changed, a new snapshot is created.
This allows to overcome the problems of losing track of the Feature’s life cycle as
well as losing the Feature if it is to be deleted. The snapshots are maintained on
the Provider’s side. Due to this, the last transmit operation between the Provider
and the Receiver is not included within the snapshots stored on the Provider. If it
is necessary to keep track of this part as well, the snapshot must be implemented
additionally on the Receiver, which is also possible by using the snapshot defini-
tion provided above. Summarising this, it is possible to create a very sophisticated
history mechanism by using the snapshot concept, thus this requirement is also
fulfilled.
R3: Trust-based correlation In order to use the trust calculation and history features, it
must be possible to not only recognise a Feature’s trustworthiness but also to corre-
late on this trustworthiness. This is provided by the extension of the Feature-based
data model. In detail, the Feature structure is embedded into the so-called Trust-
Log. The TrustLog encapsulates not only the Feature itself, including all relevant
information like the Feature’s value or the contextual information, it also encapsu-
lates all trust related parts, like the trust level and the snapshots. Given that, the
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decision making system is able to access the trust-based values and include them
into its correlation process. In particular, the domain-specific TCADS system uses
a Correlation Engine which is able to access the TrustLog data structure. This is
not only possible in an exclusive way, i.e. either correlating on a Feature’s value or
its trust, but it is possible in a mixed way. This allows to combine the trust level
along with trust changes and the standard Feature properties like value and context.
Considering this sophisticated mechanism, the requirement of providing a way to
correlate trust-based can be seen as fulfilled by using the data model of the generic
trust model and its usage within the TCADS system.
R4: Extending policies with trust To express trust related conditions it must be pos-
sible to include them into a particular policy. The concept presented allows this
in two ways. The first way is given by the generic trust model, which defines the
appropriate policy structures that are used for the trust-related parts. That is, the
Provider’s policy is used for trust-based reactions. This policy defines the building
blocks, like the relevant security properties and their ratings, for particular opera-
tions. As these operations form the overall handling procedure and hence provide
the parts for the overall trust calculation, the policy can be used to express reac-
tions on trust. Although this gives a generic method for a policy inclusion, it does
not provide a directly usable domain-specific method. This usable method is given
by the second way which is the ability to express trust-based conditions within the
standard policy used by the Correlation Engine. This is due to the trust enhanc-
ing data model, which allows to express trust as another contextual value for the
Feature. Furthermore, as the Correlation Engine can act directly upon a Feature’s
trust, it is possible to base decisions upon this trust. Those decisions can be ex-
pressed within the Correlation Engine’s policy. Given these two ways, it is possible
to express arbitrary trust-based reactions for a particular domain, thus fulfilling this
requirement.
R5: Extensibility in terms of used data and trust calculation methods As the generic
trust model should be usable for particular di↵erent environments and domains, each
with its own potential set of devices and trust sources, it is required to allow for a
very flexible usage of data and trust sources. Furthermore, with di↵erent sources, the
method of calculating the trustworthiness needs also to be very flexible. This is done
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by (1) using security properties for trust derivation and (2) by using freely definable
functions in combination with intermediary steps for the task of trust calculation.
The security properties (1) can be defined freely. By adding ratings to them, which
are the actual atomic trust measurement, it is even possible to weight trustworthi-
ness, not only by strong or weak but also by untrustworthy and trustworthy. That
is, the property concept allows also to express negative trust. Using these proper-
ties and in particular their ratings, a trust level can be calculated. This is done (2)
by providing a two step calculation approach. First, the security level of a certain
operation is calculated in detail based on the properties. Second, all security levels
are combined into the overall trust level valid for each operation being part of the
Feature handling process and thus expressing the Feature’s trustworthiness. Both
functions used, the one for establishing the security level as well as the one used for
combing the overall trust level, are freely definable. Given that and the property
concept, it allows to tailor the trust model for the scenario it is used in. Such a tai-
loring is done within the domain-specific TCADS mapping which presents an usable
way of deploying the trust model within smartphone environments. Furthermore,
the two-step approach used for calculation allows to see every single part of the
calculation, starting by the properties and their ratings via the security levels and
ending at the phase 1 and 2 trust level. Due to this, it is not only possible to define
relevant properties freely for one scenario, but also to use di↵erent definitions within
one scenario, making the approach very flexible and thus fulfilling this requirement.
R6: Ability of seamless integration To actually use the generic trust model, it is re-
quired to provide a maximum of integrability. This is necessary in order to support
a wide field of particular environments with their own infrastructure and compo-
nents. The specified role model which introduced generic roles along with generic
operations to picture an environment on a very abstract level can be used to achieve
this requirement. In detail, not only roles and operations are defined but also a pro-
cess to adopt this model to a particular scenario. It shows how to map the relevant
functions into the environment. For the environment given here, the TCADS sys-
tem represents this domain-specific mapping providing a good integrability on the
conceptual level. However, the concept does not define the actual implementation
used to provide the TCADS system. Due to that, the requirement can be considered
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fulfilled only on a conceptual level as the complete fulfilment of this requirement
depends on the implementation used.
Given this summary, it is easy to see that most of the requirements are addressed in
a satisfying manner. The integration requirement needs to be assessed on a particular
implementation which is done later in this thesis.
In addition to the assessment of the requirements, a short review of the research ques-
tions can be given. The first question “Which data and characteristics can be used to
derive trust?” can be answered with the security properties. That is, security properties
along with their ratings are used for the task of trust derivation. The second question
“How can trust be defined and calculated?” is answered by the trust level. In detail, trust
is expressed by calculating a trust level for a Feature whereas the calculation is based
on several steps beginning with the combination of the security properties. “How is it
possible to use trust in the decision making process?” can be answered with the provided
TrustLog and the policies used. I.e., the trustworthiness and all its parts including history
information is provided within the TrustLog for a Feature. Furthermore, this TrustLog
can be addressed within a policy to base decisions up on it. These three answers provide a
satisfying conceptual solution for the overall problem. To go more into the technical part,
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The previous chapter introduced the overall approach of a trust enhanced method for
decision making in a particular smartphone-enabled environment. This overall approach
was used for a domain-specific mapping which forms the TCADS system. This chapter
introduces a proof of concept implementation for this approach, in particular a proof of
concept implementation of the TCADS system. It is partly based on the already existing
proof of concept implementation of the CADS system which is explained in [2]. Due to the
CADS implementation relying on the IF-MAP protocol, IF-MAP is also used for the proof
of concept presented here. The chapter itself consists of three main parts: a detailed view
on the IF-MAP protocol, including a summary of trust relevant properties of IF-MAP,
the introduction of the overall approach for implementing the TCADS system in IF-MAP
by injecting trust and finally the actual technical implementation.
5.1 IF-MAP Revisited
As already explained in section 3.2.3, the TCG’s IF-MAP protocol (cf. [152]) provides
a content-based publish subscribe approach to share network-specific data among all IF-
MAP enabled components. It is based on so-called MAP Clients (MAPC), which can
either collect and publish data or subscribe to certain data thus receiving them. Besides
the MAPCs the so-called MAP Server (MAPS) provides the central database for the
shared data. That is, it receives the data from a MAPC by this MAPC publishing the
data to the MAPS and provides data to another MAPC by sending them data. Sending
is realised with a subscription model, thus the particular MAPC must subscribe to data
in order to receive information on changes to those data. Using IF-MAP allows for an
interoperable exchange of arbitrary data within a network.
From a technical point of view, IF-MAP is entirely based on existing technologies
and protocols. The secure hypertext transfer protocol (https, [160]) is used by IF-MAP
for realising the basic communication. This communication is provided in a secure way
as it relies on the https protocol. Furthermore, TLS [159] is used within this context,
which allows to utilise all capabilities TLS o↵ers. Layered on this, the SOAP protocol (cf.
[161, 162]) is used to allow an interoperable communication between the MAPCs and the
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MAPS. SOAP itself relies on exchanging XML-based (cf. [163]) messages and thus the
IF-MAP specific data is defined within an appropriate XML schema (cf. [164, 165]).
5.1.1 Data Model
The data model used by IF-MAP consists of the following three elements.
• Identifiers which are used for identification purposes,
• Links which connect identifiers and metadata to each other as well as
• Metadata which consist of descriptive data.
By the use of these elements a graph is formed. Figure 5.1 depicts a typical graph, con-
sisting of all elements and two distinct sub graphs. The example is based on sharing
network security related information. Within this figure, identifiers are depicted as ovals,
Figure 5.1: Example MAP graph (cf. [166]). Identifiers are shown as rectangles, ovals
depict metadata and lines express the links between the particular elements.
metadata is depicted by rectangles and links are depicted as connective lines between the
other elements. Details about each type of element is given in the following.
Identifiers
This type of element expresses information which are able to uniquely identify entities
of a network. Such entities may be either devices and their interactions or users. In case
of devices, they may for example be identified by their MAC address and in case of user
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related information, the user may be identified by her username. Identifiers cannot be
created or deleted, they implicitly exist at each time and are only visible within the MAP
graph as long as they have connections via links or metadata to other elements of the
graph. IF-MAP specifies five di↵erent types of such identifiers [152] which are given in
the following.
access-request This type of identifier represents a physical request to access a network
made by a device. It is characterised by a unique id which allows it to be identified.
Access requests are usually handled by Network Access-based components, for ex-
ample a Policy Decision Point from the TNC architecture. If an Access Requestor
would try to access a network, the PDP would publish the appropriate data and at-
tach it on to the access-request identifier. The XML-based specification is as follows
[152].
<xsd : complexType name=”AccessRequestType”>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=” admin i s t ra t ive domain” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ”/>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=”name” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ” use=” requ i r ed ”/>
</xsd : complexType>
Listing 5.1: IF-MAP XML schema for access-request identifier.
device A device identifier is used in order to depict a physical or virtual device within
the MAP graph. IF-MAP knows two types of devices: devices which gain access
and devices which may provide access or services. Given the example case of the
access-request from above, there may be either a device for the PDP attached to
the access-request as well as a device for the AR. The XML-based specification is
as follows [152].
<xsd : complexType name=”DeviceType”>
<xsd : cho ice>
<xsd : element name=”aik name” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ”/>
<xsd : element name=”name” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ”/>
</xsd : cho ice>
</xsd : complexType>
Listing 5.2: IF-MAP XML schema for device identifier.
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identity An user is identified using this type. In detail there are several sub types of
this identifier which allow to express several information used for this identification
purpose. Examples for such sub types are the username, the email address or even a
DNS name. Furthermore, a so-called other type definition can be made. This allows
to define own sub types for this kind of identifier. Given the CADS implementation
in its current version, this other type definition is used to express the category-based
graph structure. The XML-based specification is as follows [152].
<xsd : complexType name=” Ident ityType ”>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=” admin i s t ra t ive domain” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ”/>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=”name” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ” use=” requ i r ed ”/>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=” type” use=” requ i r ed ”>
<xsd : simpleType>
<xsd : r e s t r i c t i o n base=”xsd : s t r i n g ”>
<xsd : enumeration value=”aik name”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=” d i s t i ngu i sh ed name”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=”dns name”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=”email address ”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=” kerberos p r i n c i p a l ”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=”username”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=” s ip u r i ”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=” t e l u r i ”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=”hip h i t ”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=” other ”/>
</xsd : r e s t r i c t i o n >
</xsd : simpleType>
</xsd : a t t r i bu t e>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=”other type d e f i n i t i o n ” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ”/>
</xsd : complexType>
Listing 5.3: IF-MAP XML schema for identity identifier.
ip-address This identifier expresses the ip address for a certain device. This ip address
may be either of the type IPv4 or IPv6. The XML schema [152] is specified as shown.
<xsd : complexType name=”IPAddressType”>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=” admin i s t ra t ive domain” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ”/>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=”value ” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ” use=” requ i r ed ”/>




<xsd : r e s t r i c t i o n base=”xsd : s t r i n g ”>
<xsd : enumeration value=”IPv4”/>
<xsd : enumeration value=”IPv6”/>
</xsd : r e s t r i c t i o n >
</xsd : simpleType>
</xsd : a t t r i bu t e>
</xsd : complexType>
Listing 5.4: IF-MAP XML schema for ip-address identifier.
mac-address As with the ip address, the same applies for this identifier which simply ex-
presses a device’s mac address. The schema defined in [152] specifies it the following
way.
<xsd : complexType name=”MACAddressType”>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=” admin i s t ra t ive domain” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ”/>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=”value ” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ” use=” requ i r ed ”/>
</xsd : complexType>
Listing 5.5: IF-MAP XML schema for mac-address identifier.
Given these identifiers, IF-MAP allows to widely define roots for identifying certain en-
tities. Furthermore, the latest version of the IF-MAP specification allows even to define
own identifiers, which are then called extended identifiers. This allows for a more versatile
use of IF-MAP as one is able to define an environment tailored identifier for arbitrary
purposes. The base definition [152] for such identifiers are shown in the following.
<xsd : complexType name=” Id en t i f i e rType ”>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=” admin i s t ra t ive domain” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ” use=”
requ i r ed ”/>
</xsd : complexType>
Listing 5.6: IF-MAP XML schema for extended identifiers.
Links and Metadata
To establish a relationship between two di↵erent identifiers, a link is used. Links are always
given by the particular metadata attached to them. That is, if no metadata is attached,
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the link is no longer valid and is thus being deleted. Furthermore, metadata may not only
be attached to a link between two identifiers but also directly to only one identifier. In
the first case, the metadata expresses information about the relationship between the two
identifiers connected while in the second case information about a single identifier are
expressed. The basic schema of attributes that metadata must include is specified by the
TCG as following [152].
<xsd : attr ibuteGroup name=”metadataAttr ibutes ”>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=”ifmap pub l i sher id ”/>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=”ifmap timestamp” type=”xsd : dateTime”/>
<xsd : anyAttr ibute/>
</xsd : attr ibuteGroup>
Listing 5.7: IF-MAP XML schema for metadata.
The TCG allows to either use pre-defined metadata, for example in the area of network
security or, due to the basic specification, provides a way to define an own set of metadata.
Both types must be based on the attributes shown above and thus consist of so-called
operational attributes. Three of these attributes are defined within the basic schema shown
in 5.7. The remaining two must be defined within the appropriate metadata schema.
Namely, the operational attributes are the ifmap-publisher-id, ifmap-timestamp, ifmap-
cardinality, lifetime and anyAtttribute.
ifmap-publisher-id This attribute is used in order to uniquely identify a publishing MAP
Client. When an MAPC initially connects to the MAPS by publishing metadata, this
metadata is assigned with this id. Future metadata published is then also assigned
with this id, which is never changing for this MAPC. The id itself is responsible for
the assignment process and in detail also for the uniqueness of the id itself.
ifmap-timestamp The ifmap-timestamp is assigned when a MAPC publishes metadata
on a MAPS. That is, when the server places this metadata within its graph, the
time of this operations is assigned to this metadata. Only the server is able to set
this type of attribute.
ifmap-cardinality This attribute defines if an instance of a particular metadata can be
assigned only one time or multiple times to a link or to a identifier. This means,
if this attribute is set to singleValue, then only one metadata of this type can be
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assigned at the same time. If it is set to multiValue, an arbitrary amount may
be assigned at the same time. This behaviour is specified in [152] as follows, thus
extending the basic metadata attribute group specification.
<xsd : attr ibuteGroup name=” s ing l eVa lueMetadataAttr ibutes ”>
<xsd : attr ibuteGroup r e f=”metadataAttr ibutes ”/>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=”ifmap c a r d i n a l i t y ” use=” requ i r ed ”>
<xsd : simpleType>
<xsd : r e s t r i c t i o n base=”xsd : s t r i n g ”>
<xsd : enumeration value=” s ing l eVa lue ”/>
</xsd : r e s t r i c t i o n >
</xsd : simpleType>
</xsd : a t t r i bu t e>
</xsd : attr ibuteGroup>
<xsd : attr ibuteGroup name=”mult iValueMetadataAttr ibutes ”>
<xsd : attr ibuteGroup r e f=”metadataAttr ibutes ”/>
<xsd : a t t r i b u t e name=”ifmap c a r d i n a l i t y ” use=” requ i r ed ”>
<xsd : simpleType>
<xsd : r e s t r i c t i o n base=”xsd : s t r i n g ”>
<xsd : enumeration value=”mult iValue ”/>
</xsd : r e s t r i c t i o n >
</xsd : simpleType>
</xsd : a t t r i bu t e>
</xsd : attr ibuteGroup>
Listing 5.8: IF-MAP XML schema defining single and multi value metadata.
lifetime This attribute determines how long particular metadata exists on the MAP
Server. It may be either set to session or forever. Session lifetime indicates, that
this metadata is to be deleted at the time the session of the publishing MAP Client
is being terminated. That is, if that particular client disconnects from the server,
the server deletes all metadata from this client which is set to session lifetime. In
di↵erence to that, the metadata won’t be deleted if the lifetime is set to forever. In
this case the metadata will never be deleted by the server. The value itself is set




anyAttribute To allow for an extension of the metadata attribute group, the specification
allows to assign more attributes via the anyAttribute construct. This allows to
extend metadata by own attributes while still being conform to the specification.
Although it is possible to freely define own attributes by the use of this it is not
intended by the TCG. Due to this, it needs to be evaluated if there are other ways
to do this while staying conform to the specification. Nevertheless it is possible to
use this attribute for other purposes.
These three basic constructs, identifiers, links and metadata stored in an appropriate
graph on the server, form the basic data model of the IF-MAP protocol. The actual ex-
change of messages building up instances of this data types are explained in the following.
5.1.2 Communication in Detail
The underlying communication model used by the IF-MAP protocols defines three parts:
• two di↵erent channels used to exchange data,
• operations which are carried out through these channels and
• the handling of IF-MAP sessions.
IF-MAP Channels
The start of each communication is always given by the MAP Client as the server responds
only to requests and commands from the client. In detail, the client may use both types
of channels to communicate with the server. It first establishes a so-called synchronous
send receive channel (SSRC). Using this SSRC, all commands which can be immediately
processed by the server are exchanged, e.g. the publication of metadata from the client.
There is one operation, poll, which returns metadata to the MAPC. This poll operation
might block the communication channel as it waits for changed metadata. Due to this, a
second channel is required. This channel, called asynchronous receive channel (ARC), is




As IF-MAP is a stateful protocol relying on the two communication channels, a session
handling is provided. This session handling is controlled by the following commands and
their appropriate operations.
newSession This operation is initially carried out and provides a session id for a MAPC.
Due to this, the operation itself does not require a session id to be sent. The gener-
ated session id is given back to the client which uses it for all future communication
with the server.
renewSession A MAPC’s session id is treated as valid as long as the MAPC has an
active channel to the MAPS. In order to allow the client to change the https-based
connection without losing its session, the renewSession command can be used. If
the session is not refreshed within a specific amount of time and there is no active
channel to the client, the server terminates this session and thus the session id
becomes invalid.
endSession To actively terminate a session from the client, the endSession command
can be used. If the server receives this command, all metadata published by this
particular client which has its lifetime set to session is deleted. Furthermore, the
session id is considered invalid from this time.
By using these three commands, the client and server are able to handle their session in
a satisfying way.
Operations
Within an established session, there are operations to actually exchange data between
MAPCs and MAPS. There are five types of operations defined by IF-MAP which are
explained in the following.
Publish The publish operation allows a MAPC to change metadata on the server. There
are three sub types of this operation which define the actual meaning of the term changing
metadata. Due to this, the particular operation may be either a publish-update, a publish-
notify or a publish-delete.
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update Adds or updates particular metadata on the server. In detail, if the metadata
included in this operation does not exist on the server, it is initially added. If it is
already existing and is of the cardinality type single value it is updated with a new
one. If the cardinality is set to multiValue, another metadata is simply added.
notify Metadata provided by this operation is not stored within the server’s graph. In-
stead, it is directly forwarded to all clients having a subscription for this kind of
metadata.
delete Simply allows to delete particular metadata on the server.
One single publish operation may consist of an unlimited amount of combinations of all
three sub types.
Search The search operation provides a way to retrieve metadata and identifiers con-
nected by this metadata from the MAPS. The client needs to provide one identifier as root
for the search operation. Based on this root all connected links, metadata and identifiers
are put together into a searchResult. This searchResult e↵ectively provides a sub graph
of the overall graph stored on the server. To limit the e↵ect of the search process, there
are some parameters which define filter like conditions.
identifier As already written, this parameter defines the initial root which is used to start
the search at.
match-links This option provides a method to filter the result of a search by the links
that are traversed. That is, if there is a value given for this option, only links and
their appropriate data are traversed if they match the given value.
max-depth Specifies the deepness of the search operation. As the map graph may become
rather big over time, going into an unlimited deepness may result in a rather bloated
answer. To overcome this, the max-depth specifies the amount of identifiers that
should be traversed, beginning by the root.
max-size Another way of limiting the search result is the setting of this parameter. It
specifies a maximum in terms of size the result can reach and instructs the search
operation to stop at this point.
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result-filter This parameter provides another option for filtering the search result. The
value set for this parameter defines which entries of the result should be dropped
and thus excluded from the search result.
terminal-identifier-type If reaching the identifier set in this parameter, the search oper-
ation is terminated and the result is returned.
These options allow for a highly customisable search operation.
Subscribe This operation is used by the MAP Client in order to select metadata on
the MAP Server the client wants to be informed about. That is, each time the metadata
changes on the server, usually by a previously done publish operation, the MAPC which
has an active subscription for this data will be informed about the changes and the content
of the change. Furthermore, there are two sub types of a subscription: a subscribe update
operation as well as a subscribe delete operation. The subscribe update is used to add
or change a subscription while delete is used by a client in order to delete an active
subscription on the server.
Poll After a subscription has been established by the client on the server, the client
can carry out the poll operation. This is done via the ARC as poll only returns if there
is currently an actual poll result and otherwise blocks. If there is a poll result which is
provided through the ARC, it consists of the name of the subscription that triggered
this particular result. Thus, one client may di↵erentiate between subscriptions on a single
server. The poll result itself contains only changes of the data, thus omitting parts of
the returned graph which were not changed. A poll result consist of one of the same sub
types like a search result or a general search result. That is, a general result, simply called
searchResult, is returned the first time the appropriate subscription matches. In this case,
no partial elements of the returned graph are omitted. Furthermore, this type is only given
once at the first time of a matching subscription to the client. The next time parts of the
subscription are changed by a conventional publish, the client receives an updateResult.
If something is deleted, a deleteResult is used. If the publish was done through a publish-




PurgePublisher This last operation allows a MAP Client to order the server to purge all
previously published metadata from this client. To do so, the client provides the correct
publisher-id which is used by the server to identify the metadata that should be deleted.
While this operation is not used for ending a session, as the endSession command takes
care about deleting metadata with session lifetime, it is used if the client unexpectedly
terminates. It allows the client to clean up all its metadata on the server to provide a new
starting point.
Given this communication model, a deeper look into the trust model behind the IF-
MAP protocol can be done.
5.1.3 Trust Model
Based on the analysis of the propagated trust model made in [166], there are two parts
of this model: the IF-MAP protocol itself as well as the security of IF-MAP enabled
components, in particular the server. IF-MAP proposes the idea of allowing to share
network related data between arbitrary systems to not only gain an overall picture about
that network but also to support a decision making. Given that, IF-MAP systems may
be rather threatened. This is due to the fact, that an attacker is able to influence certain
aspects, like the decision making, in order to gain an advantage. To limit this, the TCG
proposes the named trust model with its two parts.
Protocol Trust Model
As stated in [166] and [152], the IF-MAP protocol itself must fulfil three requirements in
order to be considered secure. These three requirements are:
• a mutual authentication of the communicating parties, thus an authentication of
the clients and the server;
• the use of an integrity preserving protocol for data exchange;
• the support of encrypted data exchange along with the security against replay-based
attacks.




To fulfil these requirements, TLS is used. TLS provides strong and established means
to authenticate the communicating parties, to encrypt data and to check the integrity
of the exchanged data by the use of particular message authentication code mechanisms
(cf. [167]). To ensure the MAP Servers authenticity, IF-MAP relies on an appropriate
certificate of the server. That is, the client must only establish a connection with a server
if the certificate presented by the server is considered to be valid. Additionally, IF-MAP
provides two possibilities for authenticating the client: as so-called basic authentication
and a certificate-based authentication. The basic authentication is a simple exchange of a
username and password combination. This credential combination is then matched against
a set of users the server holds. If the user is known and the credentials are correct, access
is granted. As with the certificate-based authentication, the same procedure the client
uses to authenticate the server is used. Thus, the client must possess a valid certificate
which is being presented to the server in order to gain access. All these authentication
mechanisms are based on the TLS protocol which provides well established means and
can be considered as a secure way of doing this.
Trust Model for IF-MAP enabled Systems
The second part of the trust model is given by the requirements for the actual IF-MAP
enabled systems. That is, this part aims to reduce the threats imposed on IF-MAP enabled
systems and platforms. Given the analysis in [166] there are the following general points
which are applicable for both, MAP Servers and MAP Clients.
• A hardened operating system should be used. Furthermore, the OS should be main-
tained actively.
• Physical access to the appropriate systems should be limited, thus only individuals
which are allowed to access certain systems should gain physical access.
• A trusted platform should be used, thus allowing to perform a remote attestation
of the system prior to accessing the network.
• In terms of providing forensic information for the case of an incident, a sophisticated
logging approach should be used. This logging approach should keep track of all
relevant events taking place on the particular system.
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Besides these general points, there are some specific advises for either MAP Clients and
MAP Servers.
MAP Clients
The specification advises the following points to increase a MAP Client’s security.
• The MAP Server should provide a more sophisticated access control scheme than
allowing full access if a MAP Client was successfully authenticated. That is, the
server should allow to distinguish between read only access and read write access.
This gives the ability to grant MAP Clients only the lowest rights necessary and if
the client tries to perform operations which are not allowed within its current rights,
access should be denied.
• Improving this basic access control scheme, the TCG advises to optionally use a
scheme which allows to set each allowed operation individually for each particular
MAP Client. Extending this, an administrative interface for this scheme should be
established, allowing the administrator to be informed about a MAP Client trying
to use not permitted operations.
• Honeypot like metadata can be provided by a MAP Server to recognise MAP Clients
that may be compromised.
MAP Servers
The TCG advises certain points addressing the servers.
• The network access to the server should be (a) limited by a firewall and (b) moni-
tored by an intrusion detection approach.
• A host-based system monitoring should be used.
• The server should not rely on basic authentication but only on the certificate-based
method.
• An established ARC and an SSRC which are supposed to belong to the same client
should be verified for this. That is, the server should be able to recognise the hi-
jacking of certain communication channels by a rogue client.
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• Maximum size of the search result should be limited to prevent denial of service
attacks. Denial of service may happen if the server is unable to process the search
in a reasonable time (i.e. due to the result growing bigger than the server’s RAM).
• The last advise is carried out by MAPCs but it aims at recognising a rogue MAPS,
thus this point also addresses server related security. MAP Clients should be (a)
able to recognise behaviour of the MAP Server that is considered abnormal and (b)
should check the validity of the received data. How this can be achieved in detail is
not given by the specification.
Given that, the trust model defined by the TCG only addresses the communication itself
and the participating system’s security. There is no explicit trust model for the data being
exchanged. A detailed view on this point is given in the following.
5.2 Trustworthiness of IF-MAP
As shown in the previous section, IF-MAP does provide communication security, i.e.
published and subscribed data is transferred securely between the appropriate parties.
IF-MAP also makes certain advises about the hardening of the systems participating as
MAPCs and MAPSs, for example by the use of trusted computing-based technologies.
However, IF-MAP does not provide mechanisms to reason about the trustworthiness of
the (meta)data itself but states (cf, [152]) that this trustworthiness is explicitly out of
scope. Furthermore, the network overview created by IF-MAP is also defined as one
possible state the network could be within, not necessarily the actual state. Due to these
reasons, there are several enhancements necessary. Given the trust definitions made in this
thesis (section 4.2.1), which states A Feature is considered trustworthy if and only if all
operations handling this Feature perform as expected., a technical version of this definition
can be made in order to use IF-MAP as the basic communication layer. This definition
[166] simply states from a technical perspective, that trustworthiness is based upon the
integrity of metadata. This integrity might be compromised either on the MAPC or on the
MAPS but also on the communication channel used to transmit this metadata. That is,
the metadata can be considered trustworthy if the IF-MAP based operations that handle
this metadata behave as expected. Using this definition and the findings about IF-MAP’s
trust model, the particular concept for the implementation can be introduced.
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5.3 IF-MAP Mapping of TCADS
This section describes the approach which is used to map the TCADS system to IF-MAP.
In particular, the implementation is based on the CADS’ implementation described in
[2]. Due to this, this section only provides the trust-specific part of the implementation’s
concept. First of all, a recap of the TCADS system in terms of the trust extension is given.
5.3.1 TCADS Revisited
Section 4 introduces the overall trust model and the domain-specific TCADS system.
These approaches consist of several parts, in particular of an abstract model defining
the roles and their associated operations. Based on these roles and operations, trust en-
hancing components are added. Figure 5.2 depicts the combined model elements. As the
Figure 5.2: Summarised abstract trust model (cf. [166]).
figure shows, there are three roles: a Sender which creates Features, a Provider that is
responsible for storing the Features and making them available and the Receiver which
uses the Features. There are two operations, processing a Feature as well as transmitting a
Feature. Furthermore, the Provider o↵ers a special Reasoning interface and uses a compo-
nent called security property record manager (SPRM). This SPRM relies on the security
property map, which provides the conjunction of the basic trust derivation factors and
their attachment to the appropriate operations. These factors used for trust derivation
are represented by the security properties (SP), which are valid for a particular type of
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operation. Combining these SPs and their appropriate ratings, an intermediate security
level (SL) can be calculated. There is one SL for each operation which has been part of
the overall Feature handling process. Given that, the final trust level of a Feature can be
calculated by combining these SLs into one value. Based on these key abilities, a mapping
to IF-MAP is described in the following sections.
First of all, the instantiation process (4.1.4) describes roles that need to be mapped onto
the appropriate components of the particular architecture. This is done in the following.
5.3.2 Abstract Role Mapping
IF-MAP is based on two di↵erent components, the MAPC as well as the MAPS. As there
are three roles defined by the trust extension of TCADS, the following detailed mapping
is used.
• Sender Role: The role which provides Features to the Provider is mapped to the
component MAP Client. That is, operations carried out on and by the MAP Clients
are either of the type process or transmit. Transmit is mapped to the actual publish
operation of the metadata from the MAPC to the MAPS. All other Feature and
metadata relevant operations, like measuring properties of the client’s platform are
mapped to the process operation.
• Provider Role: As the Map Server receives metadata from a publishing MAP
Client and provides this metadata via a pollResult to another client requesting this
data, it is mapped to the Provider role. Furthermore, with the incoming publishing
operation already mapped, the outgoing pollResult based on an active subscription
is mapped to the transmit operation started by the Provider. All other handling of
metadata on the MAPS is mapped to the process operation.
• Receiver Role: Due to the previous mapping, the Receiver Role is also mapped
to MAP Clients. The MAP Server provides metadata to those MAP Clients by
handling their subscription and transmitting changed metadata to the appropriate
clients.
Besides the particular role-based mapping, there are two more conceptual components
which need to be addressed in order to completely specify the mapping. The first compo-
nent is the SPRM, which is responsible for retrieving the actual security properties and
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their ratings out of the second component, the security property map. These two com-
ponents may be either placed on the MAP Server itself or on a particular MAP Client.
There are several advantages and disadvantages for both ways, as pointed out in [166].
Placing the components on a MAP Client would allow for a rather resource keeping strat-
egy. Due to the fact that the SPRM may have to handle sophisticated tasks in order to
assign the correct security properties, it requires some system resources. Placing it on a
separate MAPC allows to assign all of the client’s resources for this specific task. However,
according to [166], this is the only actual benefit of this approach. In detail there are three
particular problems if using a MAP Client as SPRM:
• A special MAP Client to MAP Server interface is required.
• Unavailability of the calculating MAPC.
• Limited MAPC security.
First of all, the MAP Client requires a special interface to the MAP Server. Although
IF-MAP provides some means to exchange required data, those means do not fully allow
to exchange all data from the MAPS to this MAPC. In detail the MAPC would need
a starting identifier and, which makes it rather complex, it must be able to access all
sub graphs stored on the MAPS. This is practically very hard to achieve, as the starting
identifier needs to be pre defined.
The second problem concerns the availability of the MAPC as without it there is no
trust level calculation possible. Although a MAPS may also be unavailable, the situation
would result in metadata as well as the trust levels are not available. Relying only on a
MAPC would result in the weird situation in case of the MAPC being unavailable that
metadata is available but without a trust level.
The third disadvantage is about the MAPC’s security itself. With providing an extra
interface, this interface may be compromised. Furthermore, there are two critical com-
ponents by using this approach: the MAPS and this MAPC. Even more critical, the
connection between the MAPS and this MAPC may be interrupted resulting again in the
situation with no trust levels available.
Given these points, the MAPS should be the place of choice. Emphasising this, besides
the increasing resource requirements, the following benefits can be found. First of all,
the MAPS receives all metadata that is exchanged due to its centralised position and
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function. Given that, all metadata exchanged is extended with trust if the SPRM is
placed on the MAPS. Furthermore, the MAPS is the only component which is able to see
most of the operations carried out to handle metadata. Although it cannot directly gain
information about the processing of a sending MAPC, all other operations are within the
MAPS’s visibility. It is therefore rather easy to derive the security property attachment to
the appropriate operations. Finally, the MAPS must be trusted under all circumstances.
Due to this, placing the SPRM on it does not create a new instance which must be
trusted in addition. Given all these benefits of placing the SPRM on the MAPS, the
MAPS is responsible for carrying out the trust calculation including all necessary parts.
Figure 5.3 depicts the situation after the appropriate mapping of the abstract roles to IF-
Figure 5.3: Mapping of Roles to IF-MAP entities [166].
MAP components. Furthermore, the IF-MAP defined operations are also included, thus
transmit is carried out by either publish, the returning poll or a search operation. Using
this mapping, the actual trust extension for the IF-MAP protocol can be introduced.
5.4 Trust Extension in IF-MAP
The overall trust extension used to apply the relevant conceptual parts of TCADS to
IF-MAP is depicted in figure 5.4. It consists of two relevant layers: the extension layer
itself and the interface layer. The extension layer consists of
• the Security Property Map (SPM) realising component,
• the Security Property Record Manager (SPRM) component and
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Figure 5.4: Trust extension of IF-MAP[166]: Trust layer consisting of relevant components
and their exposed interfaces. In particular, the security property map (SPM),
the security property record manager (SPRM) which request an appropriate
rating from the SPM and the Trust Token Manager (TTMgr) which request
a Rated security property record (RSPR).
• the Trust Token Manager (TTMgr, [166]).
The interface layer provides the accessible interfaces to each of these components. Each
part is described later in this section. Prior to this, the mapping of the trust level into the
domain of IF-MAP is introduced. This mapped trust level is defined as a so-called Trust
Token (TT).
5.4.1 Trust Tokens
Section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 introduce the trust level concept. In short, a trust level expresses
the overall trustworthiness of a Feature based on the security properties of the operations
used to handle this Feature throughout the system. Furthermore, it is distinguished be-
tween a phase 1-specific trust level (TLP1
⇣





expresses the trustworthiness of the Feature for the first three operations, thus for
the Feature residing on the Provider. The TLP2
⇣
enhances this by adding the last trans-
mission operation to the trust calculation. As the current IF-MAP version provides no
capability of expressing such a trust level, a method for doing so must be introduced. It
is therefore necessary to extend IF-MAP, allowing to incorporate trust into the metadata
171
5 Implementation
environment. IF-MAP creates a graph out of published metadata reflecting a network’s
state. To do this, IF-MAP clients publish arbitrary information in a specification compli-
ant way. This metadata is collected by the MAPS and is stored within a graph. Besides
adding metadata about certain network relevant properties and other things, this concept
allows also to add metadata representing the trust level of other published metadata. In
order to realise this, IF-MAP needs to be extended with a special metadata type. This
type, called Trust Token (TT) is defined in a XML Schema as trustTokenType metadata
in the following way.
<xsd : complexType name=”trustTokenType”>
<xsd : sequence>
<xsd : element name=” trus t  l e v e l ” type=”xsd : i n t e g e r ” />
<xsd : element name=”mapc id ” type=”xsd : s t r i n g ” />
<xsd : element name=”spr process sender ” type=”spRecordType” />
<xsd : element name=”spr transmit sender prov ide r ” type=”spRecordType” />
<xsd : element name=”spr process prov ide r ” type=”spRecordType” />
<xsd : element name=”spr transmit provider r e c e i v e r ” type=”spRecordType” />
</xsd : sequence>
</xsd : complexType>
<xsd : complexType name=”spRecordType”>
<xsd : sequence>
<xsd : element name=” se cu r i t y  l e v e l ” type=”xsd : i n t e g e r ” minOccurs=”1”
maxOccurs=”1” />
<xsd : element name=” se cu r i t y property ” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”
type=”xsd : s t r i n g ” />
</xsd : sequence>
</xsd : complexType>
Listing 5.9: TrustToken XML schema.





introduced in this thesis, also including the intermediary results and
steps. It consist of the following parts.
• trust-level: This element encapsulates the overall calculated trust level. It can




, according to the generation of the Trust Token
itself.
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• mapc-id: A relationship between the MAP Client and the published metadata the
Trust Token is valid for is established through the use of this element. In detail,
the appropriate publisher id of the MAPC is stored here. In case of a delete type
operation, the id of the deleting client is used for storage.
• spr-operation: Each of these four elements represent the security property record
generated for a particular operation. Based on the entries made in these fields,
the RSPR can be obtained. As the syntax of the four elements is the same, all of
them rely on the spRecordType which encapsulates each of the security properties
assigned and the calculated overall security level for this particular operation. Given
that this record is entirely filled with values, it can be considered as RSPR.
SPRM and SPM
The SPRM is responsible for providing the appropriate security properties along with
their ratings. The SPM provides a way of holding these properties and the ratings in a
dynamic fashion. Although the conceptual part defines the SPRM as solely responsible for
managing the properties and everything connected to them, the implementation provides
also a logical SPM component which handles the actual SPM policy. Given that, there
are two interfaces: the SPM interface for updating ratings and the SPRM interface to as-
sign the actual property to an operation. The SPRM uses the SPM internally to retrieve
the appropriate rating for a property assigned. The actual task of measuring an opera-
tion to determine which property is valid for this operation, is outsourced to the MAP
Server. Due to this, there are some constraints for the properties that are usable within
this implementation. The particular definition of the properties and the used function to
calculate the security level for an operation is shown later in this section.
Trust Token Manager
The Trust Token Manager is responsible for building up the final phase 1 Trust Token
(P1TT) as well as the final phase 2 Trust Token (P2TT). To calculate them, it uses the
preparation done on the SPRM’s side. In detail, the security levels are used to form the
Trust Tokens which are then provided through the TTMgr’s interface.
The data model provided within the conceptual part of this thesis for storing the Trust-
specific data (i.e. the TrustLog data structure) is applied to allow to store the P1TT as
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well as the P2TT. Furthermore, the P1TT is directly stored within the MAPS graph
structure building up the provided data model. The P2TT is provided using enhanced
communicational means. Furthermore, the function to calculate the TTs is also maintained
and used by the TTMgr. This is necessary as the TTMgr is responsible for the calculation
task, thus it is the only component which can use this function. As the P2TT is eventually
communicated to the appropriate MAPC, the TTMgr is also responsible for providing it
in a way it can be used for this communication task.
Based up on these components and their provided interfaces, the data model of IF-MAP
can be extended with trust.
5.4.2 Extended Data Model
The P1TT needs to be calculated and stored within the MAPS graph. It is used to
calculate the P2TT if a client requests the appropriate metadata. To store a particular
Trust Token within the map graph, the trustTokenType introduced above is used. Based
on this, the actual structure used to represent the TT within the MAP graph can be
developed. This structure is called Trust-Token-Metadata (TTM) and specified in the
following form [166].
<xsd : element name=” trus t token metadata” type=”trustTokenMetadataType” />
<xsd : complexType name=”trustTokenMetadataType”>
<xsd : complexContent>
<xsd : ex t ens i on base=”trustTokenType”>
<xsd : attr ibuteGroup r e f=” ifmap : mult iValueMetadataAttr ibutes ” />
</xsd : extens ion>
</xsd : complexContent>
</xsd : complexType>
Listing 5.10: Trust-Token-Metadata XML schema.
To establish the relationship between the particular metadata stored in the graph and
the TTM, a self defined operational attribute is used. This attribute enhances metadata
by using the anyAttribute extension mechanism. It is called Trust-Token-ID (TTID) and
holds a unique string referencing the particular TTM, which is using the same id. Figure
5.5 depicts the structure which results by using this approach. The MAP Server is re-
sponsible for generating the appropriate TTM. Due to this, there are some constraints for
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Figure 5.5: Ttrust Token Metadata as defined in [166].
setting the operational attributes of the TTM. First of all, the publisher-id must be set to
the MAPS itself. This is necessary to allow all parties, in particular MAPCs, to recognise
that the TTM is managed by the MAPS. As written in [166], this id should be set when
starting the MAPS and must not be changed at any time the MAPS is running. The
lifetime attribute is set to forever which is only done to mark the TTM for readability. As
the TTM is bound to the MAPS itself, it implicitly has a lifetime of forever as there is no
real session attached to it. To allow for more than one TTM in case of multiple metadata
between identifiers, the cardinality must be set to multiValue.
Feature Base Snapshots
The introduced concept demands the use of a history providing function within the trust
extension. This history is used to keep track of value changes as well as of trust changes.
The implementation does not place this history on the MAPS, but uses the abilities the
CADS system already provides. Detailed in [2], the Correlation Engine responsible for
decision making uses a so-called Feature Base to internally manage the Features received
from the MAP Server. This Feature Base already possesses the means to build up a history
for Feature values. Due to their sequential storage of all Feature updates it can be used to
provide the history function. In detail, the sequential storage is not based on overwriting
an existing Feature but on using a linked list where the newest Feature is simply placed
in front. The history function is provided by utilising the enhanced data model, which
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encapsulates the Feature into the TrustLog data model. The Feature Base is extended
to use the TrustLog instead of the Feature, thus also including the trust updates in its
storage model. The detailed data model used for this implementation is shown later in
this chapter.
5.4.3 Extended Communication Model
In order to provide the P2TT for a particular MAPC, the communication model of IF-
MAP has to be enhanced. The first operation which is performed consists mainly of
the procedure to establish a valid session between the MAPC and the MAPS. As there
is no particular metadata exchanged, no enhancements are necessary. Besides this, the
operation itself might be used in order to assign security properties, similar to the type
of the authentication used. Operations which terminate the communication between the
MAPS and the MAPC, like an intended endSession or an unintended communication
interruption, don’t need to be enhanced either. The MAPS has only to take care about
the correct deletion of the appropriate metadata, which belongs to the client the session
has ended for. Furthermore, TT-specific data may be deleted too if there is no other client
linked to it. As written above, keeping track of such changes, in particular of the deletion,
is done on the Correlation Engine’s side by utilising the Feature Base. Due to this, the
MAPS enhancement can be kept rather simple.




• search and poll.
Details to each operation are given in the following.
The first operation which influences the TT calculation is purgePublisher. It is used
by a client to indicate a cleanup of its metadata which can be used as a fresh staring
point for republishing. Due to this cleanup, all associated TTs have to be recalculated if a
purgePublisher is triggered. If old data is not reconstructed by a following publish of the
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same MAP Client, the associated TTs have to be deleted after some time, in particular
after they have been provided to all subscribers.
If a MAP Client performs a publish-update operation, all Trust Tokens (phase 1) have to
be updated as well. In particular, the stored TTM within the MAP graph is updated with
the newly calculated result. After this process is done, the Correlation Engine is notified
about this change to allow a complete picture of the appropriate trust and value changes.
Furthermore, active subscriptions will be handled after the complete trust calculation is
finished. This is necessary to avoid states where a TTM is outdated. Finally, the MAPC
cannot publish TT itself, the server must prevent this and reply with an appropriate error.
In case of a publish-delete from a MAP Client, the metadata and their associated TTs
need to be deleted from the MAP graph. Given other subscriptions to this metadata,
the subscribers need to be informed about the deletion. In particular, the TT has to
be recalculated in order to represent the trustworthiness of the delete operation itself.
Furthermore, the Feature Base of the Correlation Engine receives this delete operation
and can keep track of the deleted metadata. Therefore, it stores the last valid version of
the metadata, along with the delete operation’s trustworthiness.
Doing a search on the MAP Server, a MAP Client receives not only the searchResult
itself but also the appropriate P2TT attached to this search. That is, the MAP Server
calculates the P2TT based on the P1TT as soon as it receives the request for the search
operation as it is able to determine the appropriate security properties for this client (i.e.
by using the SPRM which can evaluate the communication between the MAPS and the
requesting MAPC). Equally to the search operation, a pollResult is also attached with
the appropriate P2TT valid for the polling client.
5.4.4 MAPS Security
Based on the enhancements for the IF-MAP protocol made above, the security situation
of the MAP Server has to be considered again. The discussion of the security of the
MAPS consists of two parts: First, the communication part including the publish and
subscribe operations. And second, the security of the MAPS itself. As the communication
is inherently secured by using appropriate methods (e.g. TLS) defined within the MAP
specification, there is no need to investigate this part again. Contrary to this, the security
of the MAPS itself need to be treated again as the specification does only give minor hints
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on how to treat this issue. This is due to the fact, that the MAPS is not intended to hold
the actual state of the network with real data. The specification defines, that it holds a
state which may reflect the networks state. Furthermore, the MAPS is not intended to
be used as a source for decision making but solely as an information database. As the
concept presented above moves the MAPS into an active role, these drawbacks need to
be addressed explicitly.
To use the MAPS for the described kind of decision making source, it has to meet the
following requirements:
• The database the MAPS holds must be changeable in a defined way only, i.e. by
using data received via IF-MAP operations. Unauthorised access to this database
must be prevented.
• As the MAPS itself creates the Trust information and publishes those into the
MAP graph, it is important that this process runs in a defined way. A possible
compromising of this process results in invalid TTs, thus breaking the whole concept.
As said above, a MAPC must not be allowed to publish trust related information
itself.
One approach which provides a reasonable security is the use of a trusted boot as
described by Trusted Computing. To perform a trusted boot, the first step is to define
an integrity state of the platform the MAPS runs on. This state should be clear and
trustworthy, thus the system should not be compromised in any form. Additional features
may be defined, such as the systems patch level or software packets. If this state is defined,
a Trusted Platform the MAPS system has to be to use trusted boot, can be configured in
a way, that it only boots up completely if the current system state matches the predefined
one. This means, the MAPS can only start if its integrity state is as expected. This does
in particular not help against zero day issues, such as software problems, but it minimises
the risk of a compromise. Another variant of this approach can be used to derive trust
for MAPCs. A detailed description of this approach can be found in 7.4.
Based on this concept, the actual implementation is described in the next section,
including the used software.
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The implementation of the enhanced MAP Server is based on the irond server developed
and maintained by [168]. It is a TCG certified IF-MAP 2.0 capable MAPS written in
Java. Furthermore, the snapshot-based enhancements provided by extending the Correla-
tion Engine’s data model are implemented by using the CADS reference implementation.
This reference implementation consist mainly of the Correlation Engine, which was also
developed by the Trust@FHH research group. The particular implementation of it is called
irondetect [168] and is also written in Java. Enhancing both subsystems allows to provide
a reference implementation for the TCADS system. Due to both systems being written
in Java, all implementation parts of this work are also written in Java.
Going back to the MAP Server, the trust extending components are implemented in
a stand alone manner first. In order to actually use them within the irond, a interface
connecting both parts is developed as next. The trust extending components are given by
the already introduced TrustService.
5.5.1 TrustService
Internally, the TrustService is realised by three di↵erent classes forming the domain model.
This domain model is depicted in figure 5.6. As the figure shows, there is a class repre-
Figure 5.6: TrustService domain model [166].
senting the security property, the security property record and the final Trust Token. The
SecurityProperty class simply encapsulates the name of the property represented by this
element, the current rating retrieved by the SPRM and a description giving element. The
SecurityPropertyRecord class references n actual SP s, which are used to calculate the
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security level of the record. The security level is stored within this class. Four of these
SecurityPropertyRecord objects are referenced by the TrustToken class, due to the four
defined operations. Furthermore, the TrustToken class holds the particular trust level
value, the id of the MAPC and a timestamp indicating the time of calculation of the
particular trust level. Given theses domain classes, the actual service can be described.
This is done in the following.
As described within [166], aim of the TrustService-based implementation is to decouple
the trust extension from that particular MAP Server. The actual measurement of the
security properties is not part of the service itself and must be provided by the SPRM-
based component. The overall class structure is depicted in figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7: TrustService class model [166].
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It consist of several classes providing the necessary methods and attributes for the
TrustService implementation. The main interface is provided by the class TrustService
itself.
TrustService Interface
This interface allows to store measured security properties and to generate (i.e. to calcu-
late) the P1TT as well as the P2TT. It provides the following methods in order to realise
this.
addSpForMapc() This method allows to store a measured SP . It is usually triggered by
the irond MAP Server and allows to identify the SP by a particular key. This key may
be given as one of three types: the ClientIdentifier, as a ChannelIdentifier or
as SessionID. The identifier-based keys allow to use either a MAP Client’s username
or the ip/port combination as method for identifying a certain property.
addSpForMaps() To store a property measured for the MAP Server itself, i.e. the irond
server, this method is provided. As this property can only be set for exactly one
server, where the TrustService is running on, no key must be given.
getP1TT() Provides a P1 TrustToken by the use of a Session- or Publisher-ID to the
MAP Server.
getP2TTM() Allows the MAP Server to retrieve the overall P2 Trust Token. A Session-
ID, the already calculated P1TT as well as an id for the metadata is required to do
this. The method returns the particular P2TT-specific metadata.
removeAllSprOfMapc() Requires a Session-ID in order to delete all measured security
properties of a particular MAPC.
reloadSpFile() To allow for dynamic ratings, the policy containing these ratings (i.e. the
SPM’s implementation) can be reloaded at every time. This is done by triggering
this method.
TrustServiceImpl Class
The class provides an actual implementation of the TrustService interface. In order to
fulfil its task, it makes use of the SprManager, SpRepository and TrustTokenManager.
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The TrustServiceImpl is in particular responsible for delegating the appropriate method-
based requests to one of these classes. The maintenance of the particular security property
records is done by the SprManager. In detail, this class is responsible for receiving the
particular SP from the SPRM and the calculation of the corresponding security level. The
SpRepository, which can be seen as logical part of the SPRM provides the particular
access to the assigned security properties. Given both classes, the TrustTokenMananger
can create the P1TT as well as the P2TT. In detail, the assigned trust level for both
Trust Tokens is being calculated by using the given SPRs and their connected SPs. The
irond implementation allows to map the accepted keys (that is the ClientIdentifier,
ChannelIdentifier and Session-ID) by the use of its SessionRepository class. Inter-
nally, irond uses the ClientIdentifier to map all known MAP Clients to sessions and
channels. Due to this, the two other key types are mapped back to a ClientIdentifier
key by using the database of the irond. Given this, the measured security properties are
stored as references of a certain ClientIdentifier. While the mapping outsourced to the
irond itself provides a straightforward access, there is one problem: if an endSession opera-
tion is triggered, the irond server deletes the appropriate mapping instantly. This results in
a situation, where the TrustService would be unable to resolve the key using the irond’s in-
ternal mapping database. In order to provide a solution to this problem, the TrustService
holds another ClientIdentifier-based mapping on its own. The particular TrustSer-
viceImpl allows therefore to use the method mapSessionIdToClientIdentifier(). The
SprManager is able to trigger the key resolving when performing removeAllSprOfMapc().
SpRepository
This class provides the interface to the security properties, and in particular to the assigned
ratings. The locally stored policy, representing the SPM to some extent, is loaded instantly
when starting up the implementation. A HashMap-based runtime storage is used to cache
the entries of the policy: the SP as key and the rating as its value. To allow the ratings to
be changed in a dynamic fashion, the reloadSpFile() method is provided. This method
triggers a reloading and re-caching of the stored policy, thus a reloading of the appropriate
properties and their ratings. In order to update a rating, the method must be triggered
actively. That is, the current implementation does not monitor the SPM on its own and
demands an interaction in order to begin the reloading process.
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SprManager
The assignment of the particular security properties to the operations, thus to the SPRs
are managed by this class. Due to each MAP Client possessing two potential SP sets, one
for the process operation on the client itself and one for the transmission between the
client and the server, the SprManager holds two references to the SprRepository class.
This references encapsulate the particular security property record per operation for a
client. Contrary to that, only one direct reference to the SecurityPropertyRecord instance
is required for the MAP Server itself. This is due to the already mentioned fact of the
MAP Server only being one instance and only holding one set of operational properties.
To resolve a particular propertyName, the SpRepository is used in order to provide the
actual security property. The propertyName itself is provided via the already described
addSpForMapc() and addSpForMaps() methods. Using the SlFunction class, the actual
security level can be calculated for a security property record. In case of carrying out
one of the get methods (getSprOfMapc(), getSprOfMaps()), the SL is being calculated
implicitly. The particular function used of calculating the SL is not completely defined
but being provided by the means of a strategy patterns-based class. This class, RealSl-
Function, inherits from the SlFunction class and implements the specific method used for
the calculation.
TrustTokenManager
Given the security property records by using the Session-ID of the particular MAP Client
encapsulated within the SprManager, the TrustTokenManager is able to provide the P1TT
as well as the P2TT. To calculate the particular trust level included within the TT, the
TlFunction class is used. Equally to the SlFunction class and the used strategy pattern,
the actual method used to calculate the trust level is given within the RealTlFunction
class. Providing the P2TT, the TrustTokenFactory is used. This class uses another factory-
based class: the MetadataFactory which is able to create an instance of the Metadata class.
This instances is used by the irond to represent metadata within its graph structure, thus
providing the methods to create search and pollResults answering P2TT requests. Besides




getP1TT() The overall procedure which is carried out by triggering this method is de-
picted in figure 5.8. The first step in order to receive a P1TT is to access the as-
signed SPRs. As the P1TT represents a phase 1 trust level, three SPRs are needed
for calculating the TL: the SPR of the client’s process operation, the SPR for the
transmission between the client and the server as well as the process SPR of the
MAPS. Having retrieved these three SPRs, the TrustTokenManager is able to in-
stantiate the particular TrustToken. This TrustToken represents a p1tt which is
being communicated to the requesting client. Given the view from the TrustService,
a client is rendered by a party requesting this p1tt. In case of the implementation
described here, the irond represents such a client.
Figure 5.8: P1TT request [166].
getP2TTM() In order to provide the P2TT, this method is used by the irond (i.e a
particular component of the irond). The P1TT which was previously instantiated is
used for this task. This is due to the P1TT holding the particular parts which form
the final trust level (phase 2 trust level), in detail the first three security levels. As
there might be changes to these security levels, a recalculation is triggered as first.
The task of recalculation is done by the SprManager class. Using this recalculated
values, the p2tt can be created. As there is one SPR missing, the next step is formed
by retrieving the SPR for the last operation: the final transmit between the server
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and the receiving client. Given this SPR, the appropriate security level for this set of
security properties can be calculated. By finishing this, there are four security levels
available which are finally used to calculate the overall (i.e. phase 2) trust level. This
trust level is encapsulated as metadata by the use of the createTtmMetadata()and
provided to the requesting client (as already stated, the irond server). Theses steps
are depicted in figure 5.9.
Figure 5.9: P2TT request [166].
Besides these parts, which bundle the main functionality of the TrustService there are
some more classes which are used to realise the required auxiliary functions.
TrustTokenIdGenerator
This class takes responsibility for providing unique and non repeating ids for establishing
the link between the TrustTokens and the metadata they belong to. To fulfil the require-
ments of uniqueness, the instantiation process is realised by utilising a Singleton pattern.
That is, there must be only one instance existing at the same time. This instance takes
care of managing the ids, so that no id is used twice. Internally, a long type-based attribute




This enumeration maps the appropriate operations to constant-based string values. The
mapping is used to assign the security properties to the operations. Because of this there
is a mapping for the process operation on the MAP Client (PROCESS_MAPC), a mapping
for the process operation on the MAP Server (PROCESS_MAPS) and a mapping for the
transmission between the MAP Client and the MAP Server (TRANSMIT_MAPC_MAPS). Due
to the implementation creating the P2TT only on request, there is no particular mapping
for the final operation.
TrustConstStrings
This class holds all other constant strings used within the implementation. Furthermore,
external components accessing parts of the implementation can use it in order to operate
on the same attributes.
To use this TrustService in combination with the irond implementation, a strategy for
implementing it, based on the particular irond components, is required. This combination
is explained in the following section.
5.5.2 Combining MAPS and TrustService
Details of the irond implementation are given in [168] including the architectural layers
of the server. Summarising this, there are two of these layers: the communication layer
as well as the data model. The communication layer is responsible for managing the au-
thentication of MAP Clients, the handling of the sessions and the authorisation of the
MAP Clients. These tasks are not limited to one client at a time but are implemented in
a highly parallel manner. The particular storage of the graph and the process required to
realise this handling is encapsulated within the data layer. The interface between those
two layers is given by accessing data model specific methods through a call from the com-
munication layer. Based on this, the interface between the TrustService and the remaining
irond components must be realised on both layers (cf. [166]). The overall model the im-
plementation is based on, is depicted in figure 5.10. As it easy to see, the TrustService is
being called from both layers of the irond and therefore acts passively.
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Figure 5.10: TrustService extended layer model of irond [166].
The TrustService is being initialised within the irond’s initialisation process. That is,
at the same time the irond server starts its internal components, the TrustService is
instantiated. Besides that, a customised signal handler was added to the irond. This
signal handler waits for the SIGHUP signal which can be given to the irond from outside.
Receiving this signal, the irond calls the already mentioned method to reload the policy
file holding the security properties as well as their ratings. This mechanism is used to
dynamically update the ratings at runtime of the server. As already stated, the policy file
itself is not being monitored actively, thus the only method to instruct an update is to
use the appropriate signal.
Communication Layer Enhancements
To provide the appropriate security properties, the communication layer of the irond needs
to be enhanced. The process of measuring the SPs is divided into two parts: the measure-
ment of the MAP Client’s SP and the measurement of the server’s SP. Figure 5.11 depicts
the enhanced communication layer, including the TrustService interface. To measure the
appropriate security properties which can be derived from the connection between the
server and the client, the ChannelAuth class as well as the ChannelAcceptor class are able
to call methods from the TrustService. Both classes determine the type of the connection
which is either a certificate-based or a simple authentication-based connection. Using this
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Figure 5.11: TrustService extended communication layer [166].
information, they are able to assign appropriate security properties which represent these
di↵erent connection types and bind them to the correct ClientIdentifier. The partic-
Figure 5.12: Basic auth SP measurement [166].
ular steps when measuring the communication channel are depicted in figure 5.12. After
the ChannelAcceptor received a connection request for a simple authentication-based
connection, it instantiates a BasicChannelAuth object (bca) including the TrustService
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reference. Following this, the ChannelThread authenticates the clients using the provided
bca instance. This is done by calling the authenticate() method. After this step, the
derived security properties are assigned by the use of the TrustService interface.
The derivation of appropriate security properties for the MAP Server itself, thus the SP
for the MAPS’s process operation is rather straightforward. In detail, the only e↵ective
way of providing a measurement for the server itself is the use of a TPM sealed certificate.
As stated above, this certificate allows to verify that the server was booted up into a pre
defined state. Using this certificate and some signing methods, a MAP Client is able to
verify this state of the MAPS. Given that, the SP for the process operation on the MAPS
are derived using this method.
Data Model Enhancements
In order to store the P1TT metadata structure within the irond’s graph, certain enhance-
ments to the data model are necessary. As already written, the reference between the
metadata and their Trust Token is established through the TrustTokenID (TTID). Both,
the metadata as well as the P1TT use the same TTID to indicate that the P1TT belongs
to exactly this metadata. As depicted in figure 5.13, the connection between the P1TT
Figure 5.13: Enhanced data model [166].
and the metadata itself is being managed by allowing the class responsible for handling the
metadata to get or set an appropriate TTID. In detail, metadata managed by the irond is
being encapsulated within a W3cXmlMetadata object. This object holds the XML-based
representation of IF-MAP complying metadata. To link this metadata to a P1TT the
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class is enhanced with a TTID member holding the appropriate TTID. To actually store
metadata within the graph structure, the class MetadataHolderImpl is being used. This
class is enhanced by Trust Token-specific methods and a member referencing the ap-
propriate Trust Token. That is, the class not only provides the metadata storing means
but also binds the appropriate Trust Token to this metadata in the data model. Further-
more, there are four classes, ClientService, SubscriptionService, SearchService and
PublishService which are responsible for the operation-based handling. Using the en-
hancements explained above, the overall procedures when performing an IF-MAP based
operation can be explained following the responsibilities of these classes.
ClientService
This class is responsible for the overall session handling between the MAP Client and the
server. It therefore provides three methods, which all have been enhanced. Details are
given in the following.
newSession() This method is responsible for establishing a new session for a requesting
client. It is directly called when a MAP Client carries out the newSession IF-MAP
operation. Using the trust extension, it is also responsible for initialising the mapping
between the Session-ID and the ClientIdentifier used.
endSession() Calling the endSession IF-MAP operation on the MAPS by a client triggers
this method. It is responsible for cleaning up the session itself as well as attached
metadata. In addition to that, all assigned security properties of the ending MAP
Client are removed by calling the appropriate method of the trust extension.
purgePublisher() Responsible for performing the purgePublisher IF-MAP operation, this
method takes care of a recalculation of the Trust Tokens when called.
PublishService
All types of the IF-MAP publish operation are handled by this class. In detail, the class
consist of three particular private methods, which handle the update, delete and notify
publish operations. The only one of these three types which is rather di↵erent in terms
of trust-specific handling is the delete method. It simply calls the TrustService interface
to obtain a particular P1TT for the client deleting the metadata. This P1TT is attached
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to the metadata which is to be deleted. As for the publish update and notify operations,
the first step is also to obtain a particular P1TT. After this, it is checked if any of
the metadata which is to be published contains a Trust Token already. In detail, the
namespaces of the metadata is checked against the trust-specific names and if a match is
found, which indicates that a client tries to publish a Trust Token, the process is stopped
with an AccessDeniedError. If there is no Trust Token included, the metadata is extended
with the particular connection to the previously created Trust Token. In order to store the
resulting metadata elements within the MAP graph, a TTID is generated and inserted
into the metadata itself.
SearchService
IF-MAP based search operations are handled by this class. As a searchResult is generated
by this class which is given back to the requesting client, some changes are necessary. When
the searchResult is actually generated, all P1TTs for the entries stored within this result
are retrieved. These P1TTs are then converted into P2TTs. This is done by using the
MAP Clients identifier which requested the search- . Finally these P2TTs are added to
the result itself and communicated to the requesting client.
SubscriptionService
In order to provide a pollResult to a client which has a particular subscription, this class
is used. Furthermore, the initial searchResult is also provided by this class. Equally to
the SearchService, this class takes P1TTs for each metadata within its result set and
generates the appropriate P2TT for it as it is aware about the requesting client. This
combined result is then provided to the client.
As explained above, all four services have been enhanced in order to provide trust-
specific means. A detailed explanation which includes the particular single steps is given
in [166].
5.5.3 Correlation Engine Enhancements
As already stated, the snapshot-specific enhancements allowing to build up a history for
the Feature values as well as their trust level are done on the Correlation Engine’s side. Due
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to the reason, that the CE provides an internal mechanism already, referred to as Feature
Base, which stores all Feature-specific changes, only minor changes to the underlying
Feature data model are required. These changes do not only allow to store trust related
information but also to include the introduction of the trust level as a special context
type.
Figure 5.14 depicts the enhanced Feature data model. As it is easy to see, the TrustLog
as well as an enhanced Context Parameter is included. The TrustLog includes fields to
Figure 5.14: TrustLog enhanced Feature model.
store the appropriate ratings of the particular SPs within the security property records
(i.e. the RPSRs) for each operation. Within this implementation, basic integer values are
used for this purpose. This fine grained storage allows the Feature Base to keep track
of every single change which appears on the side of the security properties and their
ratings. Furthermore, the Trust Token Id is stored. When parsing the Feature out of the
received answer from the MAP Server, the connected Trust Token is parsed as well. To
allow for a reasoning between di↵erent Trust Tokens and their appropriate links to actual
metadata, this TTID is used and thus stored. In addition to these rather fine grained
trust-specific parts, the overall trust level for the Feature is stored as well. Although the
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expected trust level would be a phase 2-based version for the Correlation Engine, phase 1
is used here. This is due to the fact, that the more important changes are included in the
phase 1 version and the communication channel between the MAPS and the CE should
be considered secure within this implementation. However, the Correlation Engine is still
able to operate on the phase two version by combining the appropriate stored SPR field
on its own. The stored trust level provides a more convenient way of accessing the value.
Furthermore, the ContextParamType enumeration is extended by the TRUSTLEVEL
type. This allows the Correlation Engine to use the trust level of a Feature as a context
parameter within its policy. In detail, when constructing a Feature for its use, the TrustLog
not only stores the trust-specific information but also enables to access the phase 1 trust
level field to be accessed as special context parameter. This is done by simply adding it
to the already existing context set of the Feature.
Given all that, the Feature Base is able to provide a history of all the changes made to
these elements. Thus it stores the changes of the Feature’s value along with the change of
the trust level including particular SPR changes and the change of the trust level context
type. Finally, as the enhanced MAPS provides deleting information for Features, it is also
able to keep track of deleted Features and their corresponding values.
5.6 Evaluation
Given the implementation of the TCADS approach from the previous sections, this section
provides an evaluation of not only the implementation but the overall concept. This is
done in two steps: first the trust enabled MAP Server is evaluated in terms of performance
and isolated test cases and second an overall test case including all components of the
TCADS system is carried out. The case used for the second part is given by the ESUKOM
project and provides a real world like application to the system. To operate on a defined
basis, the used security properties are defined in the next section. These properties will
be used throughout the whole evaluation.
193
5 Implementation
5.6.1 Security Property Definition
In order to provide a basis for the following evaluation, the security properties that are
used for determining the trust levels of the communicated Features are introduced includ-
ing their initial ratings and functions for calculating security levels and trust levels.
There are six distinct properties defined for the evaluation scenario. They are explained
in detail in the following with the appropriate ratings given to each property are explained
afterwards.
Android-based smartphone This property expresses the processing of a Feature on an
Android-based smartphone. That is, this property is assigned to each process oper-
ation which is carried out on such a smartphone. Due to the fact, that the scenario
used for the evaluation only uses Android-based smartphones, this property allows
to globally distinguish between smartphone-based Feature processing and other sys-
tems carrying out process operation for Features. More in detail, the assignment
of this property is done by evaluating the basic authentication properties of the
MAP-based communication. As the TCADS system relies on a special agent in or-
der to collect smartphone-specific data, the authentication credentials of this client
are known to the MAP Server. Using the SPRM component, these credentials are
transformed into the appropriate property.
User Account Each time a MAP Client of the TCADS system is about to publish Fea-
tures, it needs to perform an authentication to provide its identity against the MAP
Server. This authentication and the derived identity of the MAP Client can be used
to assign a security property to the process operation of this client. The identity
of the particular MAP Client is derived by the identity of the user that is assigned
to this MAP Client. As with the Android-based smartphone property, the identity
is used to distinguish between di↵erent levels of trustworthiness of the client. This
is used to distinguish between internal clients and external clients. Internal clients
are Feature processing systems which are considered as more trustworthy as they
are controlled by the domains administrator. External clients, like laptops which
can be moved around, are not that trustworthy due to their usage profile and the
lower level of control the administrator has. The internal clients are likely placed on
infrastructure components like routers. Reflecting these di↵erent client types, the
rating of the property di↵ers according to each type.
194
5.6 Evaluation
Communication Channel Type This property allows to distinguish between cleartext
and encrypted communication. The SPRM component residing on the MAP Server
evaluates each communication channel which is established between a MAP Client
and the MAP Server. If the channel type that is used does not provide communica-
tion security by the use of TLS, a property expressing this is assigned. As default,
the evaluation provided here should not communicate without the use of TLS en-
crypted channels. Due to this, no property is assigned if the channel is encrypted
but only if there is no encryption or the certificate used to establish the connec-
tion is expired or invalid. Thus this property indicates negative trust and the rating
needs to express this. As the name indicates, this property is assigned to transmit
operations, indi↵erently which particular type of transmit operation is used.
OpenVAS-based Vulnerability Level In order to provide an external measurement of a
system’s vulnerability, an OpenVAS [169] enabled platform is used. This system
performs regularly scans of all other systems being part of the network including
the connected smartphones. The results of these scans, which are also based on CVE
vulnerabilities (cf. [170] for a CVE overview), are given back to the SPRM on the
MAPS as input. A default property indicating the scan result is attached to each
process operation of the client. Using the detailed result of the scan, the rating of
this property is changed. That is, the more vulnerabilities found, the lower the rating
becomes. Furthermore, the amount of the rating’s de- and increase is connected to
the type of vulnerability found. OpenVAS distinguishes between several severity
levels. These levels are used for the rating changes as well. More details on this are
given later in this section when the actual rating values are defined.
Attestation Level As explained in section 7.4, a special type of certificate can be used to
provide a measurement of a system’s state. This certificate is only accessible to the
client if the state of the platform the client is placed on is as expected. The certificate
is sealed to this particular state, thus it is encrypted using the measurement of the
clients platform which are performed by a TPM. Storing these measurements within
the TPM’s PCRs an encryption key can be derived by the TPM and the PCR values.
If the PCR values change due to a change of the system’s state, the key can no longer
be derived, resulting in the system being unable to access the certificate. Given that,
as long as the MAP Client is able to present this certificate to the MAP Server, the
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client’s platform is to be considered within the expected state. Using this, a security
property indicating this can be assigned to the client’s process operation. The rating
of this property is usually indicating a high level of trustworthiness as the system’s
desired state is usually considered trustworthy. However, this property may also be
used to determine untrustworthy states under certain circumstances.
Trust Level Trend This property is based on previously calculated trust level values for
Features of a certain Feature Collector (i.e. MAP Client). It is used to characterise
the process operation of that Feature Collector. Unlike the other properties de-
scribed, it aggregates trust measurements to a higher level as it uses the already
existing trust level as input value. In detail, not a single trust level value is used but
the trend of this trust level. If this trend decreases lower than a particular value, the
rating of this property is changed appropriately. Given that, this property amplifies
the trend of the trust level itself. The calculation used for this property is done on
the Correlation Engine’s side as it is necessary to use the history of the trust level
values for deriving a trend.
Correlation Engine Alerts The previous explained property already uses the Correlation
Engine to assign a particular property to the process operation of a MAP Client.
This can be used in a more versatile way by assigning a general security property
which is solely controlled by the Correlation Engine. This method is provided by
the use of this property and a rating set by the Correlation Engine. It allows to
create a cascade between the MAP Server’s trust level calculation and the Corre-
lation Engine. In detail, if the Correlation Engine is able to determine unexpected
behaviour of a MAP Client, it can lower the rating of this client’s property on the
MAP Server thus influencing the trust level for all Features published by this cline.
This method allows for a fine grained gearing between the Correlation Engine and
the MAP Server in terms of trust calculation and unleashes a high potential of
functionality for the TCADS system.
In order to assign appropriate ratings to these properties, the particular values used need
to be defined for the evaluation environment. Based on these definitions, the initial rating




The ratings used within the evaluation are numerical-based values indicating the trust-
worthiness of a certain property. Furthermore, they are represented by signed integer
values whereas negative values indicate rather untrustworthy values while positive num-
bers represent trustworthy values. Given that, the initial rating values can be assigned to
the above defined properties that are used throughout the evaluation.
• The Android-based smartphone property is statically assigned a -5 as rating. This
indicates the lower trustworthiness of Android-based devices. As written above, this
property is used to tag Features received from a smartphone.
• As the User Account property also indicates which MAP Client’s process operation
was used to create the Feature, the initial rating depends on the type of client. If
it is an infrastructure-based component which is under the administrator’s control,
a value of 5 is assigned. This indicates a higher level of trustworthiness which is
derived from the direct control of that component. If it is another component, a
neutral 0 is assigned. However, due to their usage profile, smartphones receive an
additional negative rating.
• If the communication channel used is not as expected, the Communication Channel
property is assigned indicating a problem with that channel. Due to this, a -10 is
assigned to this property in a static manner. Due to the high negative value, if this
property is assigned it has a rather high impact on the overall calculation.
• The OpenVAS property is rated according to the findings of the OpenVAS system.
If there are no findings but only informational hints, a 5 is assigned. This value
indicates a rather good shape of the system. If there are warning level findings, a -1
is assigned in order to indicate minor problems. OpenVAS can also scan for critical
problems. If there is one of those problems found on the system, a -10 is assigned
which indicates a rather severe problem on the platform.
• The attestation level property is assigned if a client is able to present the sealed
certificate or if a client is unable to do so although it should. In the first case, where
the client is able to represent the certificate which indicates that the client’s platform
is within the expected state, a 10 is assigned. This is due to the fact, that the state
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of the system is well defined and considered to be very trustworthy. If it is unable
to present the certificate, a -5 is assigned as the system may be untrustworthy.
• The rating used for the Trend property is not statically defined. If the trend increases
or decreases, this rating may be changed accordingly in small steps. However, ini-
tially it is set to 0.
• The same situation like for the trend’s rating applies to the Correlation Engine’s
alert properties. A static rating is not defined as the Correlation Engine decides on
its own how big the impact factor to the trust calculation should be.
With these basic definitions of the used ratings, the functions which are utilised for cal-
culating the security and the trust level can be defined in the following. Additionally, the
interpretation of the calculated values is given.
Functions





. Due to this, there are two functions that need to be defined, the
rF which combines a RSPR’s rating into a security level and a tF which combines these
security levels into a single trust level for the Feature. The basic rF function is therefore







As the result must be within a range of [ 1, 1] in order to be conform to the presented
approach and provide a scoreable value, the values of this calculation are clamped into
an interval of [ 100, 100]. That is, every value within this range is mapped into the
appropriate [ 1, 1] range while values below and above this range are interpreted as -1





1 , x > 100
x , 100  x  100
 1 , x <  100
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To get an actual trust level for a Feature, the calculated SLs need to be combined by
using the tF . As there are two types of trust level, a phase 1 type and a phase 2 type,
there are also two subtypes of the tF defined here. This is necessary in order to be able
to calculate usable TLP1
⇣
values. The tF
Phase1 which is being used to calculate the trust
level on the Feature Provider is based on adding the calculated SL values. The result of
this addition is multiplied by a static factor ↵
P1 which is set to
1
3 , thus clamping the final
TLP1
⇣




P1(SLprocessSender + SLtransmitSender + SLprocessProvider)
To calculate the TLP2
⇣
, an extended version of this tF
Phase1 is used (i.e. tFPhase2) which
simply adds the fourth SL value to the addition. Using the previously calculated TLP1
⇣
and another scaling factor ↵
P2, which is set to
1













The interpretation of both trust level types is the same due to the scaling factor mapping
both values into the same interval. That is, the trust level of a Feature is interpreted as
follows.
• A value of 1 is treated as completely trustworthy. This value is only possible if every
single SL reaches the highest possible trustworthiness.
• If the value is between 0.5 and 1 (0.5  TL < 1), the Feature is considered to be
overall trustworthy. To achieve this kind of result, most of the SLs need to have
high values without any critical finding.
• The range between -0.5 and 0.5 ( 0.5 < TL < 0.5) is interpreted as neutral judge-
ment of the Feature’s trustworthiness. That is, the actual interpretation of the value
depends on the particular case.
• If the value is lower than or equal to -0.5 (TL   0.5), the Feature is considered
untrustworthy to a high level. This value can only be reached if there are critical
findings or most of the single SL values are very low.
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• If the TL calculation returns a -1, the Feature is completely untrustworthy as this
value is only reached if all of the SL values are set to minimum.
Based on this interpretation along with the defined security properties and the required
functions to calculate the trust level, the evaluation can be carried out. This is done in
two steps: the MAP Server is evaluated isolated within the first step while the overall
TCADS system is used in the second step. The next section starts with the evaluation of
the enhanced MAP Server.
5.6.2 Trusted MAP Server
The MAP Server is tested in two di↵erent ways. First a performance evaluation is carried
out and second the actual Trust Token generation is tested. The performance evaluation
allows to judge about the approach’s usability within a practical scenario. More in detail,
a Trust Token needs to be generated for every metadata stored within the MAP Server’s
graph. The impact of this additional elements as well as the required processing power to
generate them is tested by evaluating the extended irond against a non extended version.
Using the extended version again, the second part evaluates the correct generation of the
Trust Tokens for a specific case.
Test environment
To operate on a well defined base for testing, a test environment is introduced here.
It consist of the irond in both versions and some auxiliary components which provide
required data. Figure 5.15 depicts the test environment and the used implementations.
The irond MAP Server shown in this figure refers to both versions, the trust extended
and the default implementation, as both versions are compared to each other. Besides the
MAP Server itself, the following components and their actual implementations are used.
DHCP Server This server system is provided by the use of the ISC DHCP server im-
plementation [171] in conjunction with the irondhcp MAP Client which operates
as Feature Collector. The irondhcp client simply parses the appropriate lease file




Figure 5.15: Test environment (cf. [166]).
Smartphone Two particular types of smartphones were used within this test environ-
ment: a Samsung Galaxy S III (see [172] for more details of the device) and a
Samsung Galaxy Nexus device [173]. Both devices were extended by the DECOIT
IF-MAP Client acting as a Feature Collector and providing the necessary data from
the smartphones.
Policy Decision Point As the Feature tree created by Feature Collectors requires a root
element represented by an appropriate access request of the smartphone, a Policy
Decision Point publishing this access request is required. Within this test envi-
ronment, the TNC@FHH TNC implementation [154] was used for this task. This
implementation provides two means of building up this access request information.
The first way is to use the actual server component, which is rather complex as
this requires a full TNC setup. This was only done for testing purposes and not
during the actual evaluation. During this phase, the second way which is given by
a special IF-MAP enabled script client was used. This script client simulates the
appropriate request and publishes it accordingly. This provides an easy and flexible
way of testing the smartphones as Access Requestors.
Firewall To gain more information and have a Feature Consumer ready, an iptables fire-
wall [174] was used. This firewall system also used an IF-MAP enabled client in
order to publish (i.e. acting as a Feature Collector) and subscribe (i.e. acting as a
Feature Consumer) to information.
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Using the security properties defined above, the following particular assignment was used
while evaluating the MAP Server.
• The DHCP Server uses an expired certificate for establishing the communication
channel. This results in the assignment of the communication channel property to
the transmit operation between the DHCP Server and the irond.
• The smartphones are both assigned the smartphone property which indicates the
special device class.
• The PDP uses a TPM sealed certificate for the authentication. Thus the appropriate
property is assigned which indicates the expected state of this system.
• A basic authentication is carried out between the firewall and the irond. Due to
this, the basic auth property tagging the firewall system as an infrastructure-based
component is assigned.
By assigning these properties, Trust Tokens holding the correct values (ratings as well as
trust levels) should be generated by the MAP Server. This is checked in the second step
after the performance of the creation process itself was analysed.
Performance Evaluation
The performance evaluation done here is based on the plain performance evaluation for the
irond IF-MAP Server described in [175]. Besides the irond components itself, there are four
performance evaluation clients used. These clients are simple C programs which perform
a defined flow of IF-MAP operations on the particular server. They are implemented as
simple MAP Clients using the libifmap2c (cf. [176]) library which provides easy means of





All of them are described shortly in the following.
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Test Client perf-pulsing-star-ext This small client records the time1 needed to perform
all requests sent to the server. In detail, the client establishes an active subscription for
its own published metadata on the server. It starts to publish metadata and following
this, polls for changes using the active subscription. Due to this, the time recorded is
the time between starting the publish operation and receiving the poll result. Thus this
time represents the amount of time the MAP Server needs to process the publish request,
include the published data within its graph and provide a pollResult. Given the extended
irond server, there should be more time needed as more things are to be stored within
the MAP Server’s graph and prepared for the pollResult.
The method used to publish data consist of establishing links between certain identifiers
by the use of publishing metadata on that link. In detail, this test client starts by a ROOT
identifier which has N child identifiers. The links on the same depth level are created
using a single publish request. Furthermore, the client does not only establish the tree
like structure but also deletes it according to the used parameters. Deletion is performed
the same way as the publish update: by simply deleting all links at the same depth within
one step. The parameters used for this are at the one side the N value which specifies how
many identifiers are attached to the ROOT identifier. On the other side, there is the D
value which is used to specify the depth of the graph that should be created. Listing 5.11
shows the algorithm which stands behind this testing program. Given all that, an example
run of the program is shown in figure 5.16. It is easy to recognise, that each single step of
the client only operates on the same depth in the graph for both actions, the update and
the deletion of metadata. If the max depth defined by D is reached, the established graph
is deconstructed in single steps. Important about this kind of testing client is the single
stepped operations and the creation of the links between depth increasing identifiers.
Test Client perf-pulsing-star-int Using the same subscription and publish mechanism
like the perf-pulsing-star-ext program, this test client is nearly similar to that one
but di↵ers within the link creation. The time is again recorded for all requests allowing
to compare di↵erent MAP Servers to each other. Listing 5.12 shows the algorithm behind
the client in a pseudo code form. The di↵erence between this test client and the external
client is given by the creation and the removal of the links between the identifiers. While
the external variant attaches and removes links step by step on to the deepest identifier,
1Wall time is used for this client as well as for the other testing clients.
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D, N // depth and root ch i l d r en
ROOT // root i d e n t i f i e r
i d en t s [D ] [N] // a l l i d e n t i f i e r s , array as in C
preq // pub l i sh r eque s t
sub s c r i b e update for ROOT
// bu i l d i ng the t r e e
for d in (0 . . . D   1) do
for i in (0 . . . N   1) do
i f (d == 0) then
add update (ROOT, id en t s [ d ] [ i ] ) to preq
else then
add update ( i d en t s [ d   1 ] [ i ] , i d en t s [ d ] [ i ] ) to preq
end i f
end for
send preq to se rver , r e s e t preq
p o l l s e r v e r
end for
// removing the t r e e
for d in (0 . . . D   1) do
for i in (0 . . . N   1) do
i f (d == (D   1) ) then
add d e l e t e (ROOT, i d en t s [D   d   1 ] [ i ] ) to preq
else then
add d e l e t e ( i d en t s [D   d   1 ] [ i ] , i d en t s [D   d   2 ] [ i ] ) to preq
end i f
end for
send preq to se rver , r e s e t preq
p o l l s e r v e r
end for



















































Figure 5.16: Example run of perf-pulsing-star-ext with N = 3, D = 2 [175].
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D, N // depth and root ch i l d r en
ROOT // root i d e n t i f i e r
i d en t s [D ] [N] // a l l i d e n t i f i e r s , array as in C
preq // pub l i sh r eque s t
sub s c r i b e update for ROOT
// bu i l d i ng the t r e e
for d in (0 . . . D   1) do
for i in (0 . . . N   1) do
i f (d != 0) then
add d e l e t e (ROOT, i d en t s [ d   1 ] [ i ] ) to preq
add update ( i d en t s [ d ] [ i ] , i d en t s [ d  1 ] [ 1 ] ) to preq
end i f
add update (ROOT, i d en t s [ d ] [ i ] ) to preq
end for
send preq to se rver , r e s e t preq
p o l l s e r v e r
end for
// removing the t r e e
for d in (0 . . . D   1) do
for i in (0 . . . N   1) do
i f (d != (D   1) ) then
add d e l e t e (ROOT, i d en t s [D   d   1 ] [ i ] )
add update (ROOT, id en t s [D   d   2 ] [ i ] )
end i f
add d e l e t e (ROOT, i d en t s [D   d   1 ] [ i ] ) to preq
end for
send preq to se rver , r e s e t preq
p o l l s e r v e r
end for
Listing 5.12: perf-pulsing-star-int pseudo-code [175].
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this internal client attaches new links to the ROOT identifier. In addition to that, the
previously created links which are also added to the ROOT node only, will be removed
and new links are attached to the currently handled identifiers. Figure 5.17 depicts the

















































Figure 5.17: Example run of perf-pulsing-star-int with N = 3, D = 2 [175].
never used a mix of update and delete elements within the same publish request. This
internal variant relies on this mixing and increases the amount of work the MAP Server
has to do within one step. The two remaining test clients di↵er in their methods used to
stress the MAP Server.
Test Client perf-complete-graph This test client creates a complete graph, i.e. a graph
where each identifier is connected through a link to each others identifiers. In di↵erence
to the first two star-based test clients, this client creates one subscription per identifier
published. This subscription is set to a maximum depth of number of identifiers minus
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one, so that each subscription basically returns the whole graph. Listing 5.13 shows the
basic algorithm that is carried out when using this test client. Due to the fact, that the
original version of this client was not applicable with the irond-trust MAPS, the version
depicted in 7.9 was used. This version uses another variant of checking the count of the
returned metadata and takes the Trust Tokens into account which e↵ectively doubles
the metadata returned. Contrary to the previously explained clients, this client steps
N // number o f i d e n t i f i e r s
i d en t s [N] // a l l i d e n t i f i e r s , array as in C
preq // pub l i sh r eque s t
s r eq // sub s c r i b e r eque s t
// c r e a t e s ub s c r i p t i o n s
for i in (0 . . . N   1) do
add update s ub s c r i p t i o n for i d ent [ i ] to s r eq
end for
send s req to s e r v e r
// bu i l d i ng the graph
for i in (0 . . . N   1) do
for j in ( i + 1 . . . N   1) do
add update ( ident [ i ] , i d ent [ j ] ) to preq
send preq to se rver , r e s e t preq
p o l l s e r v e r
end for
end for
Listing 5.13: perf-complete-graph pseudo-code [175].
forward by performing multiple publish requests. That is, each connection step consists of
severe sub steps rendered by appropriate publish requests. Within these requests, the links
between the identifiers are established. The graph which is created by this client including
the appropriate construction steps are shown in figure 5.18. Although a complete graph
is created when running this client, no deletion of this graph is made when the client has
finished, thus it records the creation step times only.
This type of client was originally developed to evaluate the performance of the irond
server’s data model. This is due to the fact, that there is a high amount of internal work
to do in order to connect the identifiers to each other from the data models point of view.
Furthermore, it is not only stressing the server to build the links to each other but also

































Figure 5.18: Example run of perf-complete-graph with N = 6 [175].
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uncover possible performance related problems, when combining Trust Token Metadata
with such complex graph structures.
Test Client perf-rand-graph The last of the used test clients operates similar to the
previously introduced complete graph variant. The algorithm carried out by this test
client is depicted in listing 5.14. Instead of connecting the identifiers to each other, they
N // number o f i d e n t i f i e r s
M // ope ra t i on s per p o s s i b l e l i n k
P // p r obab i l i t y o f d e l e t e 0 . . . 100
i d en t s [N] // a l l i d e n t i f i e r s , array as in C
preq // pub l i sh r eque s t
s r eq // sub s c r i b e r eque s t
L = (N ⇤ (N   1) / 2 // number o f p o s s i b l e l i n k s
// between a l l i d e n t i f i e r s
i n i t i a l i z e PRNG us ing N
// c r ea t e s ub s c r i p t i o n s
for i in (0 . . . N   1) do
add update s ub s c r i p t i o n for i d ent [ i ] to s r eq
end for
send s req to s e r v e r
for i in (0 . . . (M ⇤ L   1) ) do
I1 <  pseudo random from iden t s
I2 <  pseudo random from iden t s != I1
i f ( pseudo random number ) % 100 < P then
add d e l e t e ( I1 , I2 ) to preq
else
add update ( I1 , I2 ) to preq
end i f
send preq to se rver , r e s e t preq
i f was not d e l e t e then
p o l l s e r v e r
end i f
end for
Listing 5.14: pref-rand-graph pseudo-code [175].
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are randomly2 selected and linked or unlinked to each other. The decision, if they are
linked or unlinked, is made by their previous linking status. That is, if they are already
linked to each other, they will be unlinked and vice versa. Furthermore, this behaviour can
also be controlled by the request the client used: it is either an update or delete request.
If a delete request is used, the linking and unlinking behaviour is inverted by default. The
decision about which request is issued by the client is also made by using the rand()
function. In order to receive comparable results, the random number generator used can
be seeded prior to its usage.
All of these test clients do not regard the overhead generated by invoking these oper-
ations using the IF-MAP protocol. That is, the network-based communication delay is
not directly treated by the client programs. In order to receive comparable results, they
should all run on the same machine with the same environmental settings.
Test Results In order to provide comparable results, all tests were run on the same Intel
Xeon-based machine. This machine possessed 8 gigabytes of memory and dual CPUs. The
Java version used for the tests was an 1.6 version of the openjdk. Furthermore an Ubuntu-
based Linux was used as operating system on the test machine. Both irond version were
reset after each run, thus cleaned up and restarted to provide a common starting point.
In addition, the test clients were also placed on that machine to avoid network-based
influences. Although the client server communication was carried out via IF-MAP, there
was no real network tra c involved.
All four test clients described were used to compare the performance of the trust ex-
tended irond version against the default irond version. The particular irond implemen-
tation that was used for the trust version is based on irond 0.3.4. To provide real world
results, this version was compared against the default 0.3.5 implementation, which o↵ers
even greater performance. This allows to assess the results in a more critical way.
The first test was carried out using the perf-pulsing-star-ext test clients. The results
are depicted in figure 5.19. The setup used for this test was given with seven particular
runs of the client each with an increasing amount of identifiers and one star-based request.
The identifier amount was set to 4, 8, 16, 32, 48, 64 and 128. This can be easily seen when
comparing the points at which the response times have been recorded. Interestingly the
2In detail, they are chosen by calling rand() on the system, thus the randomness depends on the imple-
mentation of this system function.
211
5 Implementation
Figure 5.19: Performance comparison using the perf-pulsing-star-ext client.
irond-trust (i.e. the trust extended irond version) is performing equal within the first
two steps with small identifier amount. This is rather unexpected and may be due to
the way the Java VM operates and pre-caches elements, thus it is considered to be the
normal amount of variability of such measurements. The remainder of the graph until the
maximum count of identifiers is as it was expected, the irons-trust is somewhat slower
than the default irond. However, the di↵erence can be considered to be very small. This
small di↵erence is the result of the data model used by the irond. The Trust Token
generation doubles the particular amount of metadata within the graph but the irond’s
internal model handles this in a very e↵ective way.
The second test is based on the perf-pulsing-star-int test client. This test client
uses another way of constructing the links between the identifiers. The results of the runs
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which were achieved using this client are shown in figure 5.20. As the graph shows, the
Figure 5.20: Performance comparison using the perf-pulsing-star-int client.
identifier amount used this time was significantly higher than in the first test. This helps to
evaluate the performance under circumstances within which a huge amount of identifiers
are linked to each other. The particular amounts used started with 4 again and ended
at 512. Furthermore, there was only one pulse (i.e. one construction and deconstruction
cycle) per run as further test did not show any changes in the results when using more
than one pulse. Given the overall graph, the behaviour which can be derived is the same
as within the first test. That is, the irond-trust is slower but not in a significant way.
Even when considering the last measurement with an amount of 512 identifiers and a
complete construction, linking, unlinking and deconstruction cycle, the di↵erence between
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both versions is about 30 percent. Given the overall time of this operation and the high
amount of identifiers, this can be considered as acceptable.
Both of the tests which were evaluated above did only generate one link between two
particular identifiers without linking the identifiers to each other. In order to increase the
metadata amount, the two following tests were used. First, the perf-complete-graph
client was used to link the identifiers to each other, thus generating a high amount of
metadata. In case of the irond-trust, the amount of metadata generated doubles due to
the Trust Tokens. Figure 5.21 depicts the result of this test. Equally to the first two tests,
Figure 5.21: Performance comparison using the perf-complete-graph client.
several runs with di↵erent identifier amounts were made, starting with 4 identifiers and
ranging to a maximum of 32 identifiers. All of these were linked to each other. The results
which can be seen in the graph show a similar picture as the first two tests. That is,
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the irond-trust is again a little bit slower but within an acceptable range. The particular
di↵erence with the highest amount of identifiers is about 20 percent. Furthermore, it must
be considered that linking an amount of 32 identifiers to each other produces 992 links in
case of the irond-trust. Due to this, the result can be considered as reasonable and thus
acceptable.
Figure 5.22: Performance comparison using the perf-rand-graph client, first run with an
maximum amount of 32 identifiers.
The last performance-based tests that were carried out used the perf-rand-graph test
client. This client takes a certain number of identifiers and randomly connects them to
each other. Because of this randomness, it provides a way of simulating a real world like
scenario where publish and delete operations are received by the server in an rather not
deterministic way. There were three overall tests done with this client. The first and the
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second one (depicted in figure 5.22 and 5.23) have the same basic settings. They were
carried out twice to show that there are no significant di↵erences between them although
they are using random data. This stability is reached due to using the same seed for the
random number generator.
Figure 5.23: Performance comparison using the perf-rand-graph client, second run using
the same seed as in the first run and again with an maximum amount of 32
identifiers.
The first particular test is based on the same amount of identifiers used for the complete
graph test. As it easy to see in figure 5.22, the di↵erence is again from minor impact. In
detail, with the highest identifier amount of 32, the irond-0.3.5 performs about 15 percent
faster than the trust extended irond. Comparing this result to the complete graph test,
it can be summarised that the random graph test produces overall higher response times.
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However, the particular di↵erence in the response times of both irond version are smaller
than in the complete graph test.
In order to confirm the results of this first random graph test, a second test with the
same parameters was done. The results of this test are depicted in figure 5.23. As it is
easy to discover, the results are very similar to the first run. Due to this, the test can be
considered as valuable, thus showing and emphasising the small di↵erences again.
As the amount of identifiers used in the previous random graph test was rather limited
and to verify that the di↵erences between the two version do not increase in an unexpected
way, a final test with a huge identifier amount was carried out. The result of this test is
pictured in figure 5.24. The identifier amount used for this test was starting by 4 again
Figure 5.24: Performance comparison using the perf-rand-graph client and using an max-
imum amount of 128 identifiers.
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and ranging to 128 which could theoretically produce 16256 metadata elements for the
irond-trust. As the measurement results show, the response time increases to a very high
amount, peaking at more than 2500 seconds when using 128 identifiers. This shows that
this kind of test setup produced a very stressing situation, which may be di cult to reach
in a real world situation (due to the request would be performed in single steps). However,
it allows to gain an impression about how both versions behave under such circumstances.
Given the graph, it is interesting to see that the irond-trust becomes faster than the default
irond between 64 and 128 identifiers. Until that point, the results are as expected and
confirm the previously made findings about the extended irond being somewhat slower.
However, at 128 identifiers, the irond-trust performed faster within this test case. This is
rather unexpected and being considered as measuring inaccuracy. Discussing this, reasons
for this result may be either some disturbance on the system itself or the special caching
a garbage collection paradigm used within the Java VM the ironds were running in.
Summarising these tests, the irond-trust must be considered as about 10 to 20 percent
slower than the irond-0.3.5. Due to the doubled amount of metadata to be handled by
the trust extended version and the processing of the trust extension itself, this is a very
acceptable result. Given this, the irond-trust may also be used for providing a MAP
Server’s tasks as the response times are still very acceptable. If comparing them to other
MAP Servers (cf. [2] for such an comparison), the irond processes requests overall a lot
faster than other servers do. Due to this, the irond-trust can still be considered faster
than other MAP Servers.
Trust Token generation
This section summarises the evaluation of the particular trust calculation process. That
is, the above defined environment was used to simulate trust token calculations. These
calculations were checked against the expected (i.e. theoretical) results. This approach
showed that the calculated trust tokens matched the expected values. Furthermore, the
flow of operations used in this test consist of all necessary operation types. That is, trust
tokens are either created or updated. Creation takes place if new metadata is added while
updates takes place if particular ratings are changed.
Based on the test described in [166], the following flow of operations is used in order to
produce a well defined Trust Token.
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1. The DHCP Server publishes an ip-mac metadata which is set to lifetime forever and
is linked between an ip-address and a mac-address identifier. The ip address is set
to 192.168.0.1 while the mac address is given as aa:bb:cc:11:22:33. This represents
the smartphone used within this test. Figure 5.25 depicts the graph which results
this step.
Figure 5.25: Created graph after the first step.
2. Based on the previously set ip address, the firewall subscribes to this ip. That is,
the ip-address identifier is used as starting point of the subscription.
3. Continuing after the subscription, the firewall performs the poll operation on the
irond. This poll operation returns a searchResult which consists of the three elements
that were created in the first step and the appropriate Trust Token as additional
metadata. The Trust Token holds all trust-specific data for the ip-mac metadata. It
is depicted in figure 5.26.
Figure 5.26: Created Trust Token Metadata [166].
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4. The PDP uses the same search filter on the MAP Server like the firewall used
for the subscription. Doing so, it receives also a searchResult which consists of
the elements published within the first step. Although there is also a Trust Token
attached, it is not the same as in the previous step. This is due to the di↵erent last
transmit operation used. However, this is a client centric operation which results in
an unchanged graph on the MAP Server.
5. The PDP itself now publishes the metadata access-request-ip and capability. The
access-request-ip is published on to the link between the already existing ip-address
and a new access-request. This access-request uses the dummy value ar012345678. In
addition, the capability with its value invincible is published on to the access-request
also (see figure 5.27).
Figure 5.27: Created graph after the PDP publishing step.
6. As the firewall has an active subscription and an open ARC, it receives another
pollResult after the last step. This pollResult holds the added elements along with
their TT. There are two Trust Tokens included: the one for the access-request-ip
metadata as well as the one for the capability metadata. This must also be considered




7. The smartphone now publishes using a publish-notify operation event metadata
of the type p2p on the ip-address identifier. The resulting graph, which is only
temporary as the publish notify-based metadata is not stored is shown in figure
5.28.
Figure 5.28: Temporary graph including the publish notify-based metadata.
8. Given the subscription of the firewall and the active ARC again, another pollResult
is received. This time, a notifyResult is received including the event as well as the
appropriate Trust Token. No entry for the published event data is made in the
graph due to the type of operation used. The overall graph, which includes all
elements for a better understanding is depicted in figure 5.29. In addition to the
metadata itself, the trust tokens (depicted as red metadata) are also included along
with their appropriate relationships. The temporary elements which where created
by a publish-notify operation are grey coloured in order to distinguish them from
persistent graph elements.
9. The DHCP Server now performs a delete operation: the access-request-ip metadata
as well as the capability metadata is deleted.
10. As the subscription of the firewall is still active, a deleteResult is now received.
This result consists of the deleted metadata and their assigned Trust Tokens. In
particular, the Trust Tokens now hold the id of the deleting MAP client within the
mapc-id field indicating which client is responsible the the operation.
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Figure 5.29: Overall graph including the trust token metadata as well as the temporary
publish notify elements.
11. The DHCP Server performs an endSession operation thus ending its session. Due
to the ip-mac metadata being published with a lifetime of forever, it is not being
discarded. Following the endSession, the DHCP Server just performs a newSession
operation which establishes another session for it on the MAP Server. Additionally,
the rating of certain SPs within the policy is also changed and the irond is triggered
to update the rating.
12. A purgePublisher operation is carried out by the DHCP Server. This operation leads
to the deletion of the ip-mac metadata and results in the situation were no metadata
is left on the graph.
13. Due to the still valid subscription of the firewall, another pollResult of the type
deleteResult is received on the ARC. This deleteResult holds the purged ip-mac
metadata and the appropriate Trust Token. This Trust Token contains the updated
security properties as well as the mapc-id of the purging client.
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14. In order to test the TT constraints on the MAP Server, the DHCP tries to publish
a Trust Token on its own. This triggers an errorResult message containing an Ac-
cessDenied error from the MAP Server. Thus, the DHCP Server is unable to publish
TTs.
The presented flow of operations showed all three types of trust token-specific handling:
trust token creation, updating an deletion. Comparing the gathered results against the
expected results, it can be concluded, that the extends MAP Server perform as expected
in terms of trust token handling. Due to this, there are no reservations against using it
for the next evaluation step.
5.6.3 TCADS Environment
The given environment from above, consisting of the evaluated trust-enhanced MAP
Server, is extended to the following architecture. This architecture now includes all rele-
vant components and is based on the evaluation environment used in [2] for the CADS
evaluation. It is depicted in figure 5.30. Given this figure, the blue elements depict general
services like the PDP or the vulnerability scanner. All other colours indicate which kind
of TCADS role is assigned to that component. That is, the red elements illustrate Feature
Collectors, orange elements illustrate the trust extended Feature Provider, yellow is used
for the Correlation Engine and green depicts Feature Consumers. In contrast to the envi-
ronment which was used for a plain CADS-based evaluation, this particular environment
is enhanced with the trust-specific components. This is on the one hand the irond-trust
as MAP Server and on the other hand the TrustLog enhanced Correlation Engine. Fur-
thermore, an additional Feature Consumer (another ironmonitor instance) is used on the
irond-trust’s system. It is used to receive rating change instructions from the Correlation
Engine.
Testcase: Sensor Sni ng with compromised Feature Collector
To test the TCADS system and evaluate its behaviour, a sensor sni ng attack is launched
by the smartphone. In detail, an application installed from an o cial source (i.e. Google’s
Play Store, [177]) provides access to the smartphone’s camera and microphone sensors.







































the smartphone using a simple web browser. The task of connecting to the smartphone
browser-based is carried out on the Evil VM, which simulates the attacker’s system.
Within this browser, the sensors of the phone are accessible thus a live stream is provided
by the installed application. Contrary to the CADS evaluation, the Feature Collector
on the smartphone is also compromised. This results in the problem, that this Feature
Collector makes a false reporting about the smartphone’s properties, in detail about the
tra c the smartphone produces in order to stay undetected. When connecting to the app
on the phone and starting the live stream the tra c should normally increase drastically.
This is no longer being recognised due to the compromised Feature Collector. Using other
information sources from the network, in particular the Snort-based IDS the CE can
discover the compromise on the smartphone to some extent. Due to this, the CE lowers
the smartphone’s FC’s rating subsequently. Finally, a situation is reached where the trust
level trend of this FC runs under a certain threshold, thus triggering the enforcement of
the device and blocking access to the live stream.
Test environment
As already described, the test environment is based on the environment used for the CADS
evaluation in [2]. Due to this, most of the components are similar to the ones which were
used for the basic CADS evaluation. However, a short explanation of the used systems is
given in the following. The test environment was established using some physical devices
as well as three virtual machines (VMs). As the test was carried out multiple times,
the VMs have been deployed using VirtualBox on two di↵erent host systems: OS X 10.8
as well as Ubuntu Linux 12.04. Furthermore, the three VMs used simulated di↵erent
responsibilities within the environment. There is a Service VM which hosts all required
services, a Router VM responsible for establishing the network connection between the
inner and outer network as well as providing enforcement methods and the Evil VM acting
as an attackers device. The components which are housed inside these VMs along with
the particular physical devices are explained in the following.
Samsung Galaxy S III This particular device is used as the smartphone within the tests.
It is a common device type running a rather actual Android 4.1.1 as operating
system. The used App for providing the live stream feature has been installed on
it, along with the Feature Collector measuring the device’s properties. Given the
225
5 Implementation
environment, a network connection is established by the use of the access point,
thus a Wifi-based connection is used throughout all tests.
Access Point A Lancom L-54g (cf. [178]) device provides a wireless network to the smart-
phone. In detail, a 802.11g type network (cf. [179]), a very common type, is used.
The access point itself connects to the router VM and forms the outer network
(10.0.0.1/24) together with the smartphone.
iptables This service was installed within the Router VM in order to (1) provide access
from the outer network to the inner network and (2) to establish an enforcement
mechanism which is able to disconnect outer devices on demand. An Ubuntu Linux
(12.04) is used to provide routing means. Furthermore, the iptables/netfilter imple-
mentation performs the particular enforcement tasks. These tasks are received as
Features by the ironmonitor implementation. This implementation is responsible for
triggering the appropriate rule changes of the iptables service.
Snort All of the remaining services are located on the Service VM which is also an Ubuntu
Linux-based platform running version 12.04. The Snort service is used as IDS system
which recognises certain changes, in particular tra c increases of outer network de-
vices. In order to allow easy testing, the ifmapcli implementation simulating Snort’s
responses is used as a Feature Collector.
OpenVAS This service acts as vulnerability scanner which is responsible for scanning
outer network-based devices, in particular the smartphone. Results of these scans
are provided as Features by using the ironvas [180] implementation which takes
OpenVAS results and publishes them as appropriate Features.
PDP To provide the root for the Feature tree within the MAP Server, an access-request
is required. This service is responsible for performing a basic NAC handshake and
publishing the appropriate access-request for the smartphone. As with the Snort
service, in order to allow for a flexible way of testing, the ifmapcli implementation
was used as a Feature Collector providing this required access-request.
irond-trust The Feature Provider used within the tests is given by this service. It is
based on the previously evaluated irond-trust. The irond-trust implementation is
an enhanced version of the default 0.3.4 implementation of the irond that was used
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for the basic CADS evaluation. Additionally, the appropriate SPM which defines
the required security properties was directly placed on the Service VM. To allow a
change of the ratings by the Correlation Engine, the ironmonitor implementation is
used to receive appropriate Features and perform the SPM changes.
irondetect This service provides the Correlation Engine and forms the core of the TCADS
system together with the irond-trust. The extended irondetect implementation is
utilised. It is based on the version that was used for the CADS evaluation but
incorporates the TrustLog data model.
In addition to the VM-based components and the physical devices, the Ip Webcam App
on the smartphone is used to provide sensor sni ng means. This app is explained shortly
in the following.
IP Webcam App The app is provided by the o cial Google Play store and can be found
here [181]. It enables the smartphone’s camera and microphone to be accessed remotely.
As already stated, this is done by deploying a small web server on the smartphone itself
and opening up access to this server by outside connections. This web server simply
holds one web page which allows to access the camera’s live stream (including audio)
by di↵erent methods. These methods allow to use for example a Flash-based access or a
browser-specific access which utilises the appropriate browser plugin. Due to this, there
is eventual no need of installing third party software besides the browser on the machine
that is connecting to the app. Furthermore, the app has several convenience settings.
Besides the controllability given to the remote clients, there are options to hide the app
when running and to auto start the app on boot. Hiding the app means, that is not longer
being shown in Android’s notification bar, thus making it di cult to be recognised by
the user. Starting on boot means that there is no interaction required in order to run the
app when rebooting the device. Combining this with the hiding option e↵ectively puts
the app into a state where the user may be unaware that it is actually running. However,
it is still retrievable from the o cial app store and is rated rather high. Based on these
special properties, a TCADS policy can be formulated which includes all necessary parts
to recognise the sensor sni ng and to disconnect the device from the network.
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Policies There are two policies which need to be set for the test case: the initial security
property setup including the appropriate ratings (i.e. the SPM) and the Correlation
Engine policy. Section 5.6.1 defines the initial SPM setup, which is being used here.
Based on this the policy is simply created by using the defined properties and their initial
ratings. Besides this rather straightforward task, the Correlation Engine policy must be
set. In particular, the policy being used is based on the CADS evaluation policy shown
in [2] and extended according to the trust requirements. The resulting policy is given in
listing 5.15 which is shown below.
1 context {
2 ctxWorkingHours := DATETIME > ” 06 :00 ” and DATETIME < ” 22 :00 ” ;
3 ctxTrustedInfrastructureComponent := TRUSTLEVEL > ”0”
4 and DATETIME > ” 6 :00 ” and DATETIME < ” 22 :00 ” ;





10 t ra f f i cHintSmartphone := ”smartphone . communication . ip . txother ”
11 ”de . fhhannover . inform . t r u s t . i r onde t e c tp ro c edu r e s . TrendByValueCW” ”50” ;
12 t r a f f i cH i n t Sn o r t := ” id s . snor t . event . h i g h t r a f f i c ”
13 ”de . fhhannover . inform . t r u s t . i r onde t e c tp ro c edu r e s . TrendByValueCW” ”100” ;
14 trustTrendHint := ” trend . measurement . event ”





20 anoHighTraff icSmartphone := tra f f i cH intSmartphone > 0 .5 ctxWorkingHours ;
21 anoHighTra f f i cSnort := t r a f f i cH i n t Sn o r t > 0 .5 ctxTrustedInfrastructureComponent ;
22 anoLowTrafficSmartphone := tra f f i cHintSmartphone <= 0.5 ctxWorkingHours ;




27 s i gna tu r e {
28 sigCamera := ”smartphone . s enso r . cameraisused ” = ” true ” ctxWorkingHours ;
29 s igSusp ic iousApp := ”smartphone . android . app . permis s ion . granted ! 1 ” = ”android .
permis s ion .RECEIVE BOOTCOMPLETED”
30 and ”smartphone . android . app . permis s ion . granted ! 1 ” = ”android . permis s ion .CAMERA”
31 and ”smartphone . android . app . permis s ion . granted ! 1 ” = ”android . permis s ion .INTERNET”
ctxWorkingHours ;
32 sigPortOpen := count ( ” vu l n e r ab i l i t y scan r e s u l t . v u l n e r a b i l i t y . port ” ) > ”0”
ctxTrustedInfrastructureComponent ;





36 cond i t i on {
37 conDataLeakDetected := s igSusp ic iousApp and sigCamera and sigPortOpen and
anoHighTraff icSmartphone ;
38 conNoDataLeakDetected := anoLowTrafficSmartphone and sigNoReqForInv ;
39 conSp l i tRe su l t s := anoLowTrafficSmartphone and anoHighTra f f i cSnort ;
40 conAlertAndNegativeTrustTrend := anoTrustTrend ;
41 }
42
43 ac t i on {
44 r e que s tFo r Inv e s t i g a t i on := ”Reques tFor Inves t i ga t i on ” ”@smartphone . dev i c e . i paddre s s ” ;
45 decreaseSprAct ion := ” t ru s t s p rp s ” ” . / change s e cu r i t y property . sh” ”$1” ”1” ;
46 en f o r c ement I s o l a t e := ” enforcement . a c t i on ” ” . / drop c l i e n t . sh” ”$1” ”@smartphone .
dev i c e . i paddre s s ” ;
47 enforcementAllow := ” enforcement . a c t i on ” ” . / undrop c l i e n t . sh” ”$1” ”@smartphone .
dev i c e . i paddre s s ” ;
48 }
49
50 r u l e {
51 dataLeakage := i f conDataLeakDetected do en f o r c ement I s o l a t e ;
52 noDataLeakage := i f conNoDataLeakDetected do enforcementAllow ;
53 sprChange := i f c onSp l i tRe su l t s do decreaseSprAct ion ;
54 dataLeakageTrust := i f conAlertAndNegativeTrustTrend do en f o r c ement I s o l a t e ;
55 }
Listing 5.15: Evaluation Policy for detection of sensor sni ng attacks with the use of trust
enhancements.
As it is easy to recognise, the policy is rather complex and consists of several anomalies
and signatures which are used to form conditions and rules. Details of creating a policy for
the CE can be found in [2] and will be omitted for improved readability. There are three
particular parts of the policy which are di↵erent compared to the non-trust enhanced
version. The first part is the context block which defines the used contexts for Features.
In addition to the standard context types like DATETIME which defines a certain clock-
wise time window and the SLIDING context which defines a moving time window, the
TRUSTLEVEL context is used. This context allows to setup certain constraints a Feature
must fulfil in terms of trust to be processed by the Correlation Engine. There are two
trust-based contexts defined within the test case: one for all infrastructure-based services
(e.g. Snort or the PDP) and one for the Correlation Engine (i.e. irondetect) itself. The
irondetect context is used to verify that Features which (1) change ratings and (2) trig-
ger Correlation Engine-based cascades are fully trustworthy. That is, these Features are
proven to being published by the CE itself. Given that, solely by using this context-based
trust definition it is possible to define powerful trust-based rulesets.
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The second part is given by the anomalies and their appropriate hints. In addition to
the CADS evaluation policy, a trust trend anomaly is defined. This anomaly monitors the
trust level of the smartphones Feature Collector and is eventually used to recognise the
compromise of it in the test case. More in detail, the trend hint operates solely on the
process RSPR of the Feature Collector, making full usage of the underlying TrustLog
data model. Furthermore, there are two more anomaly elements which monitor the data
received from the smartphone’s Feature Collector and the corresponding data received
from the Snort IDS. If a di↵erence is detected, a rating change of the smartphone’s process
SPR is triggered.
Finally, the third part is given by the signatures and the conditions using them. They
create a cascade whereas the next step of evaluation is only engaged if high tra c from
the smartphone is detected. If this high tra c Feature is detected, the ip address of the
device producing the tra c is published as Feature and being used by irondetect to launch
the next evaluation step.
Given this policies, the particular test flow can be explained including the results after
each step.
Test flow
There are four particular steps which are carried out within the test:
1. Bootstrapping the environment, i.e. all required components start up and perform
an initial publish to the MAP Server.
2. Start of the compromised Feature Collector on the smartphone. The compromise of
this Collector results in it being unable to detect tra c increases on the phone.
3. Start of the webcam app which provides a http-based server on the smartphone.
4. The last step consists of the enforcement procedure after a connection to the smart-
phone has been established. Due to its complexity, it consists of several sub-steps:
• Connecting to the webcam app on the smartphone using the http-based server.
This results in a huge tra c increase.
• Detection of this tra c increase only by Snort but not on the smartphone itself.
This is due to the compromised Feature Collector.
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• Calculation of a trend for the detected tra c, if the trend reaches a threshold,
the Correlation Engine lowers the trust level (i.e. the rating of the particular
SPR for the process operation on the smartphone) for the smartphone to indi-
cate the di↵erent tra c measurements. This is done as the Correlation Engine
considers Snort to be fully trustworthy which was checked using Snort’s trust
context.
• A second trend is calculated by the CE for the trust level change of the smart-
phone. If the predicted value drops below a threshold, the CE publishes an
enforcement Feature to the firewall. The firewall verifies the trust context of
this Feature to ensure its validity and blocks all tra c form and to the smart-
phone.
A detailed explanation of each step, including the particular results on the Correlation
Engine is given in the following.
1. The first step consists of bootstrapping the environment and starting the irond-trust
as well as the irondetect Correlation Engine. First of all, the irond-trust is started
up as it acts as the Feature Provider. Along with it, the appropriate ironmonitor
is started. After this, the infrastructure components which are iptables, the PDP
and the access point are started up. The smartphone can then be connected to
the wireless network which is recognised by the PDP. Due to this, the appropriate
access-request which works as root for the smartphone’s Feature tree is published
by the PDP. Following this, the other infrastructure components are started. In
detail, Snort, OpenVAS and as last component the irondetect Correlation Engine is
launched. Irondetect immediately starts to evaluate its ruleset-based on the existing
Features on the irond-trust. As the smartphone has not yet published a Feature due
to the Feature Collector not being started, there are no firing rules. The result of
this evaluation can be seen in figure 5.31. If there would be a rule element which
was evaluated to be true, this is indicated by a checkmark.
2. The second step consist of starting the Feature Collector on the smartphone. As
already stated, this Feature Collector is compromised and only reports the static
properties like the installed apps correctly. It does not report dynamic properties,
like the tra c generated by the phone correctly, thus it only reports zero as tra c
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Figure 5.31: Irondetect evaluation after the first step has been finished. No policy elements
have been evaluated true.
value. Besides the Feature Collector, the Webcam app is not yet started. This is done
in the next step. The result of this step is depicted in figure 5.32. As the picture
shows, a suspicious app is detected by irondetect. This is due to the Webcam app
possessing permissions (INTERNET, RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETE, CAMERA)
that are treated as critical. Furthermore, irondetect detects no tra c and due to
this, no data leakage from the smartphone.
3. Starting the Webcam app on the smartphones initiates the third step. However,
no connection to the provided website is established at this point which results
in some of the rules firing but no increase of tra c. As depicted in figure 5.33,
irondetect recognises the activation of the camera sensor and the opened port for the
website access. In detail, the activated camera is detected by the Feature Collector
on the smartphone while the opened port is measured by the OpenVAS vulnerability
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Figure 5.32: Second step irondetect evaluation results. A checkmark indicates a true eval-
uation of a certain policy element. In this case, there is no tra c and data
leakage but a suspicious app (i.e. the Webcam app) detected.
scanner running periodic scans of the device. As there is no tra c produced yet,
there is no anomaly element evaluated true. Finishing this step completes the series
of steps which do not result in an enforcement of the device. This is due to the
missing tra c. The last step triggering this enforcement is shown next.
4. The Evil VM is now used to connect to the provided web server on the smartphone.
Following this, the live streaming of the smartphone’s video and audio is started
and played back inside the Evil VM’s browser. Due to this the tra c generated
by the smartphone, in particular in outbound direction, increases drastically. This
would be detected by irondetect using the information from the smartphone’s Fea-
ture Collector under normal conditions. However, as the Feature Collector has been
compromised in order to publish false tra c measurements, irondetect is unable to
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Figure 5.33: Evaluation results of the third step. Irondetect recognises the activation of
the camera on the device and the opening of the port which is required to
access the web server provided by the Webcam app. No tra c increase is
measured at this time as there is no connection to the live stream of the app.
detect the tra c increase using this information. As there is the Snort IDS run-
ning in the network, there is another way of detecting this increase. Snort monitors
all connections for each device within the network, thus it is able to recognise the
increase of the smartphone’s tra c. Furthermore, these tra c measurements are
periodically published as Feature. Due to the fact, that this Feature originates from
a infrastructure-based component, it has a rather high trust level which makes it
di cult to compromise it. Given this Feature, irondetect uses it for a trend-based
tra c evaluation. In detail, a linear regression with a fixed window size is used
to estimate the progression of the tra c. If this predicted progression grows over a
certain threshold, it is considered to be an abnormal behaviour, thus the anomaly el-
ement is being evaluated true. This happens in this step when connecting to the live
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stream. In addition to that, irondetect recognises the split decision between Snort’s
measurement and the smartphone’s Feature Collector as both are describing the
same particular Feature (i.e. tra c of the phone). Due to this, the smartphones
Feature Collector is interpreted as suspicious and irondetect reacts with a Feature
that lowers the particular rating of the smartphone’s process SPR. This Feature is
received by the ironmonitor on the Feature Provider which is responsible for carry-
ing out the change. In order to perform this change, the trust level of the Feature
instructing the change is verified which makes sure that only irondetect originated
Features can be used for such a changing task. Forming a cyclic relationship, the
smartphones trust level (i.e. the RSPR of the smartphone’s process operation re-
ceived through the Features published) is also monitored with an anomaly element
by irondetect. This anomaly is also trend-based an reacts if the predicted trust level
drops below a certain threshold. Note that in detail not the overall trust level is
used but the unmapped security level of the process operation. This happens in the
test case after some steps and leads eventually to the enforcement of the smart-
phone which interrupts the live stream. Figure 5.34 shows the situation after the
enforcement stage has been reached. On the anomalies side, the low and high tra c
di↵erence can be seen easily. This discrepancy is used by the split decision condition
which is triggered if both anomalies are evaluated true. This leads to the sprChange
signature which triggers the lowering of the smartphone’s rating. The trust trend
anomaly (anoTrustTrend) reacts if the trust level drops below the threshold which
results in the dataLeakageTrust rule to be fired which performs the enforcement.
To explain more in detail, figure 5.35 depicts the particular trend calculations car-
ried out by the anomaly evaluation. The upper two figures (a) and (b) show the
calculation results done by the Snort anomaly module. As the calculation is based
on several sub steps which may not be time constant, there are always two graphs
depicted. The first one shows the calculation results based over the particular cal-
culation steps of the module. The second shows the results over the runtime of the
calculation module. As the Snort graph shows, the prediction made by the anomaly
module using the linear regression is rather accurate with some small di↵erences.
Based on the graph in figure (b), the anomaly becomes evaluated true and triggers
the second anomaly module which operates on the SPR of the smartphone and pre-
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Figure 5.34: Evaluation situation of irondetect after the fourth step. The enforcement of
the smartphone has been committed due to the detection of the split decision
and the following SPR change of the Feature Collector.
dicts the trend of the rating. The calculation carried out by this module can be seen
in figure (c) and (d), with the first being the actual results again and the second
being the prediction. The second one is used for the anomaly elements decision,
i.e. if the prediction drops below a certain value, which means the rating decreases
below a threshold, it returns true as evaluation result.
Finishing this test case, the smartphone is no longer able to provide the live stream to the
Evil VM or other components. In addition to this, the compromise of the smartphone itself
is likely to be recognised as irondetect has lowered the rating of the phone. In a real world
use, one or more messages would be provided to the administrator who is then able to take
care of the smartphone. Besides that, it is easy to see that the attack has been suppressed





Figure 5.35: Trend calculations used for both anomaly evaluations.
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amount the attacker had access to the phone is enough to gain substantial information.
Even more interesting, the system was now able to deal with false information provided
by a compromised Feature Collector. This allows for a sophisticated usage profile, where
a Feature Collector may not be considered trustworthy at any time.
5.7 Summary
This chapter presented a proof of concept implementation for the conceptual approach.
This proof of concept is based on two parts: the conceptual part and the actual imple-
mentation. The conceptual part first reviews the IF-MAP protocol of the TCG, which
acts as a technological basis for the proof of concept. Instantiating the trust model from
the previous chapter, a trust layer for IF-MAP is presented. By combining this layer with
the domain-specific extension (TCADS), a particular component-based approach proof
of concept is introduced. It consists of a MAPS which is trust-enhanced and acts as a
Provider, MAPCs and a trust-aware Correlation Engine, both acting as Senders as well
as Receivers. These enhancements not only provide the basic trust concepts but also the
snapshot part of the TCADS approach as well as the possibility to express a Feature’s
trust level by the use of a contextual parameter. Using all parts of the implementation
and deploying it within a real world like scenario allowed an overall evaluation of the ap-
proach based on the proof of concept. This was done in two ways: First the trust enhanced
components (i.e. the irond-trust) have been evaluated while in the second part the overall
environment was used to detect a real world like attack.
The component-based evaluation provided two useful results. The first statement which
can be made was the acceptable performance. That is, the irond-trust which uses the Trust
Token approach can be considered to be as useful as the irond without these modifications.
The test results clearly showed, that there is some di↵erence in terms of performance
but this di↵erence is small enough to treat it as not of significance. Furthermore, when
comparing to other MAP Servers, irond-trust is still to be considered fast. The second
result of the components evaluation showed that the Trust Token generation worked as
intended. Every possible IF-MAP operation was tested against the irond-trust with all of
them providing the expected results. Both of these evaluations showed that the enhanced
irond is able to perform as expected and can be used to substitute the non trust irond.
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The second part of the evaluation used the complete TCADS system in order to detect
and enforce a sensor sni ng attack which compromised the smartphone itself. In detail,
the Correlation Engine was not only able to detect the sensor sni ng itself but also
the compromise of the smartphone. The successful completion of this complex test case
showed clearly the possibilities of the TCADS system. Furthermore, the gearing between
the irond-trust and irondetect provides a powerful mechanism for detecting not only
signature- and anomaly-based situations but also trust-based attacks. While the policy
definition for such cases must be considered rather complex, the possibilities which are
provided by the complete TCADS system cover a wide area of use.
Given the requirement R6, which demands the ability to seamless integrate the concept
into an already existing environment, the proof of concept showed that this is possible.
However, it depends on the particular implementation which is being used. In the case
presented here, the implementation is based on protocols and systems which were designed
with a high level of interoperability in mind. Due to this, integrability is achieved by simply
using the Feature-based IF-MAP data structure and adopting it for every component.
Even if is impossible to directly extend a component to use the IF-MAP data structure,
the ironmonitor component provides a way of integrating this component as it can be
customised as an adapter between a component’s internal data structure and the used
IF-MAP data structure. That is, if using the proof of concept shown here, requirement
R6 can be considered fulfilled also on the level of implementation.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter concludes the thesis. First, an overall summary of the work which has been
done is given. Next, an assessment of the results against the research questions is pre-
sented. Finally, an outlook is given. This outlook includes further questions as well as
promising directions for future developments.
6.1 Conclusion
This thesis provides two main contributions: (1) a generic trust model for smartphone
environments and (2) a domain-specific extension which provides a trust-aware decision
making system. Chapter 1 outlined the problems which arise when integrating smart-
phones into network-based business environments. The situation where smartphones can
be administered by the owner of such a network was described, showing that even this
case su↵ers from limitations in terms of integrating smartphones. In addition to that,
the chapter described the even more critical approach of bring your own device, where
the integration of such external devices becomes more valuable. Continuing this problem
description, current examples where given. These examples emphasised the need for a
solution. Based on this, approaches which try to give a solution where named and de-
scribed. However, analysing these approaches in detail, it was pointed out, that none of
them considered the trustworthiness of the collected data. As this collected data is used
as basis for the decision making process, it was made clear, that more work needs to
be done in order to use such systems e↵ectively. Based on these findings, three research
questions were identified which are assessed later in this chapter. The second chapter intro-
duced the relevant scenarios for this thesis. All presented scenarios are use cases from the
ESUKOM [21] research project. Prior to the detailed scenario description, the reference
infrastructure was introduced. Concluding this chapter, a set of requirements that need to
be fulfilled in order to solve the named problems has been introduced. Using this set of re-
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quirements as assessment criteria, chapter 3 provided an in depth look at the related work
that has been done in the relevant research areas. Furthermore, promising technologies
addressing some of the named problems were analysed. The reserach-based related work
analysis itself consists of trust centric views as well as IDS centric views and a special
view on the CADS approach, which can be considered as smartphone-capable IDS. From
the technologies point of view, Trusted Computing is one promising approach in order to
derive trust for a particular system and was therefore analysed in depth. Following this,
the stated requirements were assessed against the findings made and it was pointed out
that there is no solution available which fulfils all requirements in a satisfying manner.
Due to this, chapter 4 provided a solution for all of the requirements. In detail, the first
part of the concept introduced a generic trust model. This trust model gives not only a
definition of trust itself, but also provides means to specify, derive and calculate as well as
evaluate trust. The trust specification and derivation part is based on the introduction of
security properties upon role-based generic operations. These properties can be rated in
order to provide a basic trust measurement. Combining all rated properties into one value
introduced the trust level which expresses trust per data and not per component, thus
addressing the calculation and the evaluation of trust. Furthermore, a data model along
with a state machine using this data model was provided by the trust model. The second
part of the concept introduced the domain-specific extension, called TCADS, which is
based on the generic trust model. More precisely, the generic trust model was used to
build a trust-aware decision making system for the particular domain of smartphone en-
vironments. Finally, the generic trust model and the domain-specific TCADS system were
assessed against the requirements. This assessment showed the great potential as there
was only one requirement which could not be fulfilled completely. In particular, this was
due to the requirement’s fulfilment being very dependent on the implementation. Chapter
(5) introduced a proof of concept implementation for the conceptual parts which allowed
to show that the requirement can be fulfilled by a tailored implementation. The imple-
mentation was based on the CADS reference implementation and the IF-MAP protocol
of the TCG. The irond MAP Server was extended providing the defined trust means as
so-called Trust Tokens. Furthermore, the data model was placed on the used Correlation
Engine, irondetect, and enabled the remaining trust concepts like the history function.
Using this implementation, an evaluation was done in the same chapter. First, the used
security properties and their appropriate functions were defined. The performance of the
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enhanced MAP Server, the irond-trust, was evaluated next. This evaluation only showed
a minor decrease in processing time, thus being overall successful. The Trust Token gen-
eration including every possible operation was evaluated next and showed the expected
results. At this point, the irond-trust was able to replace the non trust extended irond.
Based on this, the complete TCADS environment was tested within a real world scenario
by a sensor sni ng attack. Running through the attack, TCADS was able to prevent the
dropping of the sni↵ed information in a very satisfying manner. As TCADS is based on
the generic trust model, the overall approach could be proved not only very promising
but also applicable.
Referring to the first chapter, three essential research questions have been stated. These
research questions can now be answered which is done in the following.
Which data and characteristics can be used to derive trust? This question is
mainly answered by the security property approach. More in detail, the introduced security
properties provide a reasonable way of expressing the most basic building block for the
overall trust model. They allow to define arbitrary properties which influence the trust
derivation for either a platform or a communication channel. By combining them, trust
is placed on a Feature rather than on a particular system as they provide a holistic view
on the complete environment. This is a very important point as all of the known existing
approaches derive trust from only one particular source (or a group of particular sources).
Given an example of this, the approach presented in this thesis is also applicable for a
scenario with multiple network-based hops. That is, if the Feature is transmitted trough
several other systems before being received on the Provider, the generic trust model allows
to recognise and evaluate this. In detail this is done by defining appropriate properties
for the transmit operation between the Sender and the Provider. These properties may
then for example be used to incorporate the trustworthiness of the systems which are in
between the Sender and the Provider. It would also be possible, e.g. in the case a secured
tunnel is used between Sender and Provider, to simply ignore the intermediate steps of
the transmission. The concept of basing trust on particular properties measuring a defined
set of operations in terms of there trustworthiness allows for this high level of flexibility.
Given this and the abstract model, the approach can be extended to arbitrary scenarios
and environments by using the model instantiation defined. As the evaluation showed,
security properties and their flexible way of definition is well suitable in a practical case.
That is, it could be shown that arbitrary sources for trust derivation may be used, thus
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it is possible to tailor them for the actual use case. Given the test case of sensor sni ng,
there was for example a property used which expresses the vulnerability level of a system.
In the particular case of the smartphone, this level increased drastically when the port
for the web server was opened up on the device. That is, the generic trust model provides
a very flexible way of deriving trust which can be tailored to fit a wide range of possible
scenarios, even more than the scenarios shown here.
How can trust be defined and calculated? In order to answer this question, the
thesis first provides a generic definition of trust which is later refined. In detail, this
was done by leveraging the trust definition of the TCG and applying it on the trust
level concept. The introduction of ratings and the related calculation steps answers the
remaining part of this question. As with the security properties, a very flexible method is
given to define the particular level of trustworthiness as well as the resulting overall trust
level and its calculation. The particular level of trustworthiness, which is represented by
the appropriate rating, can be used to express trustworthiness as well as untrustworthiness
within the same scenario and environment. This allows for example, that trust values
may drop under a certain threshold which may be lower than the initial level of trust.
For example, if Features are transmitted using a particular communication library which
was considered trustworthy at time of transmission a rating which expresses this trust is
given to the transmit operation. If the evaluation of this library changes, e.g. due to a
recently discovered bug, the rating may be set to a specific value indicating this problem
(i.e., a value that is lower than the initial lowest value). A recalculation of the trust levels
for all Features, including the ones which have already been transmitted, a↵ected by this
problem would take place. Additionally, the concept provides not only the final trust level
for further usage but holds all intermediate steps ready. It is therefore also possible to base
a trust evaluation on a certain aspect, for example on a platforms trustworthiness without
considering the transmission steps. Due to this, most of the already existing approaches
can either be used within solutions that are based on the generic trust model, like TCADS,
or completely replaced by the trust model. The evaluation clearly showed, that tailoring
these conceptual parts provides a most satisfying way of using the trust model in di↵erent
scenarios. Along with the calculation, the ratings of the particular properties can also be
defined per scenario. Looking back to the evaluation, this allows to have a fine grained
distinction between particular properties of di↵erent devices.
How is it possible to use trust in the decision making process? As already
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stated, the trust level itself is used to express the overall trustworthiness. Combined with
the domain-specific extension, it therefore answers the third question. In addition to the
plain value of the trust level, the intermediate steps are also provided. This allows to
only use certain aspects of the trust calculation, thus providing a very high flexibility.
Furthermore, the generic trust model provides two more concepts: a flexible data model
and a sophisticated state machine using the trust and operational models. The data model
allows to actually implement the trust model as it defines the relationship between the
di↵erent parts of the trust calculation and the Feature the trust is provided for. Along with
that, the relationship between the snapshot concept is also defined within the data model.
As the name states, the model only defines the entities holding certain data but not the
mechanisms operating on this data. This is given by the state machine which combines all
provided algorithms into a single overall picture. It consists of three di↵erent operational
paths, one for each request type. Due to this, the Provider which implements this state
machine is fully described. Besides that, the request type which addresses the relationship
between the decision making system and the Provider is also given by this state machine
as one request type defines the data exchange between these two systems. The domain-
specific extension, TCADS, provides a deployable trust-aware decision making system.
It contains all necessary functions to use the possibilities of the generic trust model in
order to use the trust concept within the decision making process. The extended policy
provided for the domain-specific extension addressing the Correlation Engine allows to
use the received data from the Provider in terms of trust evaluation. The proof of concept
implementation used throughout the evaluation showed, that all parts of the domain-
specific TCADS system work geared together, thus providing trust means and a solution
for the problems outlined in the introduction.
Given all this, it can be summarised that the generic trust model along with its domain-
specific extension, TCADS, provide a novel solution to the problems described. In detail,
a very flexible way of defining trust derivation, calculation and usage is introduced which
overcomes the limitations described within the state of the art. Furthermore, the trust
derivation includes every part of the information handling, thus forming an holistic system
which not only addresses small problematic parts. In addition to this, the trust derivation
and calculation is given in a dynamic fashion. That is, trust may be changed while the
system is running allowing to tweak the trust derivation to the needed level. Besides
the calculation, the particular base of trust is defined in a flexible way which allows to
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use arbitrary sources for trust derivation. This allows to use the system in a wide area
of scenarios. Considering the domain-specific extension, TCADS is able to operate and
correlate directly upon the trustworthiness including historic changes. Going one step
forward, this is not only possible for the defined scenarios but for all scenarios which can
be mapped to the generic trust model presented within the concept. The steps necessary
to this can be distinguished into two groups: conceptual and implementation. On the
conceptual side, there are only the steps of mapping the generic trust model correctly into
the environment. If these steps are completed, an implementation must be provided. This
is done by either creating an own conceptual domain-specific extension and implementing
it or by leveraging the already provided domain-specific extension. Using TCADS, it is
necessary to implement the Feature Collector on the appropriate platform along with the
TCADS Feature Provider (in particular the state machine) and the Correlation Engine.
Doing so allows to use TCADS in arbitrary environments where the role-based mapping
of the generic trust model is applicable for. That is, the TCADS system can be used for a
wider set of tasks. Providing an trust-based authorisation system or for making decisions
within a home automation environment are just two examples. Although these cases are
not relevant for this thesis, they show the possibilities of the developed system as it may be
used as a generic, trust-enabled decision making engine allowing for sophisticated tasks.
6.2 Future Work
While the current state of the concepts introduced in this thesis can be fully used, with
the generic trust model providing general purpose trust means and TCADS providing
a complete trust-based decision making system, there are some points which may be
investigated further. Namely, there are three points which leave room for improvement.
They are described in the following.
Gearing between Feature Provider and Correlation Engine TCADS is based on two
core components: the Feature Provider as well as the Correlation Engine. While the
Feature Provider is responsible for most parts of the trust calculation and derivation,
the Correlation Engine is used as main decision making component. In order to
realise sophisticated tasks like the recognition of the sensor sni ng attack presented
in the evaluation, they work together in a very fine grained manner. In detail,
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decision cascades including trust are formed between them. From the architecture’s
point of view, both of them are still distinct sub systems. This leads to the fact, that
the Provider needs to verify the trustworthiness of the Correlation Engine which is
rather unnecessary as both are core components required for a functional TCADS
environment. Due to this, the gearing between these two core components should be
looked at again and if possible improved. An outcome of this could be to form one
high level component which provides the same flexibility as the current approach
but combines both the Provider and the Correlation Engine into one aggregated
engine. This would also reduce the attack potential.
Policy combination and language Looking at the gearing of the Provider and the Cor-
relation Engine, the policies must be considered as well. The current approach uses
two di↵erent policies, one coming from the generic trust model being the SPM with
the properties and ratings while the other being the CE policy of the domain-specific
extension defining the ruleset. If combining the Provider and the CE into one single
component, the policies should also be integrated to each other. This would allow
for a single point of control. Furthermore, the used language should also be looked
at. At the moment, both policies rely on self defined languages. Although they are
completely functional for the presented cases, they can be improved. This would
also allow for an easier integration into environments which rely on certain policy
languages and which use a central policy distribution instance.
SP derivation and SPRM definition The last point aims at an easier definition of the
used security properties for the generic trust model. Although the thesis provides
a small guideline to set such properties, an analysis defining core properties which
are found in every environment could be made. Using these core properties, the
trust model could be extended by a security property construction kit which allows
to assign the properties and their ratings in a very easy fashion. Furthermore, this
kit would also allow to generate the required SPRM functions to measure these
properties.
Further development of these three points allows for an easier integration of the overall
system and would be one step towards the development of a product like system which
would be usable for a wide range of tasks. The current version of the generic trust model
247
6 Conclusion and Future Work
and the domain-specific TCADS approach provides a very reasonable and promising basis
for such an extension.
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As defined by the TCG, a Trusted Platform is a system, which fulfils the necessary re-
quirements. There are three of these requirements, namely providing so-called protected
capabilities, attestation and integrity measurement, logging and reporting. The basic ar-
chitecture of a system fulfilling these requirements is shown in figure 7.1. The three re-
Figure 7.1: Architecture of a Trusted Platform [106].
quirements are mainly fulfilled by the abilities the TPM provides to the system. They are
explained in short in the following.
Protected Capabilities The Trusted Platform provides a set of well defined operations,
which realise the most security critical tasks. These operations, called protected
capabilities, are well secured against compromise. They are for example used when
accessing critical locations in memory or when storing a certain measurement, i.e.
a hash-based, value. The use of TPM in order to perform a quotation of a PCR’s
value is for example carried out by invoking such a protected capability.
Attestation Attestation describes the process of attesting information in order to verify
their authenticity. As already stated, this is done by using the TPM’s key hierarchy
which allows it to securely determine if the information set has been signed by a
valid TPM. Furthermore, the attestation mechanism is used to verify the integrity
of a system. This is done by quoting the TPM’s PCRs and singing them using an
appropriate key. This signed message is then provided to a verifier which can (a)
check the integrity itself and (b) check the authenticity which should indicate that
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the measurement comes from a valid TPM. The verifier may also be a remote party
which receives this message, i.e. the integrity report, via network-based communi-
cation. In this case, a remote attestation is performed which is being discussed in
detail later in this section.
Integrity Measurement, Logging and Reporting To allow for a verification of a sys-
tem’s integrity, the trusted platform provides appropriate means. First of all, it
allows to actually perform the measurement in a secure way by utilising the TPM’s
capability. In addition to this measurement, the platform records the single steps
which lead to the final measurement value, i.e. the final PCR value. Although it is
not defined that this logging has to be to performed in a secure way, it is possible
to compare the steps against the actual values of the measurement, if there is any
di↵erence the integrity of the system is no longer given. Furthermore, a possibility
to report the results is provided by such a platform. This allows to use the results
and to perform comparison against well known values or against the expected log.
A Trusted Platform is required (i.e. must) to fulfil all three expectations. That is, it needs
to provide technical means to perform the desired operations. This cannot be achieved
by only incorporating specialised hardware like the TPM, it must also be software-based.
This is realised through several, trusted platform tailored extensions. The first one is given
by a specialised BIOS which supports the use of the trusted platform-specific abilities, like
performing a measurement by using the TPM. Second, the boot system and all following
components must support the trusted platform paradigm. While this may be easy for
the limited code base of a boot loader, it grows very complex for the operating system
itself. Due to this, the use of a specialised operating system, commonly called a trusted
operating system (trusted OS) is required. This trusted OS provides means to access the
trusted platform’s capabilities, like accessing the TPM for a sealing operation. The trusted
OS is also responsible for measuring high level applications and for actually starting the
integrity verification by invoking the quotation of a TPM’s PCR.
Given all that, it is possible to establish a so-called Chain of Trust, which is another
basic building block of trusted computing.
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7.2.1 Chain of Trust
The Chain of Trust concept allows to put trust in high level measurements, for exam-
ple of measurements taken from user space applications. Given this concept, it can be
considered as trust calculation method, thus being relevant for the fulfilment of R1. This
is done by measuring each single software component of the system prior to the compo-







Figure 7.2: Chain of Trust [113].
already explained, the first measurement is triggered by the CRTM, which is residing in
a hardware-based component. The CRTM consists of executable code which instructs the
very first measurement. Before the measurement actually takes places, the TPM’s PCRs
are initialised into a well known state. I.e., the initial values are known and must di↵er
from the specifications. The code of the CRTM measures the system’s BIOS and extends
these values into the appropriate PCRs. This is done before the BIOS is actually started
to recognise changes that may have been made to the BIOS itself. After this step, the
control is handed over to the BIOS which starts up and is responsible for performing
the next measurement. The next component which is to be started is represented by the
boot loader. Due to this, the BIOS measures the boot loader and afterwards hands over
control to the boot loader by executing it. The boot loader can now measure the oper-
ating system before actually starting it. If this is done, the operating system starts and,
as long as it provides the capabilities of a trusted OS, further measurements of high level
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applications can be performed. By reaching this point, a chain of measurements has been
created beginning with the CRTM and ending on the last measured application. The trust
implication which is behind this concept is that if each of the measurements taken is as
expected i.e., the values are the same as the reference values, all measured components
are trustworthy, thus a transitive trust relationship has been established. To verify the
measurements taken, there need to be reference values for each of the measured compo-
nents, which might be rather complex due to the high amount of possible components
and their trustworthy states. Furthermore, this type of Chain of Trust can only be reset
by a full system reboot. It is therefore also based on an approach called Static Root of
Trust for Measurement (SRTM) as it creates a Static Chain of Trust.
To overcome this problem of high complexity and fully rebooting the system for a reset,
there is an enhanced conceptual version of the Chain of Trust which is based on the so-
called Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). The DRTM approach allows to
establish arbitrary new Chain of Trust instances at runtime without the need to reboot the
system. It is another hardware-based concept as it must be supported by the CPU. This is
due to the fact, that the CPU is responsible for providing an isolated environment in which
the Chain of Trust can be established. Intel, with their Trusted Execution Technology
(TXT, [186]), as well as AMD with their Secure Virtual Machine Architecture (SVM,
[187]) provide such environments on chip. These isolated environments allow it to establish
a Chain of Trust which can be used to attest particular aspects of the system, without
the need to measure the whole system. This may be used to only spawn a Chain of Trust
if necessary for an application, e.g. for carrying out home banking tasks.
If deriving trust, it needs to be taken into account which one of the two types was used
to establish the actual Chain of Trust. While dynamic allows the definition of a particular
trustworthy environment on a system, static allows to derive the overall trustworthiness
of the system. Although the second option seems to be more promising, it is rather
questionable if it is possible to establish a complete static Chain of Trust in a real world
scenario. This is due to the high complexity.
7.3 Detailed Architecture of TNC
The Network Access Layer is responsible for realising the basic network-based communi-
cation. The communication may be realised by utilising di↵erent technologies, for example
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directly through 802.1X or indirect through a VPN tunnel. There are three building blocks
located in this layer, one in each component. On the AR’s side, there is the logical block
of the Network Access Requestor, which is usually software responsible for handling the
basic network connection without TNC-specific properties. The Policy Enforcement Point
consists only of this block as it only operates on this layer. This is due to the PEP being
only responsible for allowing or denying access on a network-based level. As third, the
Network Access Authority is residing on the PDP’s side. In contrast to the AR, it is not
only responsible for providing basic network-based communication but is also responsible
to include third party decisions into the overall access decision for an AR. For example,
the step of an user authentication is evaluated at this point as it is not TNC-specific.
There are two interfaces defined at this layer by the TNC architecture: IF-T for the
network-based communication and IF-PEP for the enforcement decisions the PEP has to
carry out. IF-T is defined in two di↵erent specifications. The first one [188], realises the
communication-based on EAP and 802.1X. It is mainly used when directly accessing a
network and leveraging port-based access control. It relies on the mechanisms provided
by the combination of 802.1X and EAP as there is no ip-based connection available for
communicating with the PDP. The second specification defined in [136] allows to base the
communication on an already existing ip-based network connection. It uses this connec-
tion and establishes a TLS secured tunnel. It is mainly useful in VPN environments where
the AR has already a connection to the VPN gateway. Decisions made by the PDP are
communicated to the PEP by leveraging the RADIUS-based IF-PEP [189] interface. This
is done by using the protocols ability to control the access state of the PEP. All PEPs
which are used must be able to understand this protocol to enforce the access decisions.
In order to realise the TNC-specific communication, the Integrity Evaluation Layer is
used. This layer provides means to negotiate the results of TNC-based measurements
made on the AR. It consists of two components: the TNC Client (TNCC) on the AR and
the TNC Server (TNCS) on the PDP. The TNC Client is responsible for collecting and
encapsulating the measurements made on the AR. This is done by receiving the measure-
ments through a well defined interface from the layer located above. The encapsulation is
done by leveraging the IF-TNCCS interface. This interface defines the actual communica-
tion between the TNC Client and the TNC Server. There are two versions of the protocol
defining the interface. The first version, which is specified in [190] uses a type length value
(TLV) based encoding in it’s actual revision. Legacy versions of this specification were
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based on the use of XML encoding. The second version [191], is used in order to provide
compatibility with Microsoft’s Network Access Protection (NAP, cf. [192]) concept. That
is, it is based on the exchange of so-called Statement of Health reports and allows to
use a TNC Client in conjunction with a Microsoft NAP server. After the results, i.e. the
measurements, have reached the server, they are provided to the layer above where an
in detail evaluation takes place. The result of this evaluation is given back to the TNC
Server, which is responsible for providing the final result to the NAA below. The final
result may not solely be based on the evaluation of the highest layer but also on a policy
which is located on the TNC Server. Furthermore, the result is not only given to the
NAA for enforcement purposes but also provided to the TNC Client. The interfaces to
the Network Access Layer are not specified. In particular, this is due to the fact, that
the communication at this level is very platform-specific and may not be specified. In
di↵erence, the interfaces to the upper layer are well specified to allow for a high level of
interoperability.
The upper layer, the Integrity Measurement Layer, consists of the Integrity Measure-
ment Collectors (IMCs) on the AR’s side and the Integrity Measurement Verifiers on the
PDP. The interface between these two components and the layer below is specified, as
already written. These specifications [193, 194, 195, 196] define the communication be-
tween the TNC Client and the IMCs on the AR as well as the communication of the TNC
Server and the IMVs on the PDP. Thus, they allow to use arbitrary IMC/Vs with arbitrary
server or client components. Going back to the Integrity Evaluation Layer, the IMCs on
the AR are responsible for actually performing the measurements on the platform. There
may be an arbitrary amount of such IMCs as long as there is the same amount of IMVs
on the other side. This is due to the fact, that there needs to be a component which is
possible to evaluate the measurement, which is the appropriate IMV on the PDP’s side.
Commonly, IMCs and IMVs are provided as pairs of each other, thus each IMC has a
corresponding IMV. Two di↵erent types of communications may be carried out between
them. The first one is unspecified and can only be used between pairs which belong ex-
actly to each other. This allows to measure arbitrary things and communicate the results
in the most suited manner. Although this provides a high flexibility and discretionary, it
limits the interoperability. To circumvent this, the second method that may be used is the
standard interface IF-M [121]. It provides a standardised message exchange, which allows
to combine di↵erent IMC/V pairs as long as they implement the IF-M standard.
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Besides these three layers, there is an extra component called Platform Trust Service
(PTS). It is responsible for realising the access to trusted platform-specific functions,
in detail to provide a method for accessing the TPM’s capabilities. Although the TNC
architecture is usable without the PTS enhancement, there would be no way of leveraging
the abilities of trusted computing, thus TNC would only be another NAC approach which
is not capable of providing a way to put trust into the measurements made on the client
(cf. [197]). The PTS is also a well specified interface [119]. In detail, it is located above the
Trusted Software Stack (TSS) which itself is located above the TPM. The TSS is usually
provided by the operating system as it is an interface which allows to use the capabilities
of the trusted platform and the trusted OS itself. The PTS leverages the functions of the
TSS by using its functions and due to this, it exposes this functions in a well defined
manner for the TNC architecture. It is usable through the two upper layers. The IMCs
may use it to extend their measurements made into the TPM, thus integrating them into
the chain of trust. The TNC Client can use them to measure the IMCs prior to their
execution, thus including also these components into the chain of trust. Note that the
TNC client itself must be measured by the operating system. Doing this, all three parts,
the TNC stack itself, the appropriate IMCs and their addressed components are measured
securely and are part of the chain of trust. This is the main benefit of using TNC as it
allows to perform trustworthy measurements. Trustworthy means, that it can on the one
hand distinguished between expected and unexpected measurement values and on the
other hand it is possible to recognise compromised measurement due to the chain of trust
concept.
Given these architecture and their components, the basic message flow which is carried
out when negotiating the integrity of a client can be constructed. The simplified flow is
shown in figure 7.3 with the particular steps described in the following. Note that the
actual enforcement communication is not explicitly addressed.
1. The first step starts the handshake. It is initiated from the side of the TNCC and
instructs the IMCs on the client (i.e. on the AR) to measure all necessary compo-
nents. The overall handshake process is also referred to as integrity check handshake
(cf. [96]). The IMCs perform the actual measurements.
2. Their results are communicated back to the TNCC in the second step. The TNCC
encapsulates the results in the appropriate version of the TNCCS protocol.
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Figure 7.3: Simplified TNC message flow [120].
3. The message which results from this encapsulation is then communicated to the
TNCS. This is done by using the layer below, the Network Access Layer which is
responsible for performing the actual network-based communication.
4. The TNCS unmarshalls the received message and provides the single parts, which
represent the single measurement result per IMC, to the appropriate IMV. The
IMVs are then responsible for evaluating the received results.
5. Each of the IMV provides a suggestion to the TNCS. This suggestion includes the
evaluation result of the measurements. Based on these suggestion and the combina-
tion of them, the TNCS may make a decision about the clients access. In the case
shown, a second round is triggered before the final decision is made. This is the case
if some information are missing.
6. The TNCS sends a message back to the TNCC. This message includes the request
for the missing information, thus this gives the AR the possibility to measure more
detailed and provide the missing information.




8. After these IMCs have completed their measurement, the measured values are given
back to the TNCC which encapsulates them and provides them back to the TNCS.
The TNCS uses the evaluation of the IMVs appropriately and may then be able to
make a decision.
This message flow may take several rounds to find a real result where the TNCS can base
a decision upon. Furthermore, the TNCC measures the IMCs prior to their execution
to ensure the chain of trust. The final decision about network access is based on the
suggestions of the IMVs, the decision of the TNCS, which may include chain of trust
information and on other properties from the NAA. There are several policies controlling
this behaviour which are summarised shortly in the following.
7.4 System State Sealed Authentication Certificate
In oder to derive appropriate Security Properties through the SPRM, there must be a
method to reason about the trust state of a certain MAP Client. This is done by a special
certificate which can be used to determine this trust state of a specific MAP Client. The
findings made by the use of this approach can then be used to assign the correct Security
Properties for the process operation of this client. It is necessary to provide an approach
of this, as the process operation of the Client is the only operation which is not directly
visible by the SPRM. This is due to the fact, that all other operations are carried out by
or with the MAPS where the SPRM is placed on. While a remote attestation would also
be very useful for determining properties of the client’s process, the method used here
is rather straightforward and provides a complete coverage for the implementation. The
approach itself is based on mechanisms provided by Trusted Computing, in particular on
sealing data to a certain system state.
7.4.1 Overview
In detail, this method is based on the authentication mechanism provided by IF-MAP. To
publish data and to subscribe for certain information, an MAPC has to authenticate itself.
This prevents unauthorised access to the MAPS’s graph. As IF-MAP uses SOAP and the
HTTPS protocol for communication, there are two distinct authentication mechanisms
defined: the basic authentication and the certificate-based authentication.
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• The basic authentication provides a rather simple authentication method, which
uses a username and a password, i.e. a MAPC gets access to the MAPS if it knows
the appropriate credentials.
• The second authentication method is based on a certificate. That is, the MAPC has
to present a valid (possibly correctly signed by an appropriate authority) certificate
to the MAPS. If this certificate is presented and verified, the MAPS grants access
to the MAPS.
Based on this two authentication methods, the method proposed here works the following
way. The authentication certificate is issued to each MAPC in the network by the MAPS.
The certificate is not simply provided but only distributed to the MAPC in a defined
way and under the precondition of a valid integrity state. This means, the certificate is
only given to the MAPC if (1) the MAPC’s integrity state is valid (this is defined by
a third party, e.g. the networks administrator) and (2) the MAPC has a mechanism to
bind the certificate to this valid integrity state. This ensures, that the certificate can only
be accessed by the MAPC if it is in the same state as when the certificate was provided
to it, thus e↵ectively countering unwanted system changes. When the MAPC wants to
perform MAP operations, it accesses the certificate and presents it to the MAPS. The
MAPS recognises this certificate and gives this information to the SPRM which attaches
a TT to the MAPC which presented this certificate. If the system state of this MAPC
changes, it can no longer access the certificate. As the certificate for authentication is
missing and only the simple authentication is available at this time, it will be recognised
by the MAPS. The MAPS can then change the appropriate value of the TT by the use
of the SPRM. The exact process, is presented in the following.
7.4.2 Initialisation Phase
Aim of this phase is the attachment of a TT to a MAPC publishing data. To achieve this,
certain steps are necessary. Figure 7.4 shows these steps. As already explained, this method
uses the concept of indirect trust. Thus, the trustworthiness of the data published by a
MAPC is derived from its system/integrity state. Therefore, the first step is the definition
of a trustworthy system state of the MAPC. This definition is strongly related to the
actual implementation and needs therefore to be set while deploying the system. Usually,
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Figure 7.4: Initialisation of the Certificate.
the state will be defined by a third party (like the networks administrator). It will be
chosen in a way, that no compromising element such as malware or a computer virus, is
being included. An easy but not complete way of achieving a benign state would be to
keep the system always up to date. If such a state is defined, it should be applied to the
system. After this is done, the system can be treated as trustworthy for this case and
therefore (which is a core element of this method) data published by this system can also
be treated trustworthy.
The next step is to issue, provide and bind (seal) the MAP certificate, allowing to
authenticate the MAPC. This issuing process is commonly known and therefore not ex-
plained in detail here. After the certificate has been issued, it is registered on the MAPS
side, thus giving the MAPS the information that (1) the certificate is known and (2) data
provided with this certificate can be treated trustworthy. The next task is providing the
certificate, which is rather straightforward. The actual implementation should provide a
secure way to exchange this certificate. However, the part of binding it to a system’s state
is more interesting: The binding is done by using special mechanisms which are provided
by Trusted Computing. That is, to perform this binding, which is called sealing, the sys-
tem needs to be capable of performing those operations. This means, that such a system
must provide the abilities of a trusted platform. In detail, after the certificate has been
received, it will be sealed on to the defined system state. The certificate is therefore taken
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and encrypted, i.e. it is encrypted with a key stored inside the platforms TPM. This key is
not accessible outside of the TPM and one is unable to retrieve this key out of the TPM.
Besides this, the usage of this key is bound to certain Platform Configuration Register
values. As these PCR values reflect the system’s state, the certificate is e↵ectively sealed
to the defined state. Having done this, it is not possible to access the certificate if the
platforms state has changed compared to the state which was defined as trustworthy.
With this sealed certificate, the MAPC may publish data to the MAPS. The MAPS can
distinguish between the authentication type (sealed certificate or simple authentication)
and if the connection was authenticated using the certificate, the next step is initiated.
This is described in the following.
After the connection is established, and the authentication takes place, the MAPS
verifies the certificate. If the certificate is known to the MAPS, access is granted. Otherwise
the MAPC is unable to publish data using this authentication type. If the certificate was
considered valid by the MAPS, it checks if there is already a TT entry for the metadata
published. If there is one, the update phase begins (explained below). If there doesn’t
exist a TT for the metadata of the MAPC, the MAPS starts the process of creating it. It
takes several information which are assigned as Security Properties to do so:
• The identity of the MAPC. This is uniquely identifying the MAPC thus binding the
TT to be generated globally to this MAPC.
• Some time information, which may be used for reasoning.
• Trust Anchor information. This is known due to the method used, i.e. it is always
the MAPCs TPM when using this method.
The MAPC then creates a new TTM including the above stated SPs in the SPR fields.
Along with these values, the Trust Level is put into the TTM. After the TT entities are
created, the MAPS publishes them into the MAP graph, thus finishing the initialisation.
7.5 Client Side Policy
The following two figures show the conceptual model of a client side policy and the
enhanced architecture used. An example Client-side Policy is depicted in a simplified
form in the listing (7.1) shown last.
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Figure 7.5: Client side policy definition [120].
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Figure 7.6: Extended TNC message flow [120].
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1 <po l i c y>
2 < !   zone f o r work network   >
3 <zone name=”work” network=” 141 . 71 . 30 . 0/23 ”>
4 < !   l i s t o f a l l a l lowed IF M messages   >
5 <a l low>
6 < !   an entry   >
7 <entry>









17 < !   l i s t o f a t t r i b u t e s   >
18 <ifm a t t r i b u t e>
19 <vendorID>TCG<vendorID>
20 <a t t r i b u t e>Product Vers ion</ a t t r i b u t e>
21 </ ifm a t t r i b u t e>
22 <ifm a t t r i b u t e>
23 <vendorID>TCG<vendorID>
24 <a t t r i b u t e>St r ing Vers ion</ a t t r i b u t e>





30 <component>Fi r ewa l l<component>
31 </ ifm component>
32 <ifm a t t r i b u t e>
33 <vendorID>TCG<vendorID>
34 <a t t r i b u t e>Operat iona l Status</ a t t r i b u t e>
35 </ ifm a t t r i b u t e>
36 </ entry>
37 </ a l low>







45 <ifm a t t r i b u t e>
46 <vendorID>TCG<vendorID>
47 <a t t r i b u t e>⇤</ a t t r i b u t e>
48 </ ifm a t t r i b u t e>
49 <entry>
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50 <deny>
51 </zone>
52 </ po l i c y>
Listing 7.1: An example Client-side Policy expressed in XML [120]
7.6 Interoperable Remote Attestation in VPN
Environments



























Figure 7.7: Detailed architecture for VPN environments [135].
7.7 Permission-based Attestation
Figure 7.8 and 7.9 depict the complexity of the permission structure in di↵erent situations
































































Figure 7.8: Permission graph of a HTC Desire device with top ten free games installed,




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7.10: Time required to measure permissions [149].
Performance
Performance figures are shown in table 7.1 and figure 7.10.
7.8 On Remote Attestation for Google Chrome OS
The trusted boot process is shown in figure 7.11.
The conceptual architecture of the approach is depicted in figure 7.12.
The flow of operations, based on these extension is depicted in figure 7.13.
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Table 7.1: Performance impact of Permission-based measurement of application packages
(Abstract) [149]. n
p
is the number of permissions the application requests. Time








avg min max avg min max Size
com.android.soundrecorder 4 11.54 7 30 7.08 6 37 205
com.android.voicedialer 8 13.84 8 26 7.12 6 14 344
com.android.launcher 11 62.44 52 77 6.78 6 18 465
android 1 6.87 4 14 6.83 6 11 113
com.android.providers.contacts 10 12.82 9 23 6.68 6 49 474
com.android.settings 36 35.50 28 48 6.92 6 38 1464
com.android.quicksearchbox 6 10.48 7 22 6.51 6 11 299
com.android.protips 1 5.9 4 12 6.65 6 39 79
. . .
com.android.providers.settings 1 4.63 4 7 7.26 6 47 90
com.android.magicsmoke 2 5.42 4 8 8.17 6 49 146
android.tts 2 4.53 4 9 7.65 6 43 128
com.android.mms 17 15.6 14 23 7.58 6 57 636
com.android.provision 2 3.99 3 6 7.42 6 46 143
com.android.providers.media 4 6.48 5 9 7.7 6 57 223
com.android.certinstaller 1 4.70 4 7 7.58 6 49 113
com.android.providers.downloads 9 9.90 9 18 7.51 6 51 435
com.android.server.vpn 1 4.53 3 8 7.38 6 45 96
. . .
com.android.providers.settings 1 4.04 3 6 7.41 6 49 90
android.tts 2 4.21 3 9 8.13 6 47 128
com.android.magicsmoke 2 5.14 4 7 7.64 6 40 146
com.android.mms 17 13.92 13 17 7.77 6 43 636
com.android.provision 2 3.98 3 6 8.94 6 47 143
com.android.providers.media 4 5.97 5 8 7.54 6 48 223
com.android.providers.downloads 9 9.11 8 11 7.62 6 41 435
com.android.certinstaller 1 4.07 3 6 8.46 6 48 113
com.android.server.vpn 1 4.1 3 6 8.7 6 46 96




Figure 7.11: Verified boot [151].
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Figure 7.12: Architecture for RA on Chrome OS [151].
271
7 Appendix
Figure 7.13: Flow of operations [151].
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7.9 MAP Server Performance Analysis
The following listing provides the source code for the perf-complete-graph test program
as this was used in a changed form.
1 /⇤
2 ⇤ COPYRIGHT AND PERMISSION NOTICE
3 ⇤
4 ⇤ Copyright ( c ) 2010 2011 , Arne Welzel , <arne . we lze l@goog lemai l . com>
5 ⇤
6 ⇤ Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 ⇤
8 ⇤ Permiss ion to use , copy , modify , and d i s t r i b u t e t h i s so f tware f o r any
purpose
9 ⇤ with or without f e e i s hereby granted , provided that the above copyr ight
10 ⇤ no t i c e and t h i s permis s ion no t i c e appear in a l l c op i e s .
11 ⇤
12 ⇤ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS , WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
13 ⇤ IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
14 ⇤ FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY
RIGHTS. IN
15 ⇤ NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,
16 ⇤ DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY , WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR
17 ⇤ OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR
THE USE
18 ⇤ OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
19 ⇤
20 ⇤ Except as conta ined in t h i s not i ce , the name o f a copyr ight ho lder s h a l l
not
21 ⇤ be used in adv e r t i s i n g or otherw i s e to promote the sa l e , use or other
d ea l i n g s





26 ⇤ Performance Measurement o f a MAPS us ing a complete graph and some





29 #inc lude <l i b i fmap2c / s s r c . h>
30 #inc lude <l i b i fmap2c / arc . h>
31 #inc lude <l i b i fmap2c / i d e n t i f i e r s . h>
32 #inc lude <l i b i fmap2c /metadata . h>
33 #inc lude <algor ithm>
34 #inc lude <c s t d l i b>
35 #inc lude <iostream>
36 #inc lude < l i s t >
37 #inc lude <s t r i ng>
38 #inc lude <sstream>
39 #inc lude <c s td io>
40 #inc lude ”common . h”
41
42 us ing namespace std ;
43 us ing namespace ifmap2c ;
44
45 typede f pair<s t r i ng , s t r i ng> STRP;
46 typede f l i s t <SearchResul t ⇤> SRLIST ;
47 typede f l i s t <ResultItem ⇤> RILIST ;
48 typede f l i s t <XmlMarshalable ⇤> XMLMLIST;
49
50 s t a t i c unsigned i n t graphSize ;
51 s t a t i c i n t mdNode ;
52 s t a t i c i n t mdLink ;
53
54 s t a t i c void usage ( const char ⇤name)
55 {
56 c e r r << ”Usage : ” << name << ” <nodes> <metadata per node> ”
57 ”<metadata per l ink> ” INDEPENDENT USAGE STRING << endl ;
58 }
59
60 #de f i n e f o r a l l i d e n t s ( va lue ) f o r ( ( va lue ) = 0 ; ( unsigned i n t ) ( va lue ) <
graphSize ; ( va lue )++)
61
62 s t a t i c void c r e a t eSub s c r i p t i o n s ( I d e n t i f i e r ⇤⇤ idents , SSRC ⇤ s s r c )
63 {
64 i n t i ;
65 Subscr ibeRequest ⇤ s r ;
66 l i s t <Subscr ibeElement ⇤> l i s t ;
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67
68 f o r a l l i d e n t s ( i ) {
69 s t r i ng s t r eam s s ;
70 s s << ” sub id en t ” << i ;
71 l i s t . push back ( Requests : : c reateSubscr ibeUpdate (
72 s s . s t r ( ) ,
73 ”meta : r o l e ” ,
74 graphSize   1 ,
75 ”meta : r o l e ” ,
76 SEARCH NO MAX RESULT SIZE,
77 i d en t s [ i ] >c l one ( ) ) ) ;
78 }
79
80 s r = Requests : : c reateSubscr ibeReq ( l i s t ) ;
81 sr >addXmlNamespaceDefinition (TCG META NSPAIR) ;
82 s s r c >sub s c r i b e ( s r ) ;
83 de l e t e s r ;
84 }
85
86 s t a t i c void publishMetaOnNodes ( I d e n t i f i e r ⇤⇤ idents , SSRC ⇤ s s r c )
87 {
88 i n t i ;
89 Publ ishRequest ⇤pr ;
90
91 i f (mdNode <= 0)
92 r e turn ;
93
94 f o r a l l i d e n t s ( i ) {
95 XMLMLIST l i s t ;
96 f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j < mdNode ; j++) {
97 s t r i ng s t r eam s s ;
98 s s << ” r o l e ” << j << ” o n i d e n t i f i e r ” << i ;
99 l i s t . push back (Metadata : : c r ea teRo l e ( s s . s t r ( ) ) ) ;
100 }
101 pr = Requests : : c reatePubl i shReq (
102 Requests : : createPubl i shUpdate ( l i s t , i d en t s [ i ] >c l one ( ) ) ) ;
103 pr >addXmlNamespaceDefinition (TCG META NSPAIR) ;
104 s s r c >pub l i sh ( pr ) ;






109 s t a t i c void publ i shLink ( I d e n t i f i e r ⇤ i1 , I d e n t i f i e r ⇤ i2 , SSRC ⇤ s s r c )
110 {
111 XMLMLIST l i s t ;
112 Publ ishRequest ⇤pr ;
113 XmlMarshalable ⇤md = Metadata : : c r ea t eRo l e ( ”some r o l e ” ) ;
114
115 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < mdLink ; i++)
116 l i s t . push back (md >c l one ( ) ) ;
117
118 pr = Requests : : c reatePubl i shReq ( Requests : : c reatePubl i shUpdate (
119 l i s t , i1 >c l one ( ) , i2 >c l one ( ) ) ) ;
120
121 pr >addXmlNamespaceDefinition (TCG META NSPAIR) ;
122 s s r c >pub l i sh ( pr ) ;
123 de l e t e pr ;




128 s t a t i c i n t getCountOfMetadata (RILIST r i l i s t )
129 {
130 i n t r e t = 0 ;
131 RILIST : : i t e r a t o r s t a r t = r i l i s t . begin ( ) ;
132 RILIST : : i t e r a t o r end = r i l i s t . end ( ) ;
133
134 f o r ( ; s t a r t != end ; s t a r t++)
135 r e t += (⇤ s t a r t ) >getMetadata ( ) . s i z e ( ) ;
136
137 r e turn r e t ;
138 }
139
140 s t a t i c i n t getCountOfMetadata (SRLIST l i s t )
141 {
142 SRLIST : : i t e r a t o r s t a r t = l i s t . begin ( ) ;
143 SRLIST : : i t e r a t o r end = l i s t . end ( ) ;
144 i n t r e t = 0 ;
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145
146 f o r ( ; s t a r t != end ; s t a r t++)
147 r e t += getCountOfMetadata ( (⇤ s t a r t ) >getResu l t I t ems ( ) ) ;
148
149 r e turn r e t ;
150 }
151
152 s t a t i c i n t getCountOfMetadata ( Po l lRe su l t ⇤ pres )
153 {
154 i n t r e t = 0 ;
155 i f ( pres >ge tEr ro rResu l t s ( ) . s i z e ( ) > 0) {
156 l i s t <ErrorResu l t ⇤> : : c o n s t i t e r a t o r i t = pres >ge tEr ro rResu l t s ( ) . begin
( ) ;
157 l i s t <ErrorResu l t ⇤> : : c o n s t i t e r a t o r end = pres >ge tEr ro rResu l t s ( ) . end ( )
;
158 f o r (/⇤ ⇤/ ; i t != end ; i t++) {
159 c e r r << ⇤⇤ i t << endl ;
160 }
161 }
162 r e t += getCountOfMetadata ( pres >getSearchResu l t s ( ) ) ;
163 r e t += getCountOfMetadata ( pres >getUpdateResults ( ) ) ;
164 r e t += getCountOfMetadata ( pres >ge tDe l e t eRe su l t s ( ) ) ;
165 r e t += getCountOfMetadata ( pres >ge tNot i f yResu l t s ( ) ) ;
166
167 r e turn r e t ;
168 }
169
170 s t a t i c void publishCompleteGraph ( I d e n t i f i e r ⇤⇤ idents , SSRC ⇤ s s r c , ARC ⇤ arc )
171 {
172 Po l lRe su l t ⇤ pres ;
173 i n t i , j , count , expected ;
174 f o r a l l i d e n t s ( i ) {
175 f o r a l l i d e n t s ( j ) {
176 i f ( j <= i )
177 cont inue ;
178 cout << ” . ” ;
179 cout . f l u s h ( ) ;
180
181 publ i shLink ( i d en t s [ i ] , i d en t s [ j ] , s s r c ) ;
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182 pres = arc >p o l l ( ) ;
183
184 count = getCountOfMetadata ( pres ) ;
185
186 i f ( i == 0)
187 expected = 4 ⇤ j ⇤ (mdNode + mdLink ) ;
188 e l s e
189 expected = 2 ⇤ graphSize ⇤ mdLink ;
190
191 i f ( count != expected ) {
192 i f ( count /2 != expected ) {
193 c e r r << ”Unexpected metadata count ” ;
194 c e r r << ” i=” << i << ” j=” << j ;
195 c e r r << ” count=” << count ;
196 c e r r << ” expected=” << expected << endl ;
197 } e l s e {
198 c e r r <<’’Unexpected metadata count ’ ’ ;
199 c e r r <<’’Use standard performance guest f o r standard MAPS only ;
200 c e r r <<’’ count= ’ ’ << count ;
201 cer r <<’’ matches standard MAPS va lue s but not t r u s t va lue ! ’ ’ <<
endl ;
202 }




207 de l e t e pres ;
208 }




213 s t a t i c void checkF i r s tSearchResu l t (ARC ⇤ arc )
214 {
215 Po l lRe su l t ⇤ pres = arc >p o l l ( ) ;
216 i n t count ;
217
218 i f ( pres >getSearchResu l t s ( ) . s i z e ( ) != graphSize && pres >
ge tSearchResu l t s ( ) . s i z e ( ) ⇤2 != graphSize )
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219 c e r r << ”Unexpected SearchResu l t s ” << endl ;
220
221 count = getCountOfMetadata ( pres ) ;
222
223 i f ( pres >getUpdateResults ( ) . s i z e ( ) > 0)
224 cout << ”Note : MAPS Returns updateResults in f i r s t p o l lRe su l t ” << endl ;
225
226 i f ( count != mdNode ⇤ ( s igned i n t ) graphSize ) {
227 c e r r << ”Unexpected SearchResu l t s Metadata ” ;
228 c e r r << ” expected= ” << mdNode ⇤ ( s igned i n t ) graphSize ;
229 c e r r << ” got=” << count << endl ;
230 }
231
232 de l e t e pres ;
233 }
234
235 i n t main ( i n t argc , char ⇤argv [ ] )
236 {
237 SSRC ⇤ s s r c = NULL;
238 ARC ⇤ arc = NULL;
239 char ⇤ur l , ⇤user , ⇤pass , ⇤ capath ;
240 i n t i ;
241 I d e n t i f i e r ⇤⇤ i d en t s ;
242
243 checkAndLoadParameters ( argc , argv , 3 , usage , &ur l , &user , &pass ,
244 &capath ) ;
245
246 s s r c = SSRC : : createSSRC ( ur l , user , pass , capath ) ;
247 arc = ss r c >getARC( ) ;
248
249 graphSize = a t o i ( argv [ 1 ] ) ;
250 mdNode = a t o i ( argv [ 2 ] ) ;
251 mdLink = a t o i ( argv [ 3 ] ) ;
252
253 i d en t s = new I d e n t i f i e r ⇤ [ graphSize ] ;
254
255 f o r a l l i d e n t s ( i ) {
256 s t r i ng s t r eam s s ;
257 s s << ” u s e r ” << i ;
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258 i d en t s [ i ] = I d e n t i f i e r s : : c r e a t e I d e n t i t y ( username , s s . s t r ( ) , use r ) ;
259 }
260
261 t ry {
262 s s r c >newSess ion ( ) ;
263 c r e a t eSub s c r i p t i o n s ( idents , s s r c ) ;
264 publishMetaOnNodes ( idents , s s r c ) ;
265 checkF i r s tSearchResu l t ( arc ) ;
266
267 publishCompleteGraph ( idents , s s r c , arc ) ;
268 // getchar ( ) ;
269
270 s s r c >endSess ion ( ) ;
271 } catch (XmlCommunicationError e ) {
272 c e r r << e << endl ;
273 } catch ( ErrorResu l t e ) {
274 c e r r << e << endl ;
275 }
276
277 f o r a l l i d e n t s ( i )
278 de l e t e i d en t s [ i ] ;
279
280 de l e t e i d en t s ;
281 de l e t e s s r c ;
282 de l e t e arc ;
283 }
Listing 7.2: Source of perf-complete-graph, based on [175].
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